Competition and Regulation in the Stock Markets by Pozen, Robert
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 73 Issue 2 
1974 
Competition and Regulation in the Stock Markets 
Robert Pozen 
New York University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert Pozen, Competition and Regulation in the Stock Markets, 73 MICH. L. REV. 317 (1974). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol73/iss2/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
COMPETITION AND REGULATION 
IN THE STOCK MARKETS 
Robert Pozen 
I. CURRENT A'ITEMPTs To REcoNcILE TIIE ANTITRUST LAws 
WITH THE 1934 Acr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323 
A. The Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324 
I. Choice of Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325 
a. SRO actions not subject to SEC oversight . . . . 325 
b. SRO actions subject to SEC oversight . . . . . . . 331 
c. SRO actions directed by the SEC . . . . . . . . . . . 335 
2. The Substantive Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338 
a. The Silver Test for antitrust courts . . . . . . . . 338 
b. The substantive standard for judicial review 340 
B. The Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 
1. Choice of Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 
2. The Substantive Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344 
II. AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO TRANSACTIONAL SERVICES • . • 346 
A. The Development of a New Substantive Test . . . . . 346 
1. The Stock Market as a Service Industry . . . . . . . -346 
2. Perfect Competition and the Revised Silver Test 350 
3. The Revised Silver Test in the Real World of 
Stock Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354 
a. Market imperfections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354 
b. Distributional concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356 
B. Procedures for the Revised Silver Test . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 
I. Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 
2. Administrative Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361 
3. Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 
III. APPLICATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE .APPROACH TO SELECTED 
REGULATORY DECISIONS • • • . • . • . • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • . • • • • 368 
A. Fixed Commission Rates and the Gordon Case . . . . 369 
1. The Second Circuit's Approach to Gordon . . . . . 370 
2. An Alternative Approach to Gordon . . . . . . . . . . 374 
B. The Transition from Negotiated Rates to the Cen-
tral Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378 
I. The Third-Market Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379 
2. Institutional Membership on Exchanges . . . . . . 383 
C. The Central Communications System: A Case Study 386 
I. The Current-Approach to the Consolidated Tape 387 
2. An Alternative Approach to the Consolidated 
Tape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390 
a. Efficiency loss and administrative expense . . . 390 
b. Regulatory arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 
IV. CONCLUSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 396 
COMPETITION AND REGULATION 
IN THE STOCK MARKETS 
Robert Pozen* 
T HERE are two main types of stock markets in the United States: exchanges1 and the over-the-counter market (OTC).2 An ex-
change is a centralized marketplace in which a limited number of 
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This article incorporates legislative, administrative, and judicial developments 
through January 31, 1975. 
I. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the largest American stock exchange. 
While it lists the stocks of only one tenth of one per cent of the companies in the 
United States, the 1,399 corporations it listed in 1971 owned 38.8 per cent of the total 
assets, accounted for 43.4 per cent of the total sales or revenues, and earned 95.5 per 
cent of the total net income of all American companies. NYSE, 1974 FACT BooK 34 
[hereinafter NYSE FACT BOOK]. 
The American Stock Exchange (AMEX), also located in New York City, comple-
ments rather than competes with the NYSE. Because most of the members of the 
AMEX arc also members of the NYSE, and because the NYSE forbids its members 
to join any other exchange in New York City that trades NYSE-listed stocks, the 
AMEX is effectively prevented from competing with the NYSE. See SUBCOMM. ON 
SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES 
INDUSIRY STUDY, s. Doc. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 90-91 (1973) [hereinafter SENATE 
STUDY]. AMEX listed 1,419 issues in 1972! although each year a sigrtjficant number of 
stocks "move up" to the NYSE from the AMEX. In the five years prior to 1972, for 
e.xample, 178 issues moved from the AMEX to the NYSE. AMEX DATABOOK 20, 22 
(1973). 
In terms of number of shares and dollar volume, th<:: AMEX has traditionally rated 
second among registered exchanges. However, in 1973 the dollar volume of trading on 
the AMEX dropped precipitously to 5.9 per cent of the total exchange dollar volume. 
NYSE FACT BooK, supra, at 17. By September 1974, both the Midwest and Pacific 
Coast Stock Exchanges were recording higher dollar volume trading than the AMEX. 
33 SEC STAT. BULL. 1015 (1974). Furthermore, the over-the-counter market (OTC) share 
volume was almost double that of the AMEX in 1972, 39 SEC ANN. REP. 154 (1973), 
and in 1973 the dollar volume on the OTC for only NYS~-listed stocks was about tp.e 
same as the total AMEX dollar volume. 33 STAT. BuLL. 334, 705 (1974). 
In 1973 there were 10 active regional stock exchanges. These exchanges are listed 
below, with 1973 dollar volume and share volume in stocks. NYSE and AMEX volumes 
are listed at the bottom for comparison. · 
Stock Exchange Dollar Value Share Volume 
Boston Stock Exchange 
Cincinnati Stock Exchange 
Detroit Stock Exchange 
Midwest Stock Exchange 
National Stock Exchange 
Pacific Coast Stock Exchange 
(in thousands) 
1,792,908 . 
118,849 . 
[ 317] 
380,532 
8,131,114 
23,896 
6,315,636 
(in thous~nds) 
42,171 
2,~38 
10,676 
241,484 
7,462 
~Q6,234 
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members3 ~ade certain "listed" securities.~ In contrast, the OTC is 
Stock Exchanges 
PBW Stock Exchange 
Intermountain Stock Exchange 
Spokane Stock Exchange 
Honolulu Stock Exchange 
NYSE 
AMEX 
33 SEC STAT. BULL. 334 {1974). 
Dollar Value 
(in thousands) 
4,386,341 
996 
6,685 
1,897 
146,450,834 
10,429,640 
Share Volume 
(in thousands) 
126,991 
2,262 
13,031 
260 
4,336,581 
740,358 
In 1963 the SEC estimated that trading in NYSE- and AMEX-listcd stocks accounted 
for an average of 93 per cent of the total dollar volume of trades on the major re-
gional exchanges. In terms of share volume, the SEC estimated that trading in NYSE-
and AMEX-listcd stocks accounted for between 48 and 97 per cent of the regional 
total. SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMIS-
SION, H.R. Doc. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 930, 1084 (1963) [hereinafter SPECIAL 
STUDY]. Recent statistics show that a significant portion of the volume of NYSE-listed 
shares is now being traded on the regionals. In the first quarter of 1974, for instance, 18 
per cent of all trades in 50 selected NYSE issues was effected on regionals. 33 SEC STAT. 
BULL. 706 (1974). 
For a general discussion of how exchanges work, see SPECIAL STUDY, supra, at 5-532; 
Wolfson, Rosenblum&: Russo, The Securities Markets: An Overview, 16 HoWARD L.J. 
791, 810-21 (1971). 
2. The OTC handles about 20,000 stocks not listed on any exchange. Hearings on 
the Securities Industry Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7, at 3562 (1972} 
[hereinafter House Hearings]. However, OTC trades in NYSE-listed stocks-"third 
market" trades-have been increasing rapidly. In 1972 the third market traded 327 
million shares worth $13.6 billion. Between 1965 and 1972, third-market trades as a 
proportion of NYSE trades in the same stocks increased from 2.7 to 7.3 per cent mea-
sured by share volume and from 3.4 to 8.5 per cent measured by dollar volume. 39 
SEC ANN. REP. 157 (1973). 
For a general discussion of the OTC, see I. FRIEND, G. HoFFl\lAN &: w. WINN, THE 
OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES MARKETS (1958); SPECIAL STUDY, supra note I, at 533-796. 
3. The number of members of an exchange is limited by its constitution. See, e.g., 
NYSE Const. art. IX, § I, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE ,I 1401 (1974) (1,366 members); AMEX 
Const. art. IV, § l(a)(l), 2 CCH AMEX GumE ,I 9031 (1972); Pac. Stock Exch. Const. 
art. V, § I (1973) (220 members); Midwest Stock Exch. Const. art. II, § I (1973) (465 
members). 
Membership rights on exchanges-so-called "seats"-are traded, subject to approval 
by the governing board. For example, 158 NYSE scats were transferred in 1973; cash 
prices paid for these seats ranged from $190,000 to $72,000. The highest price paid 
for an NYSE seat since 1934 was $515,000 in 1969, while the lowest was $17,000 in 1942. 
NYSE FACT BooK, supra note I, at 59. 
4. In order to have its stock traded, a corporation must be "listed" with the ex-
change. Each exchange takes into account the number of publicly held shares available 
for trading, the value of the shares, and the earnings power or assets of the corporation 
in determining whether to list a corporation's securities. For example, the NYSE re-
quires, inter alia, that a corporation have I million publicly held shares, 2,000 or more 
holders of 100 or more shares, and that the value of the publicly held common stock 
be at least $16 million. NYSE FACT BooK, supra note 1, at 30-31. The listing require-
ments for most exchanges ·are contained in the exchange constitution or rules. See, e.g., 
MmWESr STOCK ExCH. RULE 8 (1973). Stocks listed on one exchange may be traded on 
other exchanges if "unlisted trading privileges" are extended by the SEC. SENATE 
STUDY, supra note I, at 129-33. 
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a network of telephone lines and a computerized quotation system5 
through which broker-dealers can trade in any stock.6 
Both types of stock markets are supervised by self-regulatory 
organizations (SRO's) in cooperation with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC).7 An SRO is composed of brokers8 from 
a particular stock market; its primary responsibilities are protect-
ing investors and maintaining orderly trading. Every exchange is 
an SRO for its mm marketplace,9 while the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) is the sole SRO for the over-the-counter 
market.10 The SEC has several checks on the regulatory performance 
5. Prior to 1971, the OTC was a network of telephone communications together 
with daily sheets listing the "bid" and "asked" prices for OTC stocks. On February 8, 
1971, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) initiated a centralized -and 
automated quotation system called NASDAQ, which displays up-to-the-minute quota-
tions on listed stocks at terminals in subscribers' offices. Actual transactions must still 
take place over the telephone, however. See SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 89-90. In 
1972, NASDAQ reported share volume information for the 3,500 most active OTC 
issues; volume was 2.2 billion shares. In the future, NASDAQ may report its statistics 
in terms of dollar volume. 39 SEC .ANN. REP. 55 n.9, 154 (1973). 
6. This is not true for NASDAQ: "To be eligible for inclusion in NASDAQ, a 
security must meet the requirements for registration under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (i.e., it must be issued by a company with at least $1,000,000 in assets and 
500 shareholders), and must have at least two dealers making a market in it. To enter 
quotes for a security in NASDAQ, a dealer must register as a market maker (with 
NASD) •••• " SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 90 n.5. 
7. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 1, pt. 4, ch. XII, at 495-957; Jennings, Self-Regulation 
in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 
LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 663, 667-77 (1964). 
The two-tiered SEC-SRO regulatory system is often referred to as "cooperative 
regulation," a term first introduced in 1938. SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 144; 
SUBCOM?>I. ON CO?,tMERCE AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, H.R. REP. No. 92-1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 
79-116 (1972) [hereinafter HOUSE STUDY]. 
8. For purposes of this article, the term "brokers" includes broker-dealers. 
9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1970), empowers the 
SEC to register securities exchanges if they meet certain standards for self-regulatory 
activities. Under section 5 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1970), an exchange must 
be registered for a broker-dealer legally to trade on it, unless the SEC exempts the 
exchange from registration because of limited trading volume. Thirteen exchanges 
were registered with the SEC in mid-1973. Eleven registered exchanges, plus one ex-
empted exchange (the Honolulu exchange), are listed in note 1 supra. The other two 
registered exchanges are the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange, neither of which actively trades common stocks. 39 SEC ANN. REP. 10, 51, 
154 (1973). 
10. The NASD is the only registered "national securities association" under Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1970). Section 15A does not 
require a single SRO for the OTC market, but the NASD is the only one that came 
into existence. The NASD is a voluntary association, which, as of June 1973, had 3,884 
members. 39 SEC ANN. REP. 54, 61, 63 n.23 (1973). 
Any broker-dealer who trades in the OTC and is not an NASD member must be 
subject to direct regulation by the SEC under section 15 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 780 (1970). Those broker-dealers who do not join the NASD are referred to as SECO 
broker-dealers, a label derived from the additional forms that they must file with the 
SEC. As of June 1973, there were 276 SEGO broker-dealers. 39 SEC ANN. REP. 61 (1973). 
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of SRO's. All SRO's must file registration statements with the SEC, 
which can deregister SRO's on certain grounds.11 The SEC is given 
considerable power to alter or supplement exchange rules;12 new 
rules13 and disciplinary decisions14 of the NASD are subject to review 
·by the Commission. The SEC is also authorized to make rules di-
11. The use of any facility of an unregistered e.xchange to effect a securities trans-
action is Hlegal. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1970). The SEC 
may deregister an exchange "if the Commission finds that such e.xchange has violated 
any provision of this title or of the rules and regulations thereunder or has failed to 
enforce, so far as is within its power, compliance therewith by a member or by an 
issuer of a security registered thereon.'' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(a)(l), 
15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(l) (1970). The SEC has used this authority only once, See San 
Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967). 
12. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C, § 78s(b) (1970), empowers 
the SEC to alter or supplement exchange rules 
in respect of such matters as (I) safeguards in respect of the financial responsibility 
of members and adequate provision against the evasion of financial responsibility 
through the use of corporate forms or special partnerships; (2) the limitation or 
prohibition of the registration or trading in any security withm a specified period 
after the issuance or primary distribution thereof; (3) the listing or striking from 
listing of any security; (4) hours of trading; (5) the manner, method, and place of 
soliciting business; (6) fictitious or numbered accounts; (7) the time and method 
of making settlements, payments, and deliveries and of closing accounts; (8) the 
reporting of transactions on the exchange and upon tickers maintained by or with 
the consent of the exchange, including the method of reporting short sales, stopped 
sales, sales of securities of issuers in default, bankruptcy or receivership, and sales 
involving other special circumstances; (9) the fixin~ of reasonable rates of com• 
mission, interest, listing, and other charges; (10) mmimum units of trading: (11) 
odd-lot purchases and sales; (12) minimum deposits on margin accounts; and (13) 
similar matters. 
By way of comparison, under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(k)(2), 15 U.S.C, 
§ 78o-3(k)(2) (1970), the SEC may alter or supplement NASD rules in four procedural 
areas: 
(A) the basis for, and procedure in connection with, the denial of membership or 
the barring from being associated with a member or the disciplining of members 
or persons associated with members, or the qualifications required for members or 
natural persons associated with members or any class thereof. 
(B) the method for adoption of any change in or addition to the rules of the 
association. 
(C) the method of choosing officers and directors, 
(D) affiliation between registered securities associations. 
The SEC is also empowered under section 15A(l) to abrogate any rule of the NASD 
if such action "is necessary or appropriate to assure fair dealing by the members of 
such association, to assure a fair representation of its members in the administration 
of its affairs or othenvise to protect investors or effectuate the purposes of this chapter." 
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(j) (1970), requires 
the NASD to file "any changes in or additions to" its rules with the SEC before such 
changes or additions become effective, and the SEC is empowered to disapprove any 
such changes or additions within 30 days after the new rule is proposed. By compari-
son, exchanges need only provide the SEC with rule changes "forthwith upon their 
adoption." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(4) (1970). The 
SEC has no "approval" power over new exchange rules as such. It may require that 
new rules be altered or supplemented, but only if the rules fall into one of tl1e sub• 
stantive categories enumerated in section 19(b). See note 12 supra. 
14. NASD disciplinary proceedings are subject to review by the SEC, either upon 
the Commission's own motion or upon application of an aggrieved party. Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g) (1970). The SEC has no com• 
parable power over exchange disciplinary proceedings, 
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rectly for all stock markets on designated topics, such as market 
manipulation.15 
Within the next decade, this regulatory framework, as well as 
the economic structure of American stock markets, will change dra-
matically. After years of minimum commission rates fixed by the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the SEC has slated the start of 
negotiated public rates for mid-1975.16 While stock trading is now 
fragmented into multiple markets,17 the SEC has promulgated a 
blueprint for a central market utilizing advanced computer tech-
nology.18 In its past session, the Senate approved major securities 
legislation, which has a high probability of passage in the next Con-
gress.19 For the first time in over a decade, the Supreme Court has 
agreed to review an antitrust claim against a stock exchange.20 
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § IO, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970). 
16. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11073 (Oct. 24, 1974), [Current] CCH 
FED. SEC. L. REP. ,I 79,991. (Proposed rule 19b-3, which requires all exchanges to elim-
inate fixed commissions by May I, 1975); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
11203 (Jan. 23, 1975), [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,J 80,067. Fixed commission 
rates on that portion of orders above $300,000 have already been eliminated. 39 SEC 
ANN. REP. 7 (1973). Both the NYSE and the AMEX have experimentally gone to nego-
tiated commissions on transactions below $2,000. See NYSE Moves One Step Closer to 
Elimination of Fixed Rates, BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 239, at A-4 (Feb. 13, 1974); 
AMEX Follows NYSE Lead; No Fixed Rates on Small Orders, BNA SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. No. 240, at A-9 (Feb. 20, 1974). For a critique of the fixed commission system, 
see Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. 
REv. 675 (1970). 
17. Except for the complementary relationship between the l\TYSE and the AMEX, 
see note I supra, all of the exchanges and part of the OTC trade largely the same 
stocks, but the NYSE, the regionals, and the OTC are separate markets in terms of 
information and transaction flow. See SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 57-58. 
18. See, e.g., SEC, Policy Statement on a Central Market System (March 29, 1973) 
[hereinafter SEC Policy Statement]; Statement of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission on the Future of the Securities Markets, in [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH 
FED. SEc. L. REP. ,I 74,811, at 65,612 (Feb. 2, 1972) [hereinafter SEC Statement on 
Future Market Structure]. · 
19. In the second session of the Ninety-third Congress, the Senate passed The 
National Market System Act of 1974, S. 2519; The Stockholders Investment Act of 
1973, S. 2842; and The Securities Processing Act of 1973, S. 2058. See also An Act To 
Amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, S. 470, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). S. 2519, 
S. 470, and S. 2058 have since been incorporated into Securities Acts Amendments of 
1975, S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). (All citations to proposed legislation in this 
article will be to S. 249, unless otherwise indicated.) 
The House had before it an omnibus bill that included most of the areas covered 
by the Senate legislation. See The Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1973, H.R. 
5050, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Although this bill was passed by the House Com-
merce Committee by a vote of thirty-nine to one, it did not receive a rule from the 
House Rules Committee in two attempts during the lameduck session. The first nega-
tive vote of the Rules Committee was attributed to intense lobbying by the stock 
exchanges and the Securities Investors· Association, as well as- reluctance to pass major 
legislation in a lameduck session. Wall St. J., Nov. 27, 1974, at 2, cols. 2-3 (midwest ed.). 
The second vote of the Rules Committee, a tie, was attributed to the inability of the 
committee chairman to bring the issue to a vote in the early afternoon, and to the 
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This article analyzes the proposed stock market reforms in light 
of the inherent tension between two important governmental func-
tions-promotion of a competitive economy under the antitrust 
laws21 and regulation of stock transactions under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.22 Conflicts between these two public policies 
are often difficult to resolve. For example, suppose an exchange has 
only one specialist in a certain stock and rejects a second on the 
ground of inadequate capitalization.23 This would reduce the poten-
tial for competitive bids on orders for the stock and give rise to a 
colorable antitrust claim. Yet the exchange's decision might be a 
justifiable attempt to solve the chronic problems caused by under-
capitalized specialists. 
Part I of this article suggests that the courts have not satisfactorily 
resolved the tension benveen competition and regulation in the 
stock markets, and that the proposed legislation would in fact ag-
gravate that tension. Part II uses an econ~mic model of stock trans-
actions to derive an alternative approach for reconciling competitive 
and regulatory considerations. Part III applies this approach to sev-
eral key governmental decisions in the transition from fixed com-
mission rates to the central market system.24 
dental appointment of one key representative. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1974, at 61, cols. 7-8, 
66, cols. 2-5 (city ed.). H.R. 5050 has been reintroduced in the current Congress as 
H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). It is given an e.xcellent chance of passage in this 
session because Congress is significantly more liberal. See Remarks pf Rep. John E. 
Moss (D-Cal.), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance 
(which sponsored the securities legislation), reported in BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP, No. 
279, at AA-~, -2 (Nov. 27, 1974). 
For a general overview of the proposed legislation, see Painter, An Analysis of 
Recent Proposals for Reform of Federal Securities Legislation, 71 MICH, L. R.Ev. 1576 
(1973). 
20. Gordon v. NYSE, 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L,W. 3290 (U.S. 
Nov. 19, 1974) (No. 74-304). See text at notes 329-73 infra. 
21. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12·27, 
44 (1970). 
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970). 
23. Originally the NYSE had multiple specialists in single stocks, but the last com-
peting specialist vanished in 1967, and one subsequent application for a competing 
position was denied. SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 122. The SEC has recognized that 
a specialist's capitalization is an important factor in determining his ability to stabilize 
the market. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note I, pt. 2, at 168, 170. 
24. This article makes no attempt to cover such areas as the bond, commodities, 
or international securities markets. On the bond market, see TREASURY-FEDERAL RE-
SERVE STUDY oF THE GOVERNMENT SECURITIES MARKET, pt. 1 (1959); The Municipal Se-
curities Act of 1973, S. 2474, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. On the commodities market, see The 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No, 93-463, 88 Stat. 
1389. On the international securities market, see Cohen, Toward An International 
Securities Market, 5 I.Aw&: POLICY IN INTL. Bus. 357 (1973). 
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I. CURRENT ATTEMPTS To REcoNCILE THE ANTITRUST LAws 
WITH THE 1934 ACT 
In resolving conflicts between competition and regulation in the 
stock markets, the courts and Congress have used the antitrust laws 
and the 1934 Act as proxies for opposing policies.25 Such conflicts 
have been approached as jurisdictional disputes26 involving two main 
questions. One is procedural: In what forum are these conflicts to be 
resolved-the antitrust courts27 or the SEC? The other is substantive: 
What standard should be employed in each forum-that of the 
antitrust laws or the 1934 Act? Since these questions have been an-
swered inconsistently with regard to the stock markets,28 as well as 
other regulated industries,29 a jurisdictional approach may not be · 
the best way to reconcile competitive and regulatory policies. 
25. See SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 233-40; HOUSE STUDY, supra note 7, at 160-64. 
26. Commentators have usually labeled all facets of this issue as questions of pri-
mary jurisdiction. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 16, at 685. But primary jurisdiction 
comes into play only where a federal agency has concurrent jurisdiction over an action 
brought in federal court, and the court finds, for reasons of law or policy, that it 
should defer to the agency in the first instance. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LA.w 
'TREATISE § 19.01 (1958). Moreover, the courts have often eschewed the label of pri-
mary jurisdiction in dealing with conflicts between antitrust laws and the 1934 Act. 
See, e.g., Gordon v. NYSE, 498 F.2d 1303, 1309 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 
3290 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1974) (No. 74-304); Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 433 F.2d 264, 275 
(7th Cir. 1970). 
27. "Antitrust courts" are synonymous with federal district courts in this context. 
28. Compare Note, Primary Jurisdiction in Antitrust Action Against the New York 
Stock Exchange: Immunization and Expertise, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 544 (primary jurisdic-
tion in agency), with Comment, An Approach for Reconciling Antitrust Law and 
Securities Law: The Antitrust Immunity of the Securities Industry Reconsidered, 65 
Nw. U. L. REv. 260 (1970) (primary responsibility with courts). For a variety of proce-
dural and substantive approaches, see Baxter, supra note 16; Note, Antitrust and the 
Securities Industry: Lessons from the Shipping Industry, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 96 (1969); 
Note, Antitrust Laws and the Securities Exchanges; 66 Nw. U. -L. · REv; 100 (1971); 
Note, Antitrust and the Stock Exchange: Minimum Commission or Free Competition?, 
18 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1965); Note, The New York Stock Exchange Minimum Commis-
sion Rate Structure: Antitrust on Wall Street, 55 VA. L. REv. 661 (1969). For a 
recognition of the diversity of possible procedural and substantive approaches, see 
Note, Fixed Brokerage Commissions: An Antitrust Analysis After the Introduction of 
Competitive Rates on Trades Exceeding $500,000, 85 HARv. L. REv. 794 (1972). 
29. Cases involving other regulated industries do not provide a clear-cut guide for 
the securities industry. The Supreme Court tends to deal with each industry as a 
unique entity with respect to issues of primary jurisdiction. See United States v. 
Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (Comptroller of the Currency); Pan Am. 
World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (CAB); California v. FPC, 369 
U.S. 402 (1962); United States v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (FCC); Fed-
eral Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen, 356 U.S. 481 (1957); Far East Conference v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) .. 
Commentators also have not reached a consensus on the applicability of primary 
jurisdiction to other regulated industries. Compare Schwartz, Legal Restriction of 
Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 
67 HARV. L. REv. 436 (1954) (recommending that the courts retain primary jurisdiction 
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A. The Courts 
In the seminal case of Silver v. NYSE,30 decided by the Supreme 
Court in 1963, a nonmember broker sued the NYSE under the 
Sherman Act after it ordered the discontinuance of his wire connec-
tions with the offices of NYSE members without notice, explanation, 
or a hearing. The Court held that the antitrust court should adjudi-
cate Silver's claim without prior consideration by the SEC, on the 
ground that the SEC lacked jurisdiction.31 Noting that the 1934 Act 
contains no explicit antitrust exemption for exchanges,32 the Court 
laid down a substantive test for reconciling antitrust laws with secu-
rities regulation: "Repeal [ of the antitrust laws] is to be regarded as 
implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, 
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary."33 Applying 
this test to Silver's claim, the Court held that no policy of the 1934 
Act 'Was served by severing his wire connections without notice or 
hearing,34 and therefore the Exchange had acted in violation of the 
Sherman Act.35 
The Silver case raises more questions than it answers. In a foot-
note, the Court explicitly reserved decision on the appropriate forum 
for reconciling the antitrust laws with the 1934 Act where the dispute 
is subject to "Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial re-
view.''36 Moreover, since the Court decided only that the Exchange 
should give Silver a hearing, the decision says little about the extent 
of antitrust immunity afforded by the 1934 Act. Lacking guidance 
from the Supreme Court, lower courts have split on both the pro-
cedural and substantive questions in cases involving the stock mar-
kets. 
over antitrust policies), with Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: 
A Reevaluation, 6'1 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1954), and Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, '1'1 
HARv. L. REv. 1037 (1964) (both Jaffe articles favor agency primary jurisdiction, the 
latter more clearly). See also Kenstenbaum, Primary J11risdiction To Decide Antitrust 
Jurisdiction: A Practical Approach to the Allocation of Functions, 55 GEO. L.J. 
812 (1967); von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Reg11lated Industries: The Doctrine 
of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARV. L. REv. 929 (1954). 
30. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). 
31. 373 U.S. at 357-58. According to the Court, the SEC lacked jurisdiction because 
the dispute involved the application of an exchange rule rather than the validity of 
the rule itself. 
32. 3'13 U.S. at 357. 
33. 373 U.S. at 357. 
34. 3'73 U.S. at 361. 
35. 3'73 U.S. at 365. 
36. 3'13 U.S. at 358 n.12. 
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I. Choice of Forum 
Courts have generally chosen benveen two forums for resolving 
conflicts benveen the antitrust laws and the 1934 Act.37 One alterna-
tive is original federal district court jurisdiction over an antitrust 
suit against an SRO;38 the other is exclusive SEC jurisdiction, subject 
to judicial review under the "substantial evidence" test.39 In choosing 
benveen these forums, the judiciary has focused on the level of super-
vision exercised by the SEC over the particular SRO action at issue. 
On the lowest level are SRO actions not subject to SEC oversight: 
Original jurisdiction lies in the antitrust courts under Silver. On the 
intermediate level are SRO actions subject to SEC approval: Con-
flicting precedents tend toward initial deference to the SEC, followed 
by judicial review of the SEC decision. On the final level are SRO 
actions mandated by the SEC, a problem now before the courts for 
the first time. 
a. SRO actions not subject to SEC oversight. While Silver upheld 
original federal court jurisdiction over an antitrust claim that was 
presumed beyond the scope of SEC oversight,40 the Court explicitly 
37. The approaches described in the text below are the only two that have been 
seriously considered by the courts, although other possibilities exist in theory. See 
Note, 85 HARV. L. R.Ev. 794, supra note 32, at 821-25 (suggesting at least five procedures 
for resolving conflicts). 
38. See, e.g., Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970). 
39. See, e.g., Gordon v. NYSE, 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 
3290 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1974) (No. 74-304). Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 25(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 78y(a) (1970), provides for the scope of judicial review of SEC actions: "The 
findings of the Commission as, to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall 
be conclusive." Under the substantial evidence test, the reviewing court must defer 
to the SEC's factual determinations and interpretation of its broad statutory mandate, 
and may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. See 4 K. DAVIS, mpra 
note 26, §§ 29, 30. 
Judicial review in cases without a formal record of adjudication may be obtained 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, rather than under the 1934 Act. See text at 
notes 65-67 infra. In such cases, there may be a standard of judicial review other than 
substantial evidence, such as abuse of discretion. See Administrative Procedure Act 
§ IO{e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). 
40. The Court stated: 
Although the Act gives to the Securities and Exchange Commission the power to 
request exchanges to make changes in their rules •.• , and impliedly, therefore, 
to disapprove any rules adopted by an exchange .•• , it does not give the Com-
mission jurisdiction to review particular instances of enforcement of exchange 
rules .••• This aspect of the statute, for one thing, obviates any need to consider 
whether petitioners were required to resort to the Commission for relief before 
coming into court. 
373 U.S. at 357-58. 
The rule-application distinction relied upon by the Court to deny SEC jurisdiction 
has been attacked by Professor Baxter as a "sophistical" device inadequate to resolve 
the difficult question of when the jurisdiction of the SEC should be invoked. Professor 
Baxter notes that the issue of a hearing requirement in Silver could have been c.on-
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reserved decision on the appropriate forum for resolving claims 
against SRO actions subject to (1) "Commission jurisdiction" and 
(2) "ensuing judicial review."41 Since almost all SRO actions can be 
construed under the developing case law as subject to "Commission 
jurisdiction," and almost all SEC decisions are subject to "ensuing 
judicial review," Silver will rapidly become irrelevant as a procedural 
precedent. 
The scope of the phrase "Commission jurisdiction" was explored 
by analogy in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,42 the most 
important Supreme Court opinion after Silver to deal with the con-
flict between the antitrust laws and the regulation of exchanges.43 
Although the jurisdiction of the Commission over the complaint 
was dubious,44 and exercisable at the sole discretion of the Commis-
sion,45 the majority in Ricci took the position that "there is sufficient 
sidered a proper subject for the exercise of the SEC's section 19(b) power "to alter or 
supplement" exchange rules. He concludes: 
I do mean to suggest that a serious problem of primary jurisdiction was raised by 
Silver, that the Supreme Court was not persuaded that the SEC should first have 
determined the propriety of the NYSE procedures, and that the court evaded the 
primary jurisdiction question by means of a sophistical distinction. Since the issue 
did not receive serious consideration in Silver, it would be foolhardy to assume that 
the Court will necessarily adhere to the rule-versus-adjudication distinction if the 
fixed commission question comes before the Supreme Court in an antitrust context, 
Baxter, supra note 16, at 687-88. 
41. Were there Commission jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review for scru-
tiny of a particular exchange ruling, as there is ••• to examine disciplinary action 
by a registered securities association (i.e., by the NASD) • • • , a different case 
would arise concerning exemption from the operation of laws designed to prevent 
anti-competitive activity, an issue we do not decide today. 
373 U.S. at 358 n.12. 
42. 409 U.S. 289 (1973). The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (C:ME) is a commodities 
market somewhat similar in structure and function to the NYSE. Like the NYSE, the 
CME and its members are subject to governmental regulation. The CME is subject to 
the supervision of the Commodity Exchange Commission pursuant to the Commodity 
Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ l-17b (1970). The Commodity Exchange Commission, 
created only two years after the SEC, parallels the SEC in some respects, but its regu-
latory power was formerly much narrower. On October 23, 1974, new legislation broad• 
ening the powers of the Commodity Exchange Commission was enacted. See Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389; President 
Ford Signs Commodity Futures Trading Commission Bill, BNA SEC. REG, &: L. REP. 
No. 275, at A-3 (Oct. 30, 1974). 
The plaintiff in Ricci alleged that the transfer of his membership was a violation 
of CME rules, and, therefore, a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act and an 
"unlawful conspiracy aimed at restraining" competition in violation of the antitrust 
laws. 409 U.S. at 290-91. 
43. The Supreme Court also decided Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 
113 (1973), which closely follows Ricci, and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &: Smith v. 
Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973), involving the relationship of the 1934 Act to certain state 
laws on employment agreements and restraint of trade. 
44. 409 U.S. at 309-21 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas, Stewart &: Powell, JJ., 
dissenting). 
45. Justice Marshall noted that the Commodity Exchange Commission (CEC) "may" 
order the Exchange to enforce its own rules pursuant to the Commodity Exchange 
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statutory support for administrative authority in this area that the 
agency should at least be requested to institute proceeding-s."46 If 
"Commission jurisdiction" is thus equated with an arguable poten-
tial for SEC oversight,47 it encompasses almost all antitrust claims 
against SRO's. For instance, as to the content of SRO rules, the SEC 
can disapprove any new rule of the NASD,48 abrogate existing NASD 
rules in four procedural areas,49 and effectively change NASD rules 
by imposing new "interpretations."50 The SEC can alter or supple-
ment exchange rules in twelve areas and with respect to "similar 
matters," which arguably cover most aspects of SRO activity.51 It 
Act (Act), but the Act does not require the CEC to issue such an order at the instance 
of the plaintiff. Indeed, the Act expressly permits the CEC to ignore "minor viola-
tions.'' 409 U.S. at 310-11 (dissenting opinion). 
46. 409 U.S. at 304. 
47. The concept of potential oversight as a ground for deferring to the agency is 
consonant with some recent lower court decisions. In Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance 
Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972), the court 
held that insurance rates are immune from antitrust attack if the state generally 
regulates the insurance business, even though specific rates could go into effect without 
state approval and the state's regulatory scheme is not enforced. In Washington Gas 
Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. &: Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971), the court held 
that state regulation of electric power rates cloaks the activities of electric power 
companies with antitrust immunity, even though there has been "administrative 
silence" with respect to the challenged scheme. For a critique of the Washington 
Gas Light case, see 85 HARv. L. REv. 670, 670-74 (1972). 
48. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3G) (1970), empowers 
the SEC to disapprove "[a]ny change in or addition to" NASD rules within 30 days 
after the new rule is proposed. See note 13 supra. 
49. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(k), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k) (1970), authorizes 
the SEC to change or abrogate NASD rules in specified areas. See note 12 supra. For 
a recent application of this authority, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
9632 CTune 7, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ~ 78,831. 
50. The imposition of new interpretations of NASD rules arises out of the SEC's 
power to review any disciplinary action taken by the NASD or any denial of member-
ship in the NASD. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15A(g), (h), 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78o-3(g), (h) (1970). In SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9632, supra note 
49, the SEC, in reviewing a NASD disciplinary action, held that the Association "im-
properly construed and applied" its own rule, and ordered the NASD to promulgate 
an interpretation of the rule consistent with the SEC's view. Id. at 81,825. The SEC 
reviewed a similar disciplinary proceeding in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 10643 (Feb. 14, 1974), and held that the NASD had "no authority" after the 
earlier disciplinary review to enforce its rules in disregard of the SEC interpretation. 
By so holding, the SEC affirmed its belief that disciplinary proceedings have a prospec-
tive effect on the enforcement of NASD rules. 
51. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970), empowers 
the SEC to alter or supplement exchange rules. See note 12 supra. The SEC is reluc-
tant to use its section 19(b) powers formally and has done so only four times; in only 
two of those instances has the Commission gone through a full section 19(b) proceed-
ing. For a discussion of the first two instances, see Note, Informal Bargaining Process: 
An Analysis of the SEC's Regulation of the New Yark Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L.J. 
Bll, 822-25 (1971). Within the last two years the SEC has adopted rnle 19b-2, SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 Gan. 16, 1973), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. SPE· 
cIAL REPORT No. 460 (dealing with institutional membership on exchanges), and pro-
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may replace SRO rules with its own rules in designated areas,G2 and 
has the power to deregister SRO's if their rules do not meet certain 
criteria.53 As to the administration of SRO rules, the SEC can review 
NASD disciplinary proceedings, 54 and a combination of judicial 
precedent and statute arguably gives the SEC the power to attack 
nonenforcement of SRO rules.G5 The only significant gaps in the 
posed rule 19b-3, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11073, supra note 16. 
These infrequent invocations of the SEC's regulatory power should not be interpreted 
as a sign that the SEC's oversight jurisdiction is limited. For the Commission's view 
of the expansive scope of its section 19(b) powers, see SEC Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 9950, supra, at 54-70. 
52. Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1970), the SEC 
has direct authority to prescribe rules for exchange specialists, odd-lot dealers, and 
floor traders. This direct rule-making authority supercedes exchange self-regulation. 
However, only twice has the SEC promulgated rules under section II. See Note, supra 
note 51, at 815 n.32, 819-21. Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § IO, 15 U.S.C, 
§ 78j (1970), the SEC has direct authority over short sales, stop-loss orders, and manipu-
lative devices in all stock markets. The SEC has utilized section IO in a variety of 
situations that affect SRO activities. See rules IOa-1, -2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.IOa-l, -2 
(1974) (regulating short sales); rules IOb-1 to -16, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.I0b-1 to -16 (1974) 
(covering a broad range of SRO members' activities). Cf. Jennings, supra note 7, at 
682-84. 
53. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78s-(a)(l) (1970), pro-
vides for exchange suspension; § 15A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1970), authorizes the 
SEC to suspend the NASD. The SEC has utilized this power only once, however. See 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7870 (April 22, 1966), [1964-1966 Transfer 
:Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 77,343; San Francisco Mining Exch. v. SEC, 378 F.2d 
162 (9th Cir. 1967). After the 1964 passage of provisions providing for NASD suspen-
sion, Professor Loss commented: "This new suspension authority thus reinforces the 
Commission's previous authority over association rules to perhaps a greater e.xtent 
than first meets the eye, in that it may well empower the Commission to push through 
any new rule governing the substantive conduct of members, without limitation to 
the four categories of rules in § 15A(k)(2} ••• :· 5 L. Loss, SECURlTIES REGULATION 3450 
(2d ed. rev. 1969) (emphasis original). For a discussion of SEC suspension powers over 
exchanges, see 2 id. at ll71-78 (2d ed. 1961). 
54. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15A(g), (h), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(g), (h) (1970). 
The SEC has no comparable review powers over exchange disciplinary proceedings. 
55. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 53, at II72-78; Dawidoff, The Power of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission To Require Stock Exchanges To Discipline Members, 41 
FORDHAM L. REv. 549, 559-68 (1973); Note, Exchange Liability for Net Capital Enforce• 
ment, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 1262 (1973). 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1970), requires exchanges to 
provide for the enforcement of their own rules in order to be registered with the SEC, 
In a series of cases, the courts have held that this requirement imposes upon the cX· 
changes a duty to enforce their own rules and creates a private cause of action against 
the exchanges for failing to do so, subject to several possible defenses. See Baird v. 
Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Kroese v. NYSE, 227 
F. Supp. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970), imposes liability 
upon controlling persons for violations of the securities laws by their controlled per• 
sons. See Note, The Burden of Control: Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 19!),J, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1019 (1973). In one recent case, 
a court stated that the duties of a controlling person under section 20 impose a duty 
on the exchanges to enforce their rules, although no exchange liability was found in 
that case. Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED, SEC, 
L. REP. 11 94,133 (C.D. Cal, 1973). 
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SEC's power over SRO's are in the review of new rules66 and dis-
ciplinary hearings by exchanges, 57 and in the alteration of existing 
NASD rules in substantive areas.58 
Under Ricci, therefore, antitrust courts will refuse to hear most 
claims involving SRO's prior to the conclusion of proceedings 
before the Commission.59 If the Commission takes action on a claim, 
there will generally be judicial review of its decision-the second 
branch of the Silver exception.60 The traditional route for judicial 
review of SEC decisions is section 25 of the 1~34 Act, which permits 
the federal courts of appeals to hear cases involving "an order issued 
by the Commission."61 This section clearly applies to formal adjudi-
cations by the SEC, such as Commission orders reversing disciplinary 
actions by the NASD.62 While the courts· have recently taken a nar-
row view of what constitutes a Commission order under section 25,63 
other types of SEC decisions64 will be increasingly subject to judicial 
When either of these provisions is violated or about to be violated, the SEC can 
investigate (with the power of subpoena), Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 2l(a), (b), 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a), (b) (1970), bring an action for injunctive relief in federal district 
court, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2l(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e} (1970), and suspend 
or expel SRO members and officers. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78s-(a)(3) (1970). 
56. Exchanges need only submit their rule changes to the SEC after they are 
adopted. See note 13 supra. Since the SEC can alter or supplement exchange rules, 
however, it may obtain jurisdiction over new rules once they are in force. See note 12 
supra and accompanying text. 
57. See note 14 supra. 
58. The SEC has the power to alter or supplement NASD rules in four procedural 
areas. See note 12 supra. However, the SEC can also change NASD rules to promote 
fair standards of internal governance, see note 12 supra, and can change NASD rules 
by "interpretations." See note 50 supra and accompanying text. 
59. See Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deak.tor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973) (per curiam), in 
which the Court reversed a district court's refusal to stay its proceedings on antitrust 
and Commodities Exchange Act claims until the Commodities Exchange Commission 
was given an opportunity to take some action. 
60. See text at note 41 supra. 
61. 15 u.s.c. § 78y (1970). 
62. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h) (1970), em-
powers the SEC to reverse NASD disciplinary proceedings by order. 
63. Compare Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972), with Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974). 
In Medical Committee the court held that Commission acquiescence in an SEC 
staff no-action letter permitting a corporation to exclude the petitioner's proposals 
from management's proxy materials was a reviewable order under section 25 of the 
1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1970). However, the court retreated from this broad inter-
pretation in Kixmiller, in which it held that the Commission's failure to act was not 
rcviewable under section 25. The court in Kixmiller distinguished Medical Committee 
on the ground that Kixmiller involved the Commission's "affirmance of the staff's" 
no-action letter. 492 F.2d at 644. 
64. A problem permeating SEC control of SRO action is that frequently control is 
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review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).ml For in-
stance, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held that a 
district court had jurisdiction under the AP A to review a Commis-
sion request for a change of an exchange rule.66 Similarly, the SEC 
has acquiesced in district court review under the AP A of the Com-
mission's institutional membership rule.67 
Thus, Silver is relevant procedural precedent only when the 
Commission does not have jurisdiction over the dispute68 or chooses 
not to invoke its jurisdiction.69 In either case, the antitrust court 
should assume jurisdiction over the dispute under Silver, as the 
Supreme Court made clear in a footnote to Ricci. 70 
exercised through nonreviewable informal SEC negotiations with SRO's, instead of by 
formal orders. See Note, supra note 51. Even when the SEC approves an SRO rule, it 
usually issues a letter of "non-objection," rather than a formal order reviewable under 
section 25. See SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 199-201. 
65. Administrative Procedure Act § IO(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970), provides that "final 
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to 
judicial review." 
66. Independent Broker-Dealers Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
Reversing a dismissal by the district court for lack of jurisdiction, the court of appeals 
held that section IO(c) of the APA gave the district court jurisdiction to review in-
formal but final agency determinations. The court also held that section 25 of the 
1934 Act, providing for court of appeals jurisdiction and review of Commission "or-
ders," did not preclude district court jurisdiction and review of the broader category 
of final agency action. 442 F.2d at 136-43. 
67. In PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 
U.S. 969 (1974), the court of appeals held that it had no jurisdiction under the APA 
or section 25 to review an SEC rule not promulgated as an order. In its brief for denial 
of certiorari, the SEC admitted that the petitioners could presumably obtain pre-
enforcement review of the SEC's action in the district court under the AP A. Brief 
for the SEC in Opposition to ·Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, in BNA SEC. REG. &: L. 
REP. No. 249, at F-3 (April 24, 1974). Subsequently, the PBW Exchange filed papers 
in the district court for review of the SEC rule. PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, BNA 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 252, at E-1 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 1974). Jurisdiction in the new 
suit was asserted in partial reliance upon section I0(c) of the APA. 
68. See text at notes 56-58 supra. 
69. See Jacobi v. Bache & Co., [1973-19.74 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REI•. 
1[ 94,578 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Jacobi was a class action by two former registered representa-
tives of exchange brokerage firms, alleging a conspiracy by exchange members and the 
NYSE to limit the representatives' commissions. For a period of more than a year-
between 1970 and 1971-the exchange required an add-on service charge for brokerage 
commissions on exchange transactions but e."cluded this add-on charge from the calcu-
lation of representative commissions (which were otherwise calculated on the basis of 
brokerage commission charges). The SEC approved the NYSE add-on charge but dis-
claimed "any responsibility to intervene in firms' policies concerning compensation to 
registered representatives, unless a showing were made that such intervention was nec-
essary for the protection of investors." [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. 1J 94,578 at 96,021. 
70. "[S]urely if administrative proceedings are sought in vain, there would be no 
further problem for the antitrust court." Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 
289, 304-05 n.14 (1973). Similarly, the district court in Jacobi v. Bache & Co., [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 94,578 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), assumed juris-
diction over antitrust claims because the SEC had already discJaimed any responsibility 
to intervene. 
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b. SRO actions subject to SEC oversight. Since most antitrust 
claims will involve SRO actions subject to SEC jurisdiction and 
ensuing judicial review, the lower courts will find little procedural 
guidance from the Supreme Court's opinion in Silver. They will also 
find limited assistance in Ricci if the SEC does hear the dispute. As 
Chief Justice Burger emphasized in Ricci: "The Court's opinion 
should not be read to suggest that the Commission's resolution of the 
dispute either will or ·will not foreclose subsequent application of 
the antitrust law."71 The most troublesome cases are those in which 
the SEC explicitly or tacitly approves the SRO action. 
The issue of the appropriate forum for resolving antitrust claims 
in this category was first litigated in Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers,72 
in which shareholders of certain mutual funds challenged the NYSE's 
fixed commissions. The district court granted summary judgment 
for the NYSE because the plaintiffs erroneously alleged a per se vio-
lation of the antitrust laws.73 It distinguished Silver on the ground 
that agency review was available in Kaplan, because "the SEC exer-
cises a general and continuing power to change, alter, or supplement 
the rules of the Exchange fixing the rates of commission.''74 In affirm-
ing, the Seventh Circuit noted the SEC's jurisdiction over commission 
rates and summarily concluded that antitrust recovery in such a case 
was outside the intent of Congress.75 
In Thill Securities Corp. v. NYSE,76 however, a different panel 
of the Seventh Circuit held that original jurisdiction in the antitrust 
court might be appropriate despite SEC jurisdiction over the anti-
rebate rule at issue.77 The court attempted to distinguish Ka.plan on 
71. 409 U.S. at 308 (concurring in a 5-4 decision). 
72. 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), affd., 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 954 (1967). 
73. 250 F. Supp. at 564-65. 
74. 250 F. Supp. at 566. 
75. 371 F.2d at 411. 
76. 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). 
77. The court in Thill remanded the case to the district court for a determination 
whether invocation of SEC jurisdiction was appropriate. In a concurring opinion, 
Judge Swygert made clear that the court was not deciding whether the SEC should 
be allowed to make the first decision in the case. 433 F .2d at 276. On remand, the 
district court denied a motion to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and refer 
the case to the SEC. See Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 469 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1972) (district 
court's order not appealable). 
Thill was followed by a district court in the Seventh Circuit. See Frederickson v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &: Smith, BNA SEC. REc. &: L. REP. No. 271, at D-1 
(Oct. 2, 1972). The plaintiff in Frederickson alleged that the fixed commissions used 
on various stock ex.changes violated the antitrust laws. Although the SEC has juris-
diction over fixed rates under section 19(b) of the 1934 Act, the court denied the 
defendant's motion to defer to the SEC, on the ground that the agency had sanctioned 
the alleged violations. Since the 1934 Act did not provide for an ex.press ex.emption 
from the antitrust laws, SEC approval did not oust the antitrust court's jurisdiction. 
332 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 73:317 
the grounds that the plaintiffs in Thill did not allege a per se viola-
tion of the antitrust laws, that the anti-rebate rule, unlike the fixed 
commission rule, could be used to injure particular competitors, 
and that there was no evidence that the SEC was currently exercising 
its jurisdiction over anti-rebate rules.78 However, the Thill court 
stated that even if the SEC had been exercising its supervisory power, 
the exchange would not necessarily have antitrust immunity, because 
the SEC is not required to consider the anticompetitive effects of 
exchange rules and has been historically reluctant to do so.70 
While Thill does not expressly overrule Kaplan, the two cases 
are clearly inconsistent.80 In Gordon v. NYSE,81 an antitrust attack 
on fixed commission rates, the Second Circuit followed Kaplan and 
rejected Thill to the extent that it was inconsistent.82 The Supreme 
Court has recently granted certiorari in Gordon in light of the split 
in the lower qmrts.83 
The remaining issue was an implied exemption under the antitrust laws, a question 
upon which SEC expertise was helpful but not determinative. 
78. 433 F.2d at 270-71. 
79. 433 F.2d at 271-73. 
80. The three grounds given by the Thill court for distinguishing Kaplan arc tcnu• 
ous. Under modern procedure, the type of plea should not be dispositivc of a case. 
See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (action brought 
under a per se theory but court proceeded under the rule of reason). Fixed commis-
sions were especially injurious to institutional investors (the plaintiffs in Kaplan), ancl 
were indeed the main reason behind the anti-rebate rule. See Note, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 
100, supra note 28, at 106 n.40. Finally, the SEC was as involved with the anti-rebate 
rule at the time of Thill as it had been with fixed commission rates at the time of 
Kaplan. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968), [1967-1969 
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 77,557. 
81. 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3290 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1974) 
(No. 74-304). 
82. See also Robert W. Stark, Jr., Inc. v. NYSE, 346 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), 
which follows Kaplan on the ground that the SEC had jurisdiction over exchange 
membership rules, the subject of the dispute. 
83. A similar split exists in cases dealing with antitrust attacks on NASD rules. 
Section 15A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7Bo-3 (1970), governs NASD rules and ex-
plicitly requires that the NASD constitution be designed "to remove impediments to 
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market." Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, § 15A(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8) (1970). It also provides that, "if any provision 
of this section is in conflict with any provision of any law of the United States," the 
section 15A provisions shall prevail. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(n), 15 
U.S.C. § 78o-3(n) (1970). 
The court in Hanvell v. Growth Programs, Inc., 451 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1971), re-
hearing denied, 459 F.2d 461, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972), decided that the repealer 
in section 15A was (with one exception) the equivalent to the Silver "necessity" test, 
which should therefore be applied to NASD actions. On denial of rehearing the Har-
well court made clear that if the Silver "necessity" test could not be met, "then the 
mere supervisory presence of the SEC cannot divest the courts of their power to enforce 
the antitrust laws." 459 F.2d at 462. More recently, in Haddad v. Crosby Corp., 874 
F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1973), prob. juris. noted sub nom. United States v. NASD, 4S 
U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1974) (No. 73-1701), the court came to the opposite con• 
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Neither Kaplan nor Thill provides a satisfactory procedure for 
weighing the competitive and regulatory factors affecting stock mar-
kets. 84 Original jurisdiction over SRO actions in an antitrust court 
is an excellent method of constraining anticompetitive behavior.85 
The antitrust courts are very experienced in dealing with problems 
of competition, 86 and can hand out stiff penalties87 that may deter 
unreasonable restraints on trade. They can check pressure on the 
SEC from the securities industry,88 and impede the SEC's bureau-
cratic interest in expanding its regulatory role.89 But the antitrust 
courts have little expertise in dealing with the particular problems 
of the securities industry. Also, treble damages in private antitrust 
suits may seem too harsh90 for an SRO acting under explicit or im-
clusion about antitrust immunity, although Haddad and Harwell both concerned 
open-ended investment companies regulated under both the 1940 Investment Company 
Act and the 1934 Act. The Haddad court gave implied antitrust immunity to the fund 
on the ground that the competitive standard and antitrust exemption in section 15A 
made the Silver "necessity" test irrelevant to NASD actions. 374 F.2d at 111-12. 
84. As Professor Baxter has observed, the choice of forum gives one side or the 
other the "home-court advantage." Baxter, supra note 16, at 683. 
85. Professor Schwartz proposes that "judges rather than commissioners should 
shape the large outlines of our national economic policy, where Congress has not 
stated its will;" Schwartz, supra note 29, at 473. He observes that agencies tend to 
ignore the benefits of competition, and courts tend in reviewing agency decisions to 
equate the power to regulate with -the power to sanction restraints on competition. 
He argues that an agency's technical expertise in its field is not necessarily a reason 
for allowing the agency to determine the extent of competition in that field. Professor 
Schwartz concludes that, absent explicit congressional policy to the contrary, antitrust • 
courts should decide antitrust issues, because they are more likely than agencies to 
provide an independent check on regulations that curtail competition. Schwartz, supra, 
at 471-73. But see Jaffe, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1105, supra note 29; Jaffe, 77 HARV. L. REv. 
1037, supra note 29. In his 1954 article Professor Jaffe made the same critical obser-
vations of agency "expertise" as Professor Schwartz, but disagreed with Professor 
Schwartz's conclusions. Jaffe, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1105, supra, at 1134-35. In his 1964 
article, however, Professor Jaffe declared that it was "dogmatic" to presume "that 
effective antitrust regulation must be exclusively judicial." Jaffe, 77 HARV. L. REv. 
1037, supra, at 1070. 
86. "[I]t should be remembered that the courts of the United States have over the 
years become the repository of antitrust expertise." Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 443 
F.2d 264, 273 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). See Note, 85 HARV. L. 
REv. 794, supra note 28, at 808. 
87. The antitrust laws provide for civil damages of triple the loss sustained by the 
plaintiff (treble damages) plus reasonable attorney fees. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 15 (1970). 
88. For an analysis of the way in which the NYSE influences SEC regulatory pro-
grams, see Note, supra note 51. · 
89. See generally M. CROZIER, THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENON (1964); R. LANE, 
THE REGULATION oF BusINESSMEN (1954); Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market 
Structure, and the Effects of Government Regulation, 15 J. LAw & EcoN. 151-76 (1972). 
90. For example, in Thill the claim was for $21 million in treble damages. Thill 
Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 433 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). 
A claim for actual damages of $1 billion has since been filed. Reinisch v. NYSE, 
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. ~Ec. L. REP. 1f 92,820 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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plicit approval of the SEC.91 Finally, the courts have an institutional 
stake in limiting encroachments on the judicial function; they may 
refuse to recognize implied exceptions to the antitrust laws claimed 
by regulatory agencies.92 
Conversely, SEC determination followed by judicial review under 
the substantial evidence rule93 is sensitive to regulatory considerations 
but not to competitive factors. The reviewing court can rely on the 
SEC's expertise concerning the stock markets, and require the SEC 
to present empirical data supporting its position on regulatory is-
sues.94 If the SEC has abused its discretion, the court will grant 
injunctive relief rather than impose treble damages. In formulating 
regulatory policy, however, the SEC has little antitrust expertise0t1 
and has traditionally been unreceptive to competitive concerns.00 
While courts may require the Commission to consider competitive 
Professor Baxter observes: "In both Kaplan and Thill Securities private plaintiffs 
were seeking treble damages in addition to a declaration of invalidity, and judicial 
reluctance to impose treble damages was probably responsible, at least in part, for 
the analytical inadequacies of the opinions rendered in those cases." Baxter, supra 
note 16, at 692 (footnote omitted). 
91. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), states: "Any person who shall be injured 
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may 
sue therefor in any district court of the United States ••• and shall recover threefold 
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee" (emphasis added). 
Some commentators have maintained without citation to legal authority that a 
• district court may find an antitrust violation by an SRO and not award treble dam-
ages. Baxter, supra note 16, at 692; Note, 85 HARV. L. R.Ev. 794, supra note 28, at 822. 
In an early case, the Supreme Court refused to award money damages against a com-
mon carrier for rates approved by the ICC. Keogh v. Chicago &: Nw. Ry. Co., 260 
U.S. 156 (1922) (semble). Recently, the Court in dicta has hinted at some principles 
that would allow courts to grant only prospective relief in antitrust suits. See Hanover 
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 499 (1968). In fact the Court has 
supported the award of treble damages when the defendant relied on prior precedent 
in good faith, Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 396 U.S. 13 (1969) (per curiam); when the 
plaintiff was in pari delicto with the defendant, Penna Life Muffiers, Inc. v. Inter-
national Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); and when a regulated industry went 
beyond the limits of an express antitrust exemption. Carnation Co. v. Pacific West-
bound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966). See generally P • .AREEDA, ANTITRusr ANALYSIS 
68-69 (2d ed. 1974). 
92. In cases involving several different regulated industries, the Supreme Court has 
repeated the reasoning first set out in United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 
(1939), and affirmed most concisely in United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 
U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963), that "[r]epeals of the antitrust laws by implication arc dis-
favored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust 
and regnlatory provisions." See also Federal Maritime Commn. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 
411 U.S. 726, 733 (1972), and cases cited therein; Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 857 
(1963). 
93. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
94. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 818 U.S. 80, 87-94 (1948). 
95. Note, 85 HARv. L. R.Ev. 794, supra note 28, at 822. 
96. See, e.g., SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 238; Comment, supra note 28, at 295. 
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issues,97 courts do not have much leverage if the SEC-as the sole 
fact-finder-develops a record showing such consideration.98 Also, 
since courts cannot grant money damages in reviewing administrative 
decisions,00 private parties have limited financial incentive to chal-
lenge SEC decisions, especially those involving only past anticom-
petitive activity.100 
c. SRO actions directed by the SEC. While the Justice Depart-
ment has resisted deference to agency proceedings in cases involving 
SRO actions merely approved by the SEC,101 it has agreed with the 
SEC's position that antitrust courts do not have jurisdiction over SRO 
actions directed by the Commission.102 The SEC's legal position is 
97. See Municipal Elec. Assn. v. SEC, 413 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (anticompetitive 
considerations are among the public interest factors that the SEC must consider in 
approving a merger under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act). In an analogous 
situation, the Supreme Court has recently held that the Federal Power Commission 
was required to consider "antitrust and anticompetitive issues" because this "serves 
the important function of establishing a first line of defense against those competitive 
practices that might later be the subject of antitrust proceedings." Gulf States Util. 
Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 760 (1973). 
98. Even if the SEC must take account of antitrust policies, the 1934 Act does not 
stipulate what weight it should give them. The SEC has taken the position that a 
judicial mandate to consider competition "hardly suggests • • • that the antitrust laws 
will have determinative significance ••.• " Brief for the SEC at 86, PBW Stock Exch., 
Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974) [.hereinafter 
SEC Brief]. 
Where an agency has failed to assess some factor under a broad public interest 
standard, the courts will often require nothing more than mere consideration of the 
factor. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 833-36 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
412 U.S. 908 (1973) (dictum); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 990 (1972). 
99. Jurisdiction for administrative review of SEC action may be obtained under 
section 704 of the APA or section 25 of the 1934 Act. See text at notes 61-67 supra. 
Neither of these statutory provisions permits the granting of money damages. The 
doctrine of sovereign immunity will normally prevent damage suits against the govern• 
ment absent specific statutory authorization. See generally 3 K. DAVIS, sup~a note 26, 
§ 25.01. 
100. An injured party is far more likely to pursue an antitrust remedy (with the 
possibility of treble damages and attorney fees) than to appeal an administrative de-
cision. Recently, however, attorney fees have been awarded in a few suits seeking 
review of administrative decisions. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973). 
101. See BNA SEC. REc. 8e L. REP. No. 256, at A-3 Gune 12, 1974). 
102. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust 
Division, United States Department of Justice, to Hon. Harrison A. Williams, Jr., 
Chairman of the Securities Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, Hous-
ing and Urban Affairs, Feb. 11, 1974, at 3: 
Under existing law, conduct of self-regulatory organizations or their members 
which is mandated by the Securities and Exchange Commission would be ex-
empt from the antitrust laws. The antitrust laws have long recognized a distinc-
tion between voluntary business conduct and conduct mandated by affirmative 
action of a governmental body. The latter is not private volitional action which 
would subject a self-regulatory organization or its members to antitrust liability. 
The SEC"s position was articulated in its brief in the PBW case: 
[I]t should be clear that when the Commission itself takes action or directs a 
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grounded in Parker v. Brown,103 which gave antitrust immunity to 
state officials acting within the scope of their authority.104 If a gov-
ernmental agency directs a private body to take certain action, the 
SEC argues, then the antitrust immunity of state officials extends to 
the private party.105 On policy grounds, private parties should not 
be forced to choose between violating the antitrust laws and violating 
a governmental mandate. If the private party chooses to obey the 
governmental mandate, it would be particularly unjust to impose 
the antitrust penalty of treble damages. 
The SEC's argument, however, is subject to dispute on legal 
and policy grounds. Parker is a questionable precedent for SEC 
cases because the Court in Parker, faced with a conflict between state 
regulations and federal antitrust laws, gave considerable weight to 
the desirability of retaining a state role in the economic field.100 In 
the SEC cases, of course, federalism is irrelevant. Moreover, to the 
extent that Parker is a valid precedent for SEC cases, it applies to 
only a narrow range of SEC directives.101 The cases spawned by 
Parker tend to show that antitrust immunity attaches only when the 
governmental directive itself is the source of anticompetitive activity, 
and where the government actually formulates the directive.108 The 
SEC has often issued rules that effectively direct SRO's to formulate 
self-regulatory authority to take action based upon a finding by tl1e Commission 
that its action is witllin tlle scope and purposes of tlle Securities Exchange Act, 
tllere can be no direct application of tlle antitrust laws. 
SEC Brief, supra note 98, at 87 (emphasis original). 
103. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
104. 317 U.S. at 350-51. 
105. The SEC relies on Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961): "Where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the 
result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the 
[Sherman] Act can be made out." SEC Brief, supra note 98, at 86 n.219. 
106. See Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 CoLUM. L, R.Ev. 1, 7 
(1972). Professor Handler argues tllat if Parker had gone the other way, all state regu-
lation affecting interstate commerce would be subject to antitrust attack. Therefore, 
tlle Court in Parker simply recoguized the important role state governments have in 
regulating business. For a more moderate viewpoint, see Slater, Antitrust and Govern-
mental Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U. L. R.Ev, 71 
(1974). 
107. See Posner, Parker v. Brown Revisited, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1975). Professor 
Posner argues tllat tlle exemption granted in Parker should be narrowed even further 
tllan it has been. 
108. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (1951) 
(semble); Norman's on tlle Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d IOU, 1016-18 (3d Cir. 
1971); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 508-10 (4th Cir. 1959). 
See also ABA, SUPPLEMENT TO NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GEN• 
ERAL, ANTITRUSf DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 211-12 (1968) ("In general where it has 
appeared tllat private business advisors have been the real decision makers, state 
government support has been to no avail."). 
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their own rules.100 In most such instances, antitrust violations derive 
from the particular ways in which the SRO's exercise their delegated 
authority. Even when the SEC directs an SRO to take a specific ac-
tion, the directive may be outside the ambit of Patrker because the 
SRO rather than the SEC is the real decision-maker. On several oc-
casions SRO's have bargained for positions in which the SEC has 
ultimately acquiesced through directives.110 
As a policy matter, there is little reason to distinguish between 
SEC approvals and SEC directives. If the Commission has historically 
neglected competitive factors in approving SRO actions,m it will 
probably not be moved by such factors in issuing directives.112 As 
the Commission can evade judicial reversals on review of SEC ap-
provals by building a record of antitrust deliberations, so can it 
protect itself in the review of SEC directives.113 Treble damages may 
seem too harsh for SRO actions mandated by the SEC, but the same 
applies to SRO actions approved by the Commission.114 Moreover, 
judicial emphasis on the distinction between SEC approvals and 
SEC directives would encourage recalcitrance by SRO's in adopting 
Commission suggestions. Suppose the SEC suggests a regulatory re-
striction that exchange A accepts but exchange B rejects, so that the 
Commission is obliged to issue a directive to exchange B. Exchange 
B would be granted antitrust immunity for its recalcitrance, while 
exchange A might be vulnerable to antitrust claims because of its 
cooperation.115 
In short, since SEC directives can be as anticompetitive as SEC 
approvals of SRO actions, both should be constrained by judicial 
109. For e.xample, SEC rule llb-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.llb-1(2)(v) (1974), requires an 
exchange to enact "procedures which provide for the effective and systematic surveil-
lance of the activities of specialists." 
110. See generally Note, supra note 51, which discusses the bargaining process and 
concentrates on three examples of its use: floor trading, off-floor trading, and com-
mission rates. 
111. See materials cited at note 96 supra. 
112. The Justice Department's critique of rule 19b-2-the SEC's proposed rule on 
institutional membership-suggests C~mmission reluctance to consider antitrust factors 
in directing SRO action, See Brief of the United States Department of Justice at 21, 
PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 
(1974) [hereinafter Justice Department Brief]. 
113. See note 98 supra. 
114. See note 91 supra and accompanying text. 
115. For example, when the SEC tried to implement an institutional membership 
rule by voluntary action of the SRO's, the NYSE agreed in principle to the SEC sug-
gestion but other exchanges (such as the PBW) objected. See SENATE STUDY, supra 
note 1, at 81-82. The SEC later directed all exchanges to adopt rule 19b-2. See SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra note 51. If the NYSE had incorporated 
the SEC suggestion into a rule change, the NYSE would have been open to antitrust 
attack while the PBW' would have been immune. 
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procedures not weighted toward regulatory goals. But the Silver 
precedent for SRO actions not subject to SEC oversight is becoming 
irrelevant, and the Parker precedent is an inappropriate basis for the 
view that SRO actions directed by the SEC have antitrust immunity. 
The key line of precedents is on SRO actions subject to SEC ap-
proval, and this line is split on fundamental issues. 
2. The Substantive Tests 
The choice between original federal court jurisdiction over anti-
trust claims and initial deference to the SEC raises issues concerning 
not only the inherent bias of each forum but also the substantive test 
applicable to allegedly anticompetitive activities in the stock mar-
kets.116 Currently, the choice of forum largely determines the sub-
stantive test. In deciding an antitrust claim, a court should apply the 
Silver test.117 In reviewing an SEC decision, on the other hand, a 
court should determine whether the agency properly applied the 
relevant standards of the 1934 Act.118 These substantive standards are 
subject to very different interpretations. 
a. The Silver test for antitrust courts. In Silver, the Court ex-
tended antitrust immunity "only to the extent necessary to make the 
Securities Exchange Act work •... "119 The scope of this test was 
scarcely explored in Silver,120 nor was it explicated subsequently in 
Kaplan121 or Gordon.122 The Silver test was utilized, however, by 
the court of appeals in Thill123 and the district court in Jacobi v. 
Bache.124 
II6. See Jaffe, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1037, supra note 29, at 1037-38, 1060-70; Schwartz, 
supra note 29, at 464-71. 
II7. See text at note 23 supra. 
US. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970), requires 
that Commission action be "necessary or appropriate for protection of investors or to 
insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon such exchange or to insure fair admin-
istration of such exchange ••.• " Under section 15A(k)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 7Bo-3(k)(2) (1970), 
the Commission may change NASD procedural rules if such action is · "necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors or to effectuate the 
purposes of this section." Under section 15A(h)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h)(l) (1970), the 
Commission may reverse a disciplinary proceeding of the NASD if it finds that the rule 
that was violated required "conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of 
trade." 
119. See text at note 33 supra. 
120. See text at note 36 supra. 
121. See text at notes 72-75 supra. 
122. See text at notes 81-83 supra. 
123. See text at notes 76-78 supra. 
124. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fm. SEc. L. REP. 1J 94,578 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
See note 69 supra. At least one circuit court has applied the Silver test in the parallel 
area of NASD regulation of the OTC. See Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc., 451 F.2d 
240 (5th Cir. 1971), rehearing denied, 459 F.2d 461, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972), 
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After suggesting the types of evidence to be considered, 125 the 
court in Thill gave the district court some guidance in applying the 
Silver test: "[I]t must be established that subjecting the anti-rebate 
rule to antitrust attack will frustrate the purpose of the Securities 
Exchange Act or make it substantially ineffective."126 This interpre-
tation of Silver, like Silver itself, has several defects. First, it focuses 
on the 1934 Act to the neglect of antitrust considerations. No SRO 
rule would be invalidated so long as it is "necessary" for some regu-
latory goal, whatever its anticompetitive impact.127 Second, it does 
not specify which goals of the 1934 Act must be frustrated. Despite 
contrary legislative history, 128 Thill speaks as if the Act had only one 
purpose. Third, Thill is too vague about the nature of the required 
correlation between SRO rules and the 1934 Act. Phrases like "frus-
trate the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act" do not provide 
workable guidelines.129 
In Jacobi, the court interpreted Silver as requiring three in-
quiries. First, the court determined whether the NYSE's action-
requiring an add-on service charge for brokerage commissions on 
exchange transactions but not for representative commissions-was 
"taken with any anti-competitive purpose."130 This inquiry into 
discussed in note 83 supra. In Harwell, the circuit court noted that the record con-
t.-iined little evidence of actual supervision of the disputed rule or consideration of 
antitrust factors by the SEC. In its main direction to the district court, it merely 
restated the Silver test: 
If on remand the proof should show that defendants have taken actions which 
violate the antitrust laws, and, if in accordance with the principle of Silver v. 
New York Stock Exchange •.. the district court should find that the purposes of 
the Maloney Act [section 15A of the 1934 Act] do not require that these actions 
be cloaked with anti-trust immunity, then the mere supervisory presence of the 
SEC cannot divest the courts of their power to enforce the antitrust laws. 
459 F.2d at 462. 
125. Thill suggests four areas in which factual evidence should be presented: (I) 
"the effects of the anti-competitive conduct"; (2) the extent to which the rule chal-
lenged "is subject to actual review by the SEC"; (3) "what in the regulatory scheme 
'performs the antitrust function'"; and (4) why the rule "must be preserved" for the 
workings of the Act. 433 F.2d at 270. 
126. 433 F.2d at 270. 
127. The Thill court suggested that the challenged anti-rebate rule could hardly be 
,"necessary," since it could be and frequently was evaded by NYSE members. 433 F.2d 
at 273-74. 
128. The purposes of the Exchange Act are manifold. In 1934 Congress focused on 
dishonesty, manipulation, and insolvency. See R. DEBEDTS, THE NEW DEAL's SEC 56-58 
(1964); M. PARRISH, SECUIUTIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 108-44 (1970). 
129. A similar criticism can be made of Hanvell v. Growth Programs, Inc., 451 F.2d 
240 (5th Cir. 1971), rehearing denied, 459 F.2d 461, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972), 
in which the test was whether "the purposes of the Maloney Act [section 15A of the 
1934 Act] do not require that these actions be cloaked with antitrust immunity," 459 
F.2d at 462. 
130. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,I 9¾,578 at 96,027. 
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purpose may be futile because an SRO may easily build a record 
indicating that it was motivated primarily by regulatory concerns. 
Second, the court examined whether the SRO practice in fact served 
a specific regulatory goal of the 1934 Act, laudably tying the SRO 
practice to a specific statutory mandate to support the financial 
stability of broker-dealers rather than merely to the nebulous notion 
of investor protection.131 Finally, the court looked at the actual im-
pact on competition of the SRO practice. It found that the SRO 
practice had not limited competition among brokerage firms for 
the services of registered representatives.132 Having determined that 
the SRO practice served a valid regulatory goal ·with no anticompeti-
tive effect, the Jacobi court did not have to reconcile a conflict be-
tween the 1934 Act and the antitrust laws. 
b. The substantive standard for judicial review. Since the Silver 
Court considered the dispute before it to be beyond the scope of 
SEC jurisdiction,133 it never faced the issue of the proper standard for 
judicial review of SEC decisions. Similarly, when the court of appeals 
affirmed dismissal of the antitrust claim in Gordon, it noted that judi-
cial review of the SEC decision could be obtained under the 1934 Act 
or the AP A,134 but it did not discuss what substantive test should be 
applied. Only in PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC135 has the stan-
dard for reviewing appeals· of SEC decisions been fully debated. 
While the Justice Department and the SEC agree that under recent 
case law136 the SEC's statutory mandate to protect the public interest 
requires some analysis of antitrust factors, there is a dispute about 
the precise importance of such factors.131 
131. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[ 94,578 at 96,027. 
132. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 94,578 at 96,026, 
133. See text at note 40 mpra. 
134. Gordon v. NYSE, 498 F.2d 1303, 1311 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3290 
(U.S. Nov. 19, 1974) (No. 74-304). 
135. 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974). At issue in PDW 
is the promulgation by the SEC of rule 19b-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1974), which 
limits institutional membership on the exchanges. The case was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction in the circuit court, but a new complaint has been filed. See note 67 stipra. 
136. Both briefs cite Denver &: Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 
485 (1966). See SEC Brief, supra note 98, at 83; Justice Department Brief, supra note 
112, at 22. Denver involved the duty of the Interstate Commerce Commission to con• 
sider whether certain actions were in the "public interest." The Court stated: "Com-
mon sense and sound administrative policy point to the conclusion that such broad 
statutory standards require at least some degree of consideration of ••• anticompetitive 
consequences. • . • And similarly broad responsibilities are encompassed within like 
broad directives addressed to other agencies." 387 U.S. at 492-93. 
137. This dispute is reflected in analogous cases applying the antitrust laws to other 
regulated industries. Compare McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 
(1944), with Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958). 
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The Justice Department's argument is bottomed on footnote 
sixteen of Silver, which states that "any rule that might be adopted 
by the Commission would, to be consonant with the antitrust laws, 
have to provide as a minimum the procedural safeguards which those 
laws make imperative in cases like these."138 From this footnote, the 
Justice Department infers that an SEC decision "in order to be 
'consonant with the antitrust laws' must provide all the safeguards 
which the antitrust laws 'make imperative' in such cases."139 The 
phrase "to the minimum extent necessary" used in Silver,140 the 
argument goes, requires not only that the SEC action be necessary 
for the 1934 Act but also that it be the least anticompetitive altema-
tive.141 This argument, however, has two weak links.142 First, footnote· 
sixteen of Silver can easily be read to require only the provision of 
procedural safeguards for all SEC decisions, rather than adherence 
to all of the substantive standards of the antitrust laws.143 Second, the 
Silver test can reasonably be read to mean only that the antitrust laws 
are to be repealed "to the minimum extent nec€ssary."144 Moreover, 
by requiring the least anticompetitive alternative the Justice Depart-
ment would be applying a stiffer test to the stock markets, a semi-
regulated industry, than the rule of reason145 used in antitrust cases 
involving even nonregulated industries.146 
138. 373 U.S. at 364 n.16. See Justice Department Brief, supra note 112, at 24. 
139. Justice Department Brief, supra note 112, at 24 (emphasis original). 
140. See text at note 33 supra. 
141. Justice Department Brief, supra note 112, at 33, 35. 
142. Outside counsel to the NYSE argues that the Justice Department's view of the 
necessity test is "without any support." Letter from William E. Jackson, Esq., to 
James J. Needham, NYSE Chairman, March 14, 1974, at 6. 
143. The Justice Department recognizes this problem, but argues: "Such safeguards 
include not only the procedural requirements emphasized by the Supreme Court in 
Silver, but also the traditional competitive requirements •••• " Justice Department 
Brief, supra note 112, at 24. 
144. SEC Brief, supra note 98, at 83-84. 
145. Where the rule of reason applies, any constraint on competition must be judged 
in light of its surrounding context. A. NEALE, ANTrrnusr LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 20-27 
(2d ed. 1970). As Justice Brandeis explained in United States v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918): 
The legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a 
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every 
regulation of trade, restrains •••• The true test of legality is whether the restraint 
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that 
question the Court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to 
which. the restraint is applied ••• , the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual 
and probable. 
On the other hand, the courts have applied per se rules of illegality to certain 
categories of competitive constraints. A. NEALE, supra, at 27-29. Under per se rules, 
constraints are deemed illegal regardless of asserted justifications. See, e.g., United 
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
146. As a hypothetical example, assume the merger of two competing exchanges 
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In contrast, the SEC takes the position that the Silver test is auto-
matically met by its decisions: "Our unfettered ability to exercise 
the broad regulatory authority vested in us, and the necessity of 
exchange compliance with the Commission's regulatory determina-
tions, are, by any calculation, 'necessary to make the Securities Ex-
change Act work ... .' "147 The SEC cites cases involving regulated 
industries in which agencies were given wide latitude by the review-
ing courts in evaluating competitive factors,148 and concludes that it 
should be allowed to ta~e action inconsistent with the antitrust laws 
"whenever it believes such action is 'necessary or appropriate' to 
protect the public interest and carry out the fundamental policies 
underlying the Securities Exchange Act."140 This argument is less 
than persuasive. The SEC's elastic definition of "necessity" would 
eliminate any judicial analysis of competitive factors in the stock 
markets, reducing the regulatory inquiry to the existence of SEC 
jurisdiction over the subject matter150 despite cases involving agency 
decisions on regulated industries in which the courts considered 
antitrust factors paramount.151 Most importantly, the standard pro-
posed by the SEC is couched in subjective terms, giving virtually 
limitless discretion to the SEC in regulating the stock markets.102 
to achieve eoonomies of scale. See, e.g., NYSE Group To Study Pacific Exchange Links, 
BNA SEC. REo. &: L. REP. No. 221, at A-3 (Oct. 3, 1973). Under the Justice Department's 
approach, the exchanges would have to prove as an affirmative defense to an antitrust 
suit that the merger was necessary for 1934 Act purposes and that such purposes could 
not be achieved by more competitive means, such as pooling of certain resources. How-
ever, if the exchanges were not regulated, the merger might be allowed without proof 
that a less competitive alternative existed. The Supreme Court has not yet required, 
especially in the area of regulated industries, that mergers be barred simply because 
the same result could have been achieved by some more competitive alternative. See, 
e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). Cf. United 
States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973). 
147. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra note 51, at 186. 
148. SEC Brief, supra note 98, at 84 n.214. The only Supreme Court case cited is 
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944). 
149, SEC Brief, supra note 98, at 84. 
150. The subject matter jurisdiction of the SEC is expansive. See text at notes 42-58 
supra. 
151. See Federal Maritime Commn. v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 
U.S. 238 (1968); Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958). Sec also 
Federal :Maritime Commn. v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973); United States v. 
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Natl, Bank, 
374 U.S. 321 (1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962). 
152. For an eloquent critique of unfettered administrative discretion, see K. DAVIS, 
DISCRETIONARY JurnCE (1969). For a survey of the case law on decisions committed to 
agency discretion, see K. DAVlS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT§ 28.05 (3d ed. 1972) [herein-
after DAVlS TEXT]. 
December 1974] Competition and Regulation 343 
B. The Legislature 
Since the courts have not reached a definitive decision on the 
proper forum or substantive standard for reconciling the antitrust 
laws with the 1934 Act, this might be an excellent area for legislative 
clarification. In the past session of Congress, the Senate passed a 
series of bills concerning the regulation of the stock markets that 
stand a good chance of passage in the present Congress.153 Unfor-
tunately, the proposed legislation fails to resolve the basic issues left 
open by the case law. As a result, the legislation would virtually 
assure that conflicts between antitrust laws and the 1934 Act would 
be reviewable simultaneously in two different forums under two 
different standards. 
I. Choice of Forum 
The proposed legislation expands the scope of SEC jurisdiction 
and judicial review to such a degree that all future cases will probably 
fall within the area unresolved by Silver.154 It would permit the SEC 
to review rule changes155 as well as disciplinary hearings156 by ex-
changes, and to alter all substantive and procedural rules of the 
NASD,157 as well as of the exchanges.158 It gives the SEC power to 
obtain an injunction against nonenforcement of SRO rules,159 and 
to impose its own rules in areas beyond the scope of its current au-
thority.160 The new legislation would provide for judicial review of 
more SEC decisions by the courts of appeals under section 25 of the 
153. See note 19 supra. 
154. The area of SEC jurisdiction and ensuing judicial review has already been 
greatly expanded by the courts. See text at notes 41-67 supra. 
155. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1975); H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 
(1975). The Commission may currently review NASD rule changes, but not exchange 
rule changes. See note 13 supra. 
156. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1975); H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 
(1975). The SEC currently is empowered to review NASD disciplinary proceedings, but 
not exchange disciplinary proceedings. See note 14 supra. 
157. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1975); H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 
(1975). The SEC currently has direct power to amend NASD rules in four procedural 
categories. See note 12 supra. 
158. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1975); H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 
(1975). The Commission can now amend exchange rules in twelve substantive areas 
plus "similar matters." See note 12 supra. 
159. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 16 (1975); H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 
(1975). Currently, the SEC can arguably obtain enforcement of SRO rules by a cir-
cuitous route based on sections 6 and 20 of the 1934 Act. See note 55 supra. 
160. The legislation gives the SEC more direct authority over certain areas of the 
market, such as dealer practices in the OTC. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1975); 
H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 205 (1975). Similarly, the legislation gives the SEC 
power over other market participants, such as clearing agencies. S. 249, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. § 14 (1975); H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 404 (1975). 
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1934 Act and by the district courts under the APA,161 including 
judicial review of most SEC decisions requiring or inducing actions 
by SRO's.162 
This expansion of SEC jurisdiction over SRO activity and of 
judicial review of SEC decisions could be viewed as a legislative 
resolution of the procedural question reserved by Silver. All conflicts 
between the antitrust laws and the 1934 Act could be litigated as 
challenges to SEC decisions in the courts of appeals. The legislative 
history of the bills, however, strongly supports the existing prece-
dents for jurisdiction by antitrust courts over SRO actions. The 
Senate Repo~t states: "In the Committee's view, it is essential that 
the antitrust courts retain their jurisdiction to make the ultimate 
accommodation between antitrust principles and the powers and 
actions of the self-regulatory organizations."163 Moreover, the Senate 
Report goes further than existing case law, which does not include 
any successful antitrust suits against SRO actions directed by the 
SEC.164 The Report says that original jurisdiction by antitrust courts 
should be permitted irrespective of whether self-regulatory conduct 
"has been approved or required by the SEC . . . ."166 Thus, instead 
of resolving the procedural question left open by Silver, the proposed 
legislation confuses matters further. 
2. The Substantive Test 
Having established two separate forums for deciding conflicts 
between the antitrust laws and the 1934 Act, the proposed legislation 
lays dmvn a different substantive test for each forum. Where antitrust 
courts have original jurisdiction, the proposed legislation explicitly 
retains the Silver test as if its meaning were clear. The Report em-
braces "the basic principle enunciated in Silver that no repeal of 
161. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19 (1975); H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Scss. § 203 
(1975). For the current distinctions between review under section 25 and APA review, 
see text at notes 61-65 supra. 
162. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19 (1975); H.R. 10, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 208 
(1975). For the current problems in obtaining judicial review of SRO actions induced 
or imposed by the SEC, see notes 66-67 supra. 
163. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 
NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKET SYSTEM Acr OF 1974, S. REP. No. 93-865, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess. 11 (1974) [hereinafter NATIONAL MARKET REPORT]. Although the Report deals 
with legislation introduced in the Ninety-third Congress, it is applicable to the new 
legislation, which consolidates the bills passed by the Senate in its last term. See note 
19 supra. The report accompanying the consolidation bill is merely a summary, 
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF 
PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF SECURITIES Acrs AMENDMENTS OF 1975, s. 249, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1975). 
164. See text at notes 104-08 supra. 
165. NATIONAL MARKET REPoRT, supra note 163, at 11 (emphasis added). 
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the antitrust laws ·with respect to the conduct of self-regulatory 
organizations would be implied unless such repeal were 'necessary 
to make the Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum 
extent necessary.' '"166 Yet the legislation implicitly rejects the inter-
pretations given the Silver test by both the SEC and the Justice De-
partment. Since the Senate Report envisages a judicial inquiry into 
the "necessity" of SRO conduct, regardless of approval or direction 
from the SEC, it does not equate SEC action with fulfillment of the 
Silver test.167 On the other hand, since the Senate Report says that 
SRO conduct should not constitute an "unreasonable restraint on 
competition,''168 it seems to favor the rule of reason used in prior anti-
trust cases rather than the "least anticompetitive alternative" ap-
proach urged by the Justice Department.169 
Whatever the standard it embraces for original actions in anti-
trust courts, the proposed legislation delineates a different standard 
for judicial review of SEC decisions: "necessary or appropriate" in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors.17° The use of 
the words "or appropriate" provides a more lenient standard for 
judging anticompetitive activity in the stock markets than the Silver 
"necessity" test.171 In contrast to its naive embrace of the Silver test 
for use by the antitrust courts, however, the Report laudably at-
tempts to give economic content to the "necessary or appropriate" 
standard: "Under all these sections, the SEC's responsibility would 
be to balance the anti-competitive effects of the regulatory policy or 
decision at issue against the purposes of the Exchange Act that would 
be advanced thereby and the costs· of doing so.''172 
In sum, having increased the probability' of simultaneous deci-
sions on the same dispute in two judicial forums, the proposed legis-
lation emphasizes the differences in the substantive tests for recon-
ciling the antitrust laws with the 1934 Act in each forum. As a result, 
a district court might strike down an SRO action as an antitrust 
violation under the Silver "necessity" test, while a court of appeals 
166. Id., quoting Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). 
167. The SEC contends that its decisions automatically meet the Silver test. See 
text at notes 147-49 supra. 
168. NATIONAL MARKET REPORT, supra note 163, at 11. 
169. See text at note 141 supra. 
170. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 15, 17 (1975). 
171. The standard for judicial review was "reasonably necessary" in the early drafts 
of the new legislation, but was changed to "necessary or appropriate" in the final 
version. Compare S. 2519, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 18, 20 (1973) with S. 249, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. §§ 15, 17 (1975). But the "necessary or appropriate" standard has always 
been part of the 1934 Act. See note 118 supra. 
172. NATIONAL MARKET REPORT, supra note 163, at 10. 
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might uphold the SEC's approval of the same SRO action as "appro-
priate" to the 1934 Act. The prime saving grace of the legislation is 
its attempt to define the "necessary or appropriate" standard in 
meaningful economic terms. 
II. AN ECONOMIC .APPROACH TO TRANSACTIONAL SERVICES 
Since both the courts and Congress have failed to develop satis-
factory procedures or criteria for resolving conflicts between antitrust 
laws and the 1934 Act, this section will suggest a different approach. 
It begins by describing an economic model of the stock market as a 
service industry for facilitating stock transactions. It then derives 
from that model a new substantive test for reconciling competition 
and regulation in the stock market, starting with the stringent as-
sumptions of perfect competition and going on to deal with the main 
deviations from these assumptions in the actual market. Finally, 
this section outlines procedures for implementing the new substan-
tive test, which delineate important roles for the Justice Department, 
Congress, the SEC, and the courts. 
A. The Development of a New Substantive Test 
I. The Stock Market as a Service Industry 
Stock173 represents the right to a proportionate share of future 
corporate income.174 Stock markets175 provide the medium through 
which investors may trade their rights to future corporate income 
173. Corporations obtain investment capital by selling stock to the public (a so-called 
"primary distribution"). For a survey of the distribution process and the application 
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-h (1970), to primary distributions, sec 
w. CARY, CORPORATIONS: CAsES AND MATERIALS 1287-477 (1969). Corporations also ob• 
tain investment capital from sources other than the sale of common stock-most 
importantly, retention of corporate earnings and sale of corporate bonds, See 37 SEC 
ANN. REP. 218 (1971). 
174. Corporate income may be paid out as dividends or retained by the corporation 
for investment. The latter course may not only appreciate the value of the shareholder's 
stock, but may also offer more favorable long-run tax treatment. See generally V. DRUD• 
NEY 8: M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 419-44 (1972). Stock 
also represents the right to a proportionate share of corporate assets upon liquidation, 
but this aspect need not be considered here. 
175. The stock markets (e.g., the NYSE and the OTC) are secondary trading mar-
kets, on which previously issued stock is traded among investors. Secondary markets 
permit investors the liquidity necessary to attract investment capital to the primary 
distribution of securities. Similarly, prices in the secondary market influence prices set 
by corporate offerors in a distribution of new securities. See R. ROBINSON 8: D. WRIGHTS• 
MAN, FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE AcCUl\IULATION AND Ar.LOCATION OF WEALrn 11-12 (1974). 
Secondary trading far exceeds the volume and value of primary distributions, Between 
1960 and 1973, for example, new issues of corporate stock totaled only Sl3.6 billion, 
or less than 8 per cent of the S178 billion volume on exchange markets alone. NYSE 
FACT BooK, supra note 1, at 17, 68. 
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for cash or other securities.176 Stock transactions are facilitated by 
three main services: dissemination of current information on stock 
prices,177 market making to offset temporary imbalances in orders,178 
and a clearing process for consummated trades.179 Ancillary stock 
transaction services include research on stock performance180 and 
the holding of stock certificates by brokers.181 
Like other service industries, the facilitation of stock transactions 
can be analyzed in terms of supply and demand.182 At the retail 
level,183 brokerage houses supply transactional services through out-
lets established in most American cities. While all brokerage houses 
have similar cost items (e.g., office rent, salaries, and processing equip-
ment),184 overall costs may vary according to such factors as office 
176. See Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 82 Q. J. EcoN. 33, 35 (1968). 
177. Price reports on recent stock trades are provided by tick.er tapes, the largest 
of which are operated by the NYSE and AMEX. Regional exchanges (e.g., the Mid-
west Stock Exchange) have tapes with relatively small distributions; the OTC has no 
tape. SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 96. 
The NYSE and AMEX also have the largest "quote systems," whereby price reports 
on current offers {"quotations'') are communicated. The OTC's elaborate quote system 
is called NASDAQ. See SENATE STUDY, supra, at 97, 103; note 5 supra. 
178. Market making is the willingness of dealers to carry stock inventories sufficient 
to absorb temporary imbalances in the flow of buy and sell orders. See generally 
R. WFSr &: S. TINJc, THE EcoNoMics OF THE STOCK MARKET 143 {1971). 
179. For a general discussion of the transfer of ownership process, see HouSE STUDY, 
supra note 7, ch. vm. · · 
180. For a discussion of the legal and economic aspects of research, and advice 
based upon research, see SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 60-62; Cohen, The Suitability 
Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604 (1971). 
181. See Guttman, Broker-Dealer Bankruptdes, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 887, 890-93 (1973). 
182. The arguments of the NYSE often imply that the usual economic laws of 
supply and demand do not apply to stock markets. Arguing for fixing intramember 
rates, the NYSE stated: 
A critical problem associated with changes in the number of active floor brokers 
is that declines tend to be irreversible. This occurs as a result of the fact that only 
a limited number of individuals are qualified for these positions at any particular 
time. As departing brokers commit themselves to other endeavors, the replacement 
rate at peak demand periods will fall below the departure rate in inactive periods. 
Thus, if declining floor brokerage rates due to competitive pressures when volume 
was low thinned the ranks of independent floor brokers, the loss in capacity would 
probably never be fully made up, even at a later date when higher volume levels 
might stimulate higher rates. · 
NYSE, The Need for Fixed Floor Brokerage Rates 14-15 (May 29, 1974) (report sub-
mitted to the SEC). 
The NYSE argument ignores certain basic economic principles. It is true that as 
floor brokerage profits decline in a period of low volume, floor brokers will leave the 
exchange. However, rising profits accompanying a period of high volume will induce 
the entry of new floor brokers. That "the loss in capacity would probably never be 
fully made up" is explained by the barriers imposed by NYSE regulatory restrictions. 
If the NYSE allowed floor brokers immediate entry into the business, or maintained a 
pool of qualified floor brokers, high volume would induce the return of floor brokers 
so long as profits from this line of business exceed those available elsewhere. 
183. "Retail" here denotes broker transactions with public investors. "Wholesale" 
transactions describe those among brokers and dealers and other market professionals. 
184. See I. FRIEND &: M. BLUME, THE CONSEQUENCES OF CoMPEI'ITlVE COMMISSIONS OF 
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location,185 type of investor serviced,186 and efficiency of operation.187 
At the wholesale level, the stock markets provide member firms with 
central facilities for disseminating price information, executing 
trades, and transferring ownership of securities. Each marketplace 
is organized as a users' cooperative188 owned by brokers who pay 
fees to cover operating costs and who share pro rata any annual 
profits. 
Exchanges and the OTC are different types of stock markets. In 
a stock exchange, one specialist maintains price quotations in each 
stock in return for the exclusive right to trade that stock on the ex-
change floor.189 Orders190 received by member firms are transmitted 
via floor brokers to the specialist's post. There public orders are 
matched with other public orders or with the specialist's own inven-
tory at the current price quotation.191 Unmatched "market" orders 
are generally returned to the investor; "limit orders" are retained 
by the specialist for future matches.192 By contrast, the OTC is not 
limited to single specialists with exclusive trading rights.193 Nu-
merous dealers may make offers for trades through a computerized 
quote system or through daily "pink sheets."194 The price and volume 
of trades are then negotiated by phone. An OTC firm may negotiate 
a trade on behalf of a customer with the dealer offering the best 
quotation, much as the exchange member sends orders to the spe-
, < 
THE NEW YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE 267-79 (1972), reprinted in Hearings on S, J169 Before 
the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 267-318 (1972) [hereinafter Hearings on S, J169]; R. WEST 
&: S. T1N1c, supra note 178, at 123-39. 
185. See I. FRIEND &: M. BLUME, supra note 184, at 276-79. 
186. See id. 
187. For a summary of the studies on the efficiency of different types of brokerage 
firms, see SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 52-53. 
188. See Baxter, supra note 16, at 705. 
189. See generally Wolfson, Rosenblum &: Russo, supra note 1, at 810·21. 
190. There arc two main types of orders-market and limit orders. A market order 
is for sale or purchase at the current price. A limit order is for sale or purchase at a 
specified price only. 
191. If there is no public match, the specialist is under a loosely defined obligation 
to effect a match from his inventory at the current price. See, e.g., NYSE Rule 104, 
2 CCH NYSE GUIDE ,r 2104 (1975). For criticism of such rules, see Securities Industry 
Study, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm, on Ban1'ing, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-21 (1972) [hereinafter Securities 
Industry Study]. Cf. note 199 infra. 
192. See note 190 supra. 
193. See generally 2 L. Loss, supra note 53, at 1277-87. 
194. For a description of the computerized quotation system (NASDAQ), see note 5 
supra. The daily "pink sheets" are sent to broker-dealers in the OTC and are pub• 
lishcd in newspapers. 
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cialist on an agency basis. Alternatively, an OTC firm may buy or 
sell shares directly with the customer, in a fashion similar to the 
specialist who deals in his own inventory.195 
Two principal categories of investors purchase transactional 
services: institutions and individuals. Institutional investors owri. 
about forty-five per cent of the market value of all NYSE-listed 
stocks,196 and have a turnover rate in shares more than twice that of 
individual investors.197" 
Investors of both types want the lowest possible transaction costs: 
that is, the narrowest spread (the difference between the buy and 
sell prices offered simultaneously by a dealer) necessary for market 
making and the lowest charge for using transactional facilities.198 
In an exchange, an investor pays the specialist's spread unless the 
investor's order is matched with another public order.199 In the OTC, 
the investor always pays the spread, either to another dealer in an 
agency execution or to the OTC broker trading for his own account. 
In an exchange, the user charge is the commission200-a fee for the 
broker's facilities and for exchange facilities (floor brokerage).201 In 
195. See R. WFSr & S. TINIC, supra note 178, at 51-54. 
196. The NYSE says that the holdings of financial institutions comprise 31.4 per 
cent of the market value of all NYSE-listed stock, excluding nonregistered mutual 
funds, investment partnerships, nonbank trusts, foreign institutions, and bank ·trust 
funds. If the estimated holdings of these financial institutions were added, institutions 
would own over 45 per cent of the ~YSE list. NYSE FACT BooK, supra note I, at 52. 
Of the institutional portfolios, the largest are held by bank trust funds, pension funds, 
mutual funds, insurance companies, and foundations, listed in descending order .. See 
id.; INSTlTUTIONAL INVESTOR. STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMN., 
H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 414, 430 (1971) [hereinafter INsrrrUTioNAL 
INVESTOR STUDY]. 
Eighteen million individuals own the remaining 55 per cent of NYSE-listed stock. 
NYSE, A DETAILED LooK AT THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR 3 (1970) [hereinafter DETAILED 
LOOK]. 
197. In 1971, for example, the total value of trades in NYSE-listed stocks was di-
vided as follows: 52.4 per cent by institutional investors, 24.4 per cent by individuals, 
and 23.2 per cent by NYSE members. A comparison of turnover rates must also take 
into account the fact that institutional investors own IO per cent less stock by value 
than individual members. See note 196 supra. 
198. Demsetz, supra note 176, at 35. Demsetz says that the spread consists of about 
40 per cent transaction costs and about 60 per cent brokerage fees. Id. at 40. 
199. Only about six per cent of all exchange orders are matched with other public 
orders in the so-called "crowd" in front of the specialist's desk. See Blumenthal, The 
Development of the Central Market System: Revolution-One Step at a Time, 3 
RUTGERS J. CoMPUTERS & L. 232, 238-40 & n.21 (1974). 
200. For a discussion of commission charges on exchanges, see Ratner, Regulation 
of the Compensation of Securities Dealers, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 348, 350-54 (1970). 
201. For a discussion of floor brokerage, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 10751 (April 23, 1974) [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC~ L. REP. ~ 79,764. 
Floor brokerage is usually paid to the floor broker for executing a trade, but is given 
to the specialist for holding a limit order if that order is ultimately matched with 
another public order. See generally text at notes 190-92 supra. 
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the OTC, there is no floor brokerage:202 The OTC firm that nego-
tiates a trade for a customer charges a commission for use of its 
facilities; the OTC firm that trades for its own account directly with 
a customer buries the user charge in the spread for the dealer func-
tion. 
2. Perfect Competition and the Revised Silver Test 
We may begin by positing a market for stock transactions that 
satisfies the central assumptions of perfect competition:203 (1) sup-
pliers provide a homogeneous commodity or service; (2) producers 
and consumers are numerous in relation to the size of the market; 
(3) perfect information about market choices is available; (4) barriers 
to entry are absent; and (5) external effects imposed by parties on 
others without compensation are absent.204 
Under these assumptions, the market for stock transactions would 
be efficient205 without any governmental restrictions. Each broker 
would compute its internal costs as well as the cost of using the rel-
evant marketplaces for various types of transactions; each investor 
would seek out the brokerage firm providing the narrowest spread 
and lowest user charge for the desired stock transactions. Through 
the interplay of supply and demand, prices for each type of transac-
tional service would equal the marginal cost of supplying the last 
unit of that service.206 Such operational efficiency in transactional 
202. See Letter from Bache &: Co. to Stan West, NYSE Assistant Vice-President, 
Nov. 9, 1973, in Hearings on S. 2519 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate 
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Scss. 500-01 (1973). 
203. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSI'RIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 8-11 (4th ed. 1973). Implicit in the concept of perfectly competitive markets 
arc certain assumptions about individual consumers and suppliers, Individuals arc as• 
sumed rationally to maximize utility functions, which arc continuous and convex. 
Similar assumptions apply to producers. See Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Poten-
tially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 
HAR.v. L. REv. 1655, 1666-69 (1974). 
204. The first four assumptions arc discussed in J. HENDERSON &: R. QUANDT, MICRO 
ECONOMIC THEORY: A MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 104-05 (2d ed. 1971). For a description 
of externalities, see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS, 474-76 (9th ed. 1973). 
205. Efficiency is defined for a given income distribution as a state at which it 
would be impossible to rearrange resources so that those who gain by rearrangement 
would be better off if they were to compensate those who lose by rearrangement. See 
Polinsky, supra note 203, at 1663-64. In other words, neither brokers nor investors 
could alter the arrangement of transactional services without causing more harm to 
others than benefit to themselves. 
206. As a practical matter, these equilibrium prices would probably be reflected in 
a set of schedules for different types of transactional services offered by brokerage firms. 
See, e.g., Cole, Wall Street's "Negotiated Rates" Plans Start Today, N.Y. Times, April I, 
1974, at 49, cols, 3-7 (late city ed.) (schedules published during the experimental phase 
on competitive commission rates for small transactions). 
For the characteristics of a long-run competitive equilibrium, see F. SCHERER, supra 
note 203, at 13. 
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services207 is a necessary but not sufficient condition for allocational 
efficiency208 in the broader market for investment capital. To allocate 
investment capital efficiently, stock prices should reflect long-run 
projections of corporate income.209 When new information about 
projected corporate income is revealed, the price of a company's 
shares should adjust quickly to the appropriate level.210 Investors 
will not alter their positions in response to the new information 
about projected corporate income, however, if the cost of transacting 
in that stock exceeds the value of the new information to the in-
vestors.211 
Under these assumptions, competitive adjustment of the market 
for stock transactions would also entail lower administrative burdens 
than any regulatory restriction. The interplay of market forces would 
correct any short-term deviation from operational efficiency.212 For 
example, changes in the demand function of buyers would lead to 
price changes and adjustments in the amount of services supplied, 
until marginal cost again equals price.213 At the same time, the com-
petitive process would maximize individual choice and minimize 
bureaucratic constraint.214 The government's role would be confined 
mainly to the judicial enforcement of contracts.215 
The extent of the costs imposed by a regulatory restriction216 
on the market for transactional services would depend on the type 
and incidence of that restriction. Regulations to maintain price fixing 
207. See I. FRmND &: M. BLUME, supra note 184, at 335-36. 
208. See id. at 336-38. 
209. For a discussion of long-term allocational efficiency and prices in stock markets, 
see w. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 35-36 (1965). For a dis-
cussion of short-term price movements in the stock markets and their relation to 
allocational efficiency, see R. Wur &: S. TINIC, supra note 178, at 26-42. 
210. There is considerable evidence that new information is assimilated rapidly by 
the stock markets through changes in stock prices. For a relatively basic introduction 
to the relevant studies, see Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. 
ANAL. J., Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 55. For a compreh~ive survey of the empirical and theo-
retical literature in this field, see Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A _Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
211. R. WESr &: S. TINic, supra note 178, at 176. Of course, there may be other 
reasons why changes in the future potential for corporate earnings may not be re-
flected rapidly in price changes on the stock markets, such as the withholding of inside 
information. For this reason operational efficiency is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for allocational efficiency. 
212. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 204, at 385-86_ 
213. Cf. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSlS OF LAW 1-2 (1973). 
214. Blake &: Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 377, 382-83 (1965). 
215. Cf. L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMEru:CA 23 (1965). 
216. Regulatory restrictions include all rules of SRO's and the SEC that prohibit 
or constrain the behavior of investors, brokers, or other market participants. 
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(e.g., mm1mum commission rates)217 impose both large efficiency 
losses and administrative expenses. Changes in demand for services 
and cost to suppliers require price fluctuations; a fixed rate would 
never be efficient in fully competitive markets. To ensure that in-
vestors and brokers do not circumvent a fixed rate, some administra-
tive body must guard against black markets and kickback schemes.218 
Trading restrictions on marketplaces tend to impose relatively high 
efficiency losses and relatively low administrative expenses because 
there are so few marketplaces. For instance, if the SEC withdrew the 
right of a regional exchange to trade in a NYSE-listed stock, the re-
moval of a computing specialist might lead to wider spreads for mar-
ket making on other exchanges,219 although the SEC could easily 
enforce the trading prohibition at the regional exchange.220 Since 
t4e securities industry contains many brokers, restrictions on broker-
age activity tend to impose relatively low efficiency losses and rela-
tively high administrative expenses. A good example is the net 
capital rule, which requires all brokers to maintain a certain ratio of 
capital reserves to aggregate indebtedness.221 While this rule may 
impose a legal barrier to entry for some potential brokers222-thereby 
decreasing competition for investor orders223-these efficiency losses 
will be-relatively low in cities with many brokerage firms. But the 
net capital rule has spawned a complex set of administrative prob-
lems in interpreting minimum standards and applying them to a 
diverse group of brokerage firms on a regular basis.224 
· Efficiency losses and administrative expenses imposed by a regu-
latory restriction would generally be passed on to investors in the 
form of higher prices for transactional services. For instance, a 
regulatory restriction of trading to one marketplace permits special-
ists at that marketplace to reap excess profits in the form of wide 
spreads paid by investors.220 The extra administrative cost of any 
217. See· Ratner, supra note 200, at 350-54. 
218. See, for example, the discussion of the various schemes to avoid the NYSE's 
fixed commission rates in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 196, at 2182·89. 
219, $ee text at note 225 infra. 
220. The SEC has well-established procedures for granting or denying unlisted 
trading privileges to exchanges. See SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 129-33. 
221. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1970). 
222. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 213, at 126-27. 
223. For a discussion of the economic effects of minimum entry standards for pro• 
fessions, see w. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GoVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS 106-18 
(1956); T. ScrroVSKY, WELFARE AND COMPETITION 426 (1951). See generally J. BAIN, 
BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956). 
224. See; e.g., HOUSE STUDY, supra note 7, at 25-30; SENATE STUDY, supra note I, 
at 29-32. 
225. See I. FRIEND &: M. BLUME, supra note 184, at 352-54; R. WEST &: s. TJNrc, 
supra note 178, at 162. 
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regulatory activity undertaken by SRO's is financed in large part by 
assessments paid by member firms according to the amount of their 
commissions.226 The assessments become part of the cost basis by 
which brokers compute user charges for their services. The SEC 
finances its administration of the stock markets by levying a registra-
tion tax on each marketplace based on the dollar value of stocks 
traded at that marketplace.227 This tax also is passed on to investors.228 
To the extent that the revenues from the registration tax offset the 
SEC's congressional appropriation, the SEC's expenses for regulating 
the stock markets are effectively borne by investors. , 
The foregoing discussion implies that regulatory restrictions 
designed to promote the purposes of the 1934 Act should be judged 
according to the following revised Silver test: A regulatory restriction 
should be validated only if its re-gulatory benefits outweigh the ef-
ficiency losses and administrative expenses imposed by the restriction. 
Although new procedures would be required to generate the data 
for the application of this test,229 it is superior 'to the current ap-
proach. The test is based neither on an ambigfr~us footnote in a 
Supreme Court decision nor on a semantic explication of the word 
"necessity."230 It is derived from an economic model of the stock 
markets. In contrast to the substantive tests proposed by the Justice 
Department and the SEC,231 it does not resolve the underlying ten-
sion between competition and regulation wholly in favor of either 
competition or regulation. Rather, it requires a balancing of all 
relevant costs and benefits. The revised test does' not distinguish 
between judicial review and original antitrust suits or between con-
duct directed by the SEC and conduct approved _by the SEC.232 Any_ 
226. For example, NYSE members are liable for an assessment not in excess of 
"one per cent of the difference between the gross commission charged by the member, 
member firm or member corporation ••• and the commissions payable by such mem-
ber • • • ." ?\,YSE Const. art. X, § 2. Cf. BosroN STOCK EXCH. RULES c. XXIII, § 3; 
NASD MANUAL, ,I 1301A, sched. A, § l(b). -
SRO's impose uniform dues of limited amounts. See NYSE Const. art. X, § l; Bos-
ton Stock Exchange art. m, § 2; NASD MANUAL ,r 1301A, sched. A, § l(a). Exchanges 
also impose substantial fees on corporations whose stock is listed for trading on that 
marketplace. See, e.g., NYSE, Schedule of Listing Fees (effective Nov. 18, 1974). The 
NASD has recently proposed that companies listed on NASDAQ pay listing fees. BNA 
SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 247, at A-12 to -13 (April IO, 1974). 
227. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 31, 15 U.S.C. § 78ee (1970). Although this 
tax does not currently apply to the OTC, it would apply under the proposed legisla-
tion. See S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 21 (1975). 
228. See Rosin v. NYSE, 484 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1973), cert, denied, 415 p.s. 977 
(1974). 
229. See section IIB infra. 
230. See text at note 33 supra. 
231. See text at notes 139-41, 147-49 supra. 
232. See text at notes 71-115 supra. 
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regulatory restriction on the stock markets may impose efficiency 
losses and regulatory expense; the revised test provides a single sub-
stantive standard by which to test all such restrictions. 
3. The Revised Silver Test in the Real 
World of Stock Transactions 
Because the revised Silver test is derived from a model of perfect 
competition, it is relevant to ask whether it can be sensibly applied 
in the real world of stock transactions. Two criticisms of the new 
test are likely to be made. First, the actual market for stock transac-
tions may deviate from one or more of the assumptions behind the 
model of perfect competition, suffering from what may be called 
market imperfections.233 Second, even an efficient market for stock 
transactions may be socially objectionable because of distributional 
concerns, that is, resulting inequities in stock mmership and in-
come.284 
a. Market imperjections. Th_e important market imperfections 
for stock transactions are monopoly power in some parts of the secu-
rities industry,285 inadequate information of investors about market 
choices,236 and external costs or benefits not considered by market 
participants.237 Professor Coase has argued that inefficiencies due to 
market imperfections could be corrected by market participants with-
out governmental intervention if bargaining costs238 among all rele-
vant parties were equal to zero. Assume, for example, inefficiencies 
caused by a market in which investors have inadequate information 
about the range of available transactional services. Absent bargaining 
costs, investors would pool funds to establish an information service to 
facilitate optimal choices.23~ In other words, investors would reach 
efficiency through bargaining among themselves, and any regulatory 
restriction would be unnecessary. Coase's argument, however, is 
tautological, because it defines efficiency as an economic state that 
233, Assumptions regarding individual behavior may also be violated. For example, 
nonconvexities may occur. See Polinsky, supra note 203, at 1675-76. 
234. Cf. Kassouf, Towards a Legal Framework for Efficiency and Equity in the 
Securities Markets, 25 HAsnNcs L.J. 417, 418 (1974). 
235. See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 203, at 13-19. 
236. See generally Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer 
Transactions, 1973 WIS. L. R.Ev. 400. 
237. See generally E. MISHAN, THE COSTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH, chs. 5-6 (1967). 
238. Bargaining costs include the costs of gathering information, organizing con-
sumers, and transferring property rights. Coase calls these "transaction" costs. Coase, 
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAw 8: EcoN. I (1960). The term "bargaining" costs 
is used here to avoid confusion. 
239. See Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. PoL. EcoN. 213 (1961). Coase 
himself applies his thesis to externalities. See Coase, supra note 238, 
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must exist in the absence of bargaining costs.240 If there were no 
bargaining costs, market imperfections would not exist in the first 
place. 
In practice, the cost to parties of finding each other and reaching 
an agreement may outweigh the gains that could be achieved through 
private bargaining.241 Bargaining costs will be very high if correction 
of a market failure requires agreement among all American in-
vestors, as would be the case if private bargaining alone were relied 
upon to prevent fraudulent transactions based on inside informa-
tion.242 Market correction through bargaining may be constrained 
by conflicts among the interests of various market participants, such 
as individual and institutional investors.243 Voluntary correction of 
market failures may also be stymied by free riders who refuse to 
pay for protection against an abuse such as specialist manipulation 
because they will receive the benefits of protection so long as other 
investors pay.244 
Thus, the revised Silver test is an appropriate tool for comparing 
the costs of correcting market imperfections through bargaining or 
regulation. If bargaining is less expensive than regulation, we should 
allow the market to correct itself or pass a rule to facilitate the bar-
gaining process, such as a law allowing freer use of class actions.245 
In such situations, regulatory restrictions would impose extra ad-
ministrative costs. On the other hand, if bargaining is very expensive 
and regulation is not, the efficiency gains of a regulatory restriction 
may very well outweigh its administrative costs. In such a situation 
an unregulated market would not reach operational efficiency 
through bargaining. If we are unsure about the relative costs of 
240, See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules, 11 
J. LAW &: ECON. 67, 67-73 (1968). While the perfect competition model also can be 
called tautological, it is explicitly used here as an analytical construct with discrete 
limits, rather than a comprehensive justification for actual trading patterns. 
241. See Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. 797, 817-27 (1973). 
242. See R. POSNER, supra note 213, at 183-84. 
243. Cf. BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 282, at A-7 (Dec. 18, 1974) (SEC hearings on 
beneficial ownership, mergers, and takeovers). -
244, Cf. G. CALABRE.SI, THE Cosr OF AccmENTs 137 n.4 (1970). There may also be 
the problem of a hold-out-a person who will not go along with the bargain and 
whose agreement is necessary for anything to be done. A good example is the owner 
of a few shares who will not approve a merger in a corporation that requires unanim-
ity for merger votes. For a discussion of the hold-out problem in another context, see 
David &: Whinston, The Economics of Urban Renewal, 26 LAw &: CONTEMP. PROB. 105, 
111 (1961). 
245. For an analysis of the way in which the class action mechanism may facilitate 
the bargaining process, see Note, The Cost-Internalization Case for Class Actions, 21 
STAN. L. REV. 383 (1969). 
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the two correction methods, or if we know that each method is 
superior in specific respects, then we should choose a combination 
of bargaining and regulation for transactional services.246 
b. Distributional concerns. The competitive process begins with 
the present distribution of income and then reaches the most efficient 
point for that distribution.247 Some people would prefer to change 
the present distribution of income, however, and advocate regulatory 
restrictions on stock transactions that would in effect subsidize needy 
groups. Economists often object to such restrictions on competition 
because they cause efficiency loss and administrative expense.248 In-
stead, economists suggest that the government achieve any desired 
redistribution by extramarket means (e.g., ta.xation) and allow the 
market to reach the most efficient point for this new income distribu-
tion. 249 
In the real world, the best method of redistribution is a more 
complicated question. The unstated premise of the economists is 
that extramarket distribution involves lower costs than those imposed 
by redistribution through restrictions on the market. In fact, extra-
market methods may themselves impose substantial costs.260 An in-
come tax, for example, requires a bureaucracy and may decrease the 
incentive to work.251 Because both taxation and regulatory restric-
tions may entail administrative expense and efficiency loss, the re-
vised Silver test is an appropriate tool for comparing the relative 
costs of these alternative methods of redistributing income. 
In discussions about reforms for the stock markets, a plea for the 
individual investor is often made on distributional grounds.262 Re-
cent proposals call for regulatory restrictions on share ownership21l3 
246. Professor Calabresi writes: "The resource allocation aim is to approximate, 
both closely and cheaply, the result the market would bring about if bargaining ac• 
tually were costless. The question then becomes: Is this accomplished most accurately 
and most cheaply by structural rules (like anti-trust laws), by liability rules, by tax-
ation and governmental spending, by letting the market have free play or by some 
combination of these?" Calabresi, supra note 240, at 69 (footnotes omitted). 
247. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L, REv. 1089, 1096 (1972). 
248. For an illustrative discussion o{ the problems caused by restrictions on the 
market process to help the poor, see R. POSNER, supra note 213, at 259-63, 
249. See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 203, at 1668-69. 
250. Taxation is the usual method by which income is redistributed outside of the 
market process. A tax without some distortion of efficient behavior, however, is vir• 
tually impossible to achieve. For a survey of the costs associated with different methods 
of redistribution, see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, Punuc FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRAcnCE 443-64 (1973). 
251. Polinsky, supra note 203, at 1678, 
252, See Rolo, The Case of the Vanishing Investor, N.Y. Times, June 9, 19'74, § 6 
(Magazine), at 14 aune 9, 1974). 
25!1. S. 2842, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-3 (1973). 
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and trading patterns254 of institutional investors aimed at protecting 
disadvantaged individual investors. The idea of restricting stock 
transactions to help individual investors, however, is fundamentally 
misguided on distributional grounds.255 Individual investors do not 
represent the poor or moderate-income families in America; indi-
vidual stock ownership is highly concentrated in families with annual 
incomes of over 100,000 dollars.256 In contrast, the beneficiaries of 
pension funds are mainly low or moderate-income families;257 the 
beneficiaries of mutual funds258 and the holders of insurance stocks259 
are middle-income more than wealthy families.260 While restrictions 
on stock transactions could be designed to increase the share owner-
ship of low and moderate-income families in the future, such re- . 
strictions would certainly be more costly than income redistribution 
through an established tax system. Redistribution through subsidized 
stock transactions allegedly offers the benefit of broader participation 
in corporate ownership,261 but the importance of this benefit is sus-
pect because small shareholders cannot effectively participate in the 
management of large corporations.262 
254. See text at notes 443-68 infra. 
255. To the extent that the plea for the individual investor has any validity, it is 
an efficiency argument about the adverse impact of institutional investors on liquidity-
a problem of market imperfection. See, for example, the critique of institutional impact 
qn market efficiency in Loomis, How the Terrible Two-Tier Market Came to Wall 
Street, FoRTUNE, July 1973, at 82. Even this efficiency argument, however, has been 
seriously questioned in recent studies of stock transactions by institutional investors. 
See INSTITllTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 196, pt. III, chs. 10-13; U.S. TREAS. 
DEPT., PllBUC POUCY FOR .AMERICAN CAI'ITAL MARKETS 12-15 (1974). 
256. These wealthy families own over 80 per cent of the market value of all corpo-
rate stock held by noninstitutional investors. INsnrunoNAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 
196, Supp. I, at 388, 392. 
257. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT. OF LABOR, REP. No. 423, COVERAGE AND 
VESTING OF FUU.•TIME EMPLOYEES UNDER PRIVATE RETIREMENT PLANS: FINDINGS FROM 
THE APRIL 1972 SURVEY 22 (1973). 
258. In 1970, the median income of mutual fund shareholders was $14,600, and 
only 30 per cent of all mutual fund shareholders had incomes above $20,000. DETAILED 
LooK, supra note 196, at 82. 
259. There is sparse data on the income distribution of insurance stockholders. 
Mutual insurance companies, which control two thirds of all insurance assets, are 
formally controlled by their policyholders. Because the two most important types of 
mutual insurance policies are automobile and ordinary life policies, the policyholders 
tend to represent a broad cross-section of the American population. For example, 57 
per cent of all new purchases of ordinary life insurance policies were made by indi-
viduals with annual incomes below $10,000. INsrITUTE OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSUR• 
ANCE FAcrBOOK 17 (1974). 
260. Although no precise statistics are available, most beneficiaries of bank trusts 
are probably from a high-income group. 
261. In the 1960's, for example, the NYSE used the following slogan in its adver-
tisements: "Own Your Share of American Business." Letter from Daniel H. Wood-
ward, Jr., to the author, January 29, 1975. 
262. See Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477 (1958). 
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Similarly, the distributional pleas for the small broker are at 
odds with the empirical data on the stock markets.263 It is often 
argued that regulatory restrictions on the market for stock trans-
actions are needed because open competition would lead to the 
demise of small brokerage firms.264 This argument assumes that small 
brokers are less efficient than large brokerage houses.200 That assump-
tion, however, has been refuted by several scholars.200 In the defini-
tive study on this subject, Professors Friend and Blume concluded: 
The study gives no support to the view that it is the small and 
regional firms which would be mainly affected by any decline 
in brokerage profitability, ·with possibly disastrous consequences 
for these firms and for sectors of the economy which they service. 
An analysis of the cost and profit structure of NYSE firms and of 
changes in the concentration of securities business over time 
leads to the conclusion that economies of scale in the brokerage 
business do not seem to be very strong, especially for regional 
firms.201 
Thus, while market imperfections and distributional concerns 
may justify regulatory restrictions in the stock market, the mere 
presence of some bargaining and redistribution costs does not require 
the imposition of regulatory restrictions. Rather, the decision to 
regulate should only follow a careful evaluation of regulatory ben-
efits, efficiency losses, and administrative expenses of the proposed 
restriction. Since some of these factors may not be readily quantifi-
able for particular restrictions, some per se rules for applying this 
new approach to stock transactions would be helpful.208 In light of 
the above critique of subsidizing transactions for needy investors or 
brokers, restrictions with such distributional goals should face a 
very strong negative presumption under the revised Silver test. The 
263. See Senate Report Analyzes Regulatory Paperwork Burden on Small Bro1'er-
Dealers, Criticizes SEC Progress, BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 257, at A-15 to -17 
aune 19, 1974). 
264. For example, the NYSE argues that fixed commission rates are necessary to 
subsidize small brokers against destructive competition from large brokers. See NYSE, 
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF NEGOTIATED COMMISSION RATES ON THE BROKERAGE JNDUSl'RY, TUE 
MARKET FOR CORPORATE SECURITIES, AND THE INVESTING Punuc 43-83 (1968). 
265. See SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 52. 
266. Dr. Garil has shown that, for the year 1967, 70 NYSE firms had higher profit 
margins than Merrill Lynch, the largest brokerage firm, and 240 firms had higher 
profit margins than the average for the largest IO brokerage firms. The NYSE's own 
analysis of its member firms in 1971 found that the average profit for all firms was 
6.2 per cent, as compared to 5.3 per cent for the 34 largest member firms. SENATE STUDY, 
supra note I, at 52-53. 
267. I. FRIEND&: M. BLUME, supra note 184, at 395. 
268. Cf. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of I.Aw and Economics, 
74 HARV. L. REv. 226, 278-355 (1960). 
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balance under the suggested approach is not so clear for restrictions 
on stock transactions designed to correct market imperfections. Be-
cause the data required to evaluate such restrictions may be subject 
to varying interpretations, the procedures for applying the revised 
Silver test must provide for competing fact-finders.269 
B. Procedures for the Revised Silver Test 
Implementation of the revised Silver test requires a new set of 
procedures less dependent on the courts. Without assistance from 
Congress, the SEC, and the Antitrust Division, many judges may be 
unable to carry out the economic analysis of empirical data de-
manded by the revised Silver test. Nor does the traditional separation 
between antitrust suits against SRO's and judicial review of SEC 
decisions make sense when one substantive test is used to evaluate all 
regulatory restrictions on stock markets. A single forum should be 
designated to review cases in light of input from the Congress, the 
SEC, and the Antitrust Division. 
I. Congress 
Congress has three main functions under the revised Silver test. 
First, it should pass legislation that defines the new substantive test 
and details procedures to be followed in assessing restrictions on 
transactional services. Under present law, a court could reach the 
revised Silver test by considering competitive factors under a public 
policy rubric on direct review of a regulatory restriction,270 or by 
taking a regulatory approach in applying the "necessity" test in an 
original antitrust suit.271 Similarly, courts might now create a single 
procedure for judicial review through liberal joinder of administra-
tive and antitrust claims272 and by permitting intervention by the 
Justice Department and the SEC in each other's cases.273 An explicit 
congressional mandate for the new substantive test, however, would 
provide a stronger legal foundation. The recent Senate bill moves 
in this direction by defining its "necessary or appropriate" standard 
in terms of the regulatory costs and benefits of any restriction.274 lts 
269. See text at notes 282-323 infra. 
270. Cf. Gulf State Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747, 756-62 (1973); Denver &: Rio 
Grande W. R.R. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967). 
271. Cf. Pitosky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the 
Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1007, 1057-58 (1969). 
272. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 18, 20, 42. 
273. See, e.g., Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 469 F.2d 14, 15 (7th Cir. 1972) (intervention 
by SEC and Antitrust Division); Justice Department Brief, supra note 112. 
274. See text at notes 170-72 supra. 
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provision for SEC and judicial review of almost all SRO decisions 
incorporates significant elements of the new procedure outlined 
below.275 
Congress might also involve itself more directly in assessing the 
effects of regulation. For example, it might set up new investiga-
tory teams on certain aspects of transactional services or direct the 
SEC to conduct such a study.276 Congress could demand more exten-
sive annual reports from the SEC about the costs of regulation.277 
Congressional committees could focus more clearly on the three vari-
ables weighed under the revised Silver test-regulatory benefits, 
efficiency losses, and administrative expenses-in hearings held to 
gather facts about stock market proposals.278 
Finally, when enacting legislation that affects stock markets, Con-
gress should provide the SEC ·with definite directions about restric-
tions on stock transactions. Congress could set up detailed regulatory 
schemes similar to the insurance system for broker-dealers passed in 
1970.279 To ensure periodic review, Congress could follow the legis-
lative model of section 167k of the I:qternal Revenue Code, which 
terminates at a specific date unless extended. Even if Congress gives 
the SEC open-ended authorization to implement reforms on a sub-
ject, it should articulate its desired regulatory goals in more precise 
terms than "investor protection" and "orderly markets."280 A de-
tailed congressional mandate would be favored by the courts under 
the procedures suggested below.2s1 
275. See text at notes 154-62 supra. But see text at notes 163-65 supra. 
In addition to the recent Senate bill, Congress would have to pass provisions with 
respect to the Antitrust Division's right to challenge SEC conclusions, see text at notes 
290-96 infra; the increased weight of the Division's findings in judicial review of SEC 
decisions, see text preceding note 302 infra; the elimination of antitrust claims against 
SRO's, see text at notes 297-301 infra; and the award of attorney's fees for successful 
appeals of SEC decisions. See te.xt at note 318 infra. 
276. Congress recently directed the SEC to undertake a study of institutional in• 
vestors. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 196, at v. Cf. S. Res. 109, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1971), authorizing the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs "to examine, investigate, and make a complete study of any and all 
matters pertaining to the securities industry and the securities markets of the United 
States." 
277. See, e.g., S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 17 (1975) (requiring cost-breakdowns on 
self-regulation). This section also requires the SEC to include in its annual reports 
information on the development of a national market system and the steps taken 
toward equal regulation of market participants. 
278. See, e.g., Securities Industry Study, supra note 191. 
279. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll (1970). 
280. Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § ll(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (1970). 
281. See text at notes 309-11 infra. 
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2. Administrative Agencies 
Even if Congress _provides more direction on regulatory policy 
for the stock market, the SEC will still have to implement con-
gressional mandates by issuing rules, and it should have the power 
to review all SRO restrictions.282 Before issuing its mvn rules or 
passing on SRO restrictions, however, the SEC should examine the 
regulatory benefits of its recommendations relative to their efficiency 
costs and administrative expenses.283 To conduct this analysis, the 
SEC could expand its currently small staff of in-house researchers 
with economic expertise;284 establish advisory committees, represent-
ing a broader cross-section of interests, to make recommendations 
on specific problems;285 and establish more pilot programs to gather 
282. Cf. text at notes 154-58 supra. 
283. The SEC would also be empowered to review all adjudications by an SRO, 
cf. text at note 156 supra, subject to review by a court of appeals. Cf. text at note 
161 supra. 
Review of an adjudication by the SEC could be sought on various grounds. If 
invalidity of an SRO rule under the new substantive test were asserted, the SEC would 
follow the procedures outlined below. See text at notes 320-23 infra. If, however, the 
appellant claims only that an othenvise valid restriction has been misapplied, the SEC 
would not have to undertake a thorough reevaluation of economic impact and regu-
latory benefit. Under the recent Senate bill, the SEC could affirm the SRO's decision, 
modify it, or remand for further proceedings, as well as cancel, reduce, or require. the 
remission of any penalty. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1975). While these remedies 
appear adequate for most cases, in some instances an aggrieved party may suffer mone-
tary damage because of an SRO's misapplication of its rules. The SEC therefore should 
have the power to award money damages to the aggrieved party. Cf. National Labor 
Relations Act § IO(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). This would not violate the SRO's 
seventh amendment right to a jury trial; the Supreme Court has cited administrative 
expertise as justifying an exception to tile right in agency proceedings. Curtis v. 
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1973). In addition, the aggrieved party might be able 
to sue the SRO for money damages under a statutory tort theory. See Baird v. Frank-
lin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Lowenfels, Private Enforce-
ment in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets: Implied Liabilities Based on NASD 
Rules, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 633 (1966); Note, 73 CoLUM, L. REv. 1262, supra note 55. 
284. The SEC now has one chief economist with .a small staff. SEC lawyers, not 
unlike other lawyers, are largely untrained in economics. Cf. Posner, Natural Monop-
oly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 623 (1969). 
285. The SEC has been working with a number of advisory committees on various 
aspects of the central market plan (see text at note 18 supra), but the committees 
suffer from several defects. The SEC is relying on a Securities Industry Association 
(SIA) committee for advice concerning a central clearing facility. The SIA is the trade 
organization of broker-dealers and does not hold publicly announced meetings. Inter-
view with Anthony Nuland, Special Counsel, SEC Office of Broker-Dealer Financial 
Responsibility and Securities Transactions, Washington, D.C., April 12, 1974. Similarly, 
the original advisory committee on the central market met in private and was com-
posed of nine representatives from the securities industry and two SEC staff members. 
SEC ADVISORY COMM. REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CENTRAL MARKET SYSTEM 
(1974), reprinted in CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. No. 469 (March 9, 1973). Recently, the SEC 
appointed a second advisory committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 
5 U.S.C. app. I, §§ 1-15 (Supp. II, 1972). This Act requires public meetings and public 
records. Although the new committee has five representatives from outsiQ.~ the broker-
362 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 73:317 
empirical data on regulatory proposals.286 The Commission should 
also hold hearings on all major regulatory decisions, not only to 
acquire relevant information but also to give affected market par-
ticipants and the Justice Department an opportunity to present their 
views.287 Counsel should be permitted for all participants in the 
hearing, and relevant SEC information should be available on re-
quest.288 After the hearing, the SEC would report its findings on 
each of the three factors considered under the revised Silver test and 
issue a reasoned opinion setting forth its conclusion as to whether 
regulatory benefits outweigh potential costs and losses.289 
The procedures outlined above should provide some check upon 
the regulatory predisposition of the SEC. Increased participation 
by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department may be expected 
to emphasize competitive values. The Division historically has been 
a strong critic of regulatory policies condoned by the SEC,200 and 
has vast experience in dealing with the economic impact of govern-
mental restrictions.201 Under the new procedure, it would have the 
power to challenge the SEC's conclusions about restrictions on stock 
transactions.292 Such an option would permit the Division to restrain 
dealer community, it has no representatives of small investors, and seven representa• 
tives, including the chairman, come from the securities industry. See the bibliography 
of members in SEC, Advisory Committee on the Implementation of a Central Market 
System-First Meeting Discussion Topics (l\fay 31, 1974). 
286. The SEC has held pilot runs for negotiated rates. See SEC Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 11019 (Sept. 19, 1974), BNA SEc. REG. &: L. REP. No. 270, at D-1 
(Sept. 25, 1974). 
287. The SEC has held many public hearings on proposed rules. See, e.g., id. at n.7 
(intramember rates). However, it has been criticized for not permitting full public 
participation in dealing with SRO rules. See SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 196-201. 
Cf. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 17 (1975). 
288. The SEC has not always permitted public inspection of documents relevant 
to regulatory decisions. See Note, supra note 51, at 822-23. Public inspection would be 
explicitly permitted when the SEC makes rules or regulations under S. 249, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. § l 7 (1975). 
289. A good model to follow would be the SEC's explanation of its position on t11c 
institutional membership rule. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, 
supra note 51. Such a reasoned defense of regulatory decisions is explicitly required 
for SEC rules or regulations by S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 15, 17 (1975). 
290. For example, the Justice Department initiated the challenge to fL'{ed commis-
sion rates. See R. WESr &: S. TINic, supra note 178, at 202. 
291. For a description of the enforcement policies of the Antitrust Division, sec 
A. NEALE, supra note 145, ch. XIII. But compare the criticism of the Division's alleged 
lax enforcement in M. GREEN, B. MooRE &: B. WAssERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE 
SYSTEM 30-144 (1972). 
292. For an analogous approach, see the role of the Environmental Protection 
Agency in publishing environmental critiques under the Clean Air Act§ 309, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1857h-7 (1970), and that of the Council on Environmental Quality under the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970). See generally Leven-
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SEC decisions with serious anticompetitive effects, without subject-
ing the Commission to attacks on inconsequential measures. 
The procedures available to the Antitrust Division would be as 
follows: If the Division objects to the anticompetitive effects of a 
proposed regulatory restriction, it would have sixty days in which 
to file critical comments with the SEC. If the SEC either fails to 
respond or alters its proposed regulation in a manner unsatisfactory 
to the Division, the latter could solicit written comments and, at the 
request of a party aggrieved by the proposal, hold its own hearing 
on efficiency losses. The Antitrust Division would ultimately publish · 
its findings on efficiency losses and its overall conclusion as to the 
validity of the restriction under the revised Silver test. Like the SEC, 
the Division would give a reasoned defense of its position and pro-
vide public access to relevant documents. At each step the Division's 
action should conform to its own published guidelines for competi-
tion in the securities industry.293 
An adverse conclusion by the Antitrust Division could stimulate 
negotiations between the Division and the SEC on revising the pro-
posed regulation.294 In these negotiations the SEC would be under 
pressure from several sources to accommodate the view of the Anti-
trust Division. The Division's notices in the Federal Register might 
attract the critical attention of legislators- as well as the news media. 
The Division's negative findings on efficiency losses would form 
part of the record subsequently reviewed by a court of appeals under 
the procedure described below.295 Moreover, the SEC may sometimes 
use the Division's opposition for leverage in negotiations with anti-
competitive groups from the securities industry.296 
thal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 
509, 511-18 (1974). 
293. The Justice Department should formulate guidelines for intervention into 
SEC regulatory decisions, similar to those it has issued for challenges to mergers. See 
Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 4510 at 6,881 
(1974). Cf. Posner, A Program for the Antitrust Division, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 500, 529-31 
(1971). Published guidelines would give notice to the SEC and the SRO's of what the 
Division considers anticompetitive activity in the securities industry. They would also 
provide a constraint upon the exercise of the Antitrust Division's statutory option to 
sue. To guard against neglect or abuse of the option to sue, private parties should be 
given the right to seek an injunction requiring the Antitrust Division to follow its 
guidelines. 
294. Cf., e.g., Harlem Valley Transp. Assn. v. Stafford, 500 F.2d 328, 331-32 (2d Cir. 
1974). 
295. See text preceding note 302 infra. 
296. For instance, the opposition of the Justice Department to fixed commission 
rates provided the SEC with some leverage in its later attempts to introduce negotiated 
rates. See Note, 55 V4. L. REv. 661, supra note 28, at 667. 
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3. Courts 
Persons who have unsuccessfully challenged a proposed regulatory 
restriction in the SEC's validation proceedings would have a right 
to appeal the Commission's decision to a court of appeals within 
sixty days after expiration of the period during which the Antitrust 
Division might act, or, if the Division does act, within sixty days 
after the Division publishes its findings.297 While similar disputes 
may now be heard either in an original antitrust suit against an SRO 
or pursuant to judicial review of an SEC decision,208 the proposed 
reform would limit review to a single judicial appeal: Disputes 
involving SRO actions reviewed by the SEC would be litigated only 
on review of SEC decisions in the courts of appe~s, and antitrust 
suits against SRO's would be eliminated. The proposal is designed 
to emphasize the respective advantages of both existing procedures. 
Agencies are better equipped than antitrust courts to gather the 
empirical data required under the revised Silver test.200 The SEC's 
increasing involvement in the regulatory actions of SRO's800 and 
the development of a central market system,801 in particular, make 
the Commission a more competent forum in which to build a record 
for further review than a district court. This is not to suggest, how-
ever, that judicial review of SEC decisions should be a narrow in-
quiry into abuses of SEC discretion. Rather, the court should make 
a relatively independent assessment of a challenged restriction with 
the aid of competing fact-finders, and should provide appropriate 
relief before monetary claims arise from anticompetitive regulations. 
In reviewing the SEC's conclusions on a regulatory restriction 
under the revised Silver test, the court should use the substantial 
evidence rule to assess only the SEC's findings on regulatory benefits 
and administrative expense: It should obtain data on efficiency 
losses from other sources. If the Antitrust Division has made findings 
on efficiency losses, the court should apply the substantial evidence 
test to them. If the Antitrust Division has not exercised its option, 
the court should review de novo the SEC's findings on efficiency 
losses and permit the parties to present affidavits on this factor. By 
utilizing competing fact-finders,302 the new procedure permits the 
297. The Antitrust Division might also be empowered to appeal SEC decisions. 
298. See text at notes 37-39 supra. 
299. See Note, The Back Office Problem and the Antitrust Laws, 69 C0Lu11r. L. 
R.Ev. 299, 307 (1969); Note, 1970 U. !LL. L.F. 544, supra note 28, at 566-67. 
300. For the judicial trend, see text at notes 42-55 supra; for the legislative trend, 
see text at notes 154-62 supra. 
301. See text at note 18 supra. 
302. One of the drawbacks in the analogous area of environmental law is the prac-
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court some independence from any one agency's special expertise 
and bias, and simultaneously avoids a rehearing of all of the evi-
dence.303 
The court would independently balance the agency findings 
under the revised Silver test to determine whether regulatory benefits 
in fact out:w-eigh efficiency losses and administrative costs.3M The 
result under this balancing test will sometimes be clear-cut. For 
instance, a restriction may give rise to substantial regulatory benefits 
with negligible efficiency losses,305 or it may not implement any reg-
ulatory goals.306 However, the courts will face difficult cases in which 
the economic analysis of the revised Silver test will not yield a clear-
cut answer. In such cases, the court could appoint an economics 
expert as a master to assist in the decision,807 ask an agency to obtain 
more information about the impact of a regulation, or tentatively 
approve a new regulation while retaining jurisdiction in anticipation 
of subsequent developments.808 
I£ resolution on the economic merits of the dispute remains 
unclear, courts should consider the following guidelines for disposing 
of the case. First, courts should look for direction from Congress. 
Congress sometimes passes detailed regulations for stock transac-
tions.809 When such legislative mandates are incorporated into SEC 
or SRO restrictions, courts should defer to the implicit congressional 
judgment that the benefits of the regulation outweigh its adminis-
trative and efficiency costs. No such deference is due SEC or SRO 
regulations that are based only upon some vague legislative mandate 
tical difficulty of reviewing cost-benefit analyses offered by only one agency. Instead of 
undertaking an independent examination of the data, some courts have refused to 
review the agency determinations. See Leventhal, supra note 292, at 527-29. 
303. The Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), exemplify the Su-
preme Court's reluctance to immerse itself in the technical minutiae' of a heavily 
regulated industry. While some older cases required de novo review of agency decisions 
in certain areas, these precedents are waning quickly. DAVIS TEXT, supra note 152, 
at 539-42. The court has gravitated more and more to the substantial evidence rule. 
Id. at 526. 
304. Courts are now undertaking review of cost-benefit analyses in the environmen-
tal area. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123, 
1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For a defense of the feasibility of a balancing test on the similar 
issue of state regulation and the antitrust law, see Slater, supra note 106, at 104-08. 
305. Cf. text at notes 131-32 supra. 
306. If regulatory gains and efficiency losses are both zero, the restriction would be 
invalid because all restrictions impose some administrative expense. 
307. See, e.g., First Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas &: Elec. Coop., 245 
F.2d 613, 627-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957). See generally Kaufman, 
Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 CoLtJM. L. R.Ev. 452, 455-59 (1958). 
308. Cf. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 381 (1973). 
309. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7Saaa-lll 
(1970). 
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such as promoting investor protection or stabilizing the stock mar-
ket.310 Indeed, courts should discount the benefits of these regu-
lations; such vague policies could be employed to rationalize almost 
any anticompetitive intrusion into the market for stock transactions. 
Intermediate situations, in which regulations are authorized by Con-
gress on certain discrete subjects without delineation of their con-
tent,311 should carry no presumption, so courts must use other 
guidelines. 
Second, the courts should favor regulations aimed at facilitating 
the bargaining process in the private market and disfavor those 
involving a high degree of government intervention into the securi-
ties business, because efficiency losses from the former are generally 
easier to correct.812 For example, compare a regulation making 
brokers liable for damages incurred by nondisclosure of certain 
information with a flat requirement that this information be given 
to all investors. Assume that certain information covered by both 
regulations ultimately proves worthless to investors. While the 
liability regulation provides a mechanism by which to correct re-
source misallocations, the disclosure requirement does not. 
Similarly, courts should favor restrictions that may readily be 
corrected through the political process if proved unwise.318 Assume, 
for example, that the enforcement costs for margin requirements 
could be financed either through a user tax on investors with margin 
accounts or an SEC appropriation taken from general tax revenues. 
If enforcement costs ultimately exceed regulatory benefits, investors 
with margin accounts are more likely to bring political pressure for 
a new regulation than are taxpayers in general. 
In doubtful cases courts should also view critically a regulation 
whose goals can as well be achieved by existing legal mechanisms,814 
such as private suits, SEC actions under existing regulations aimed at 
specific abuses,315 or more general rules, such as rule IOb-5.816 Con-
310. See, e.g., SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 161-63 (rules adopted by two exchanges 
concerning sales of life insurance by member firms). 
3ll. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § ll(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a) (1970). 
312. See G. CALABREsJ, supra note 244, at 150-52. 
313. See generally id. at 144-50. 
314. See R. PoSNER, supra note 213, at 156. 
315. See, e.g., rule 15cl-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7 (1974). See generally Note, Churn-
ing by Securities Dealers, BO HARV. L. REv. 869 (1967). 
316. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5 (1974). See Jacobs, The Impact of Securities Exchange 
Act Rule lOb-5 on Broker-Dealers, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 869 (1972). 
The SEC is empowered to investigate abuses in securities markets. Securities Ex• 
change Act of 1934, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1970). Injunctive actions by the SEC may 
serve as the basis for private damage actions, See, e.g., Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
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versely, if the current remedies for a particular abuse are inade-
quate,317 courts should be more favorably disposed toward new 
regulation aimed at the abuse. 
If the results of the balancing test are favorable-that is, if regu-
latory benefit outweighs efficiency loss and administrative costs-the 
court would validate the regulation. If the results are unfavorable, 
the court would invalidate the regulation, enjoin its future enforce-
ment, and award the plaintiff attorney's fees to be paid by the issuer 
of the regulation.318 Invalidation and award of fees should provide 
sufficient incentive for challenging regulatory restrictions to in-
vestors, brokers, exchanges, and other parties who may be injured 
by the implementation of anticompetitive regulations. The court, 
however, would generally not be permitted to entertain damage 
claims against SRO's for past injuries caused by an invalidated regu-
lation.319 After Congress enacts the new review procedures, a regula-
tion alleged by the Justice Department or an aggrieved party to have 
anticompetitive effects on stock transactions will not become effective 
unless it meets the revised Silver test according to the combined 
judgment of the SEC, the Antitrust Division, and the courts. 
Four main problems are raised by the elimination of damage 
claims against SRO's for invalid restrictions, all of which can be 
resolved by appropriate provisions in new legislation. First, some 
plaintiffs may have filed antitrust suits against SRO's before the 
enactment of the new procedures for deciding cases under the revised 
Silver test. The new legislation should not be retroactive; any prior 
claim for monetary damages would be decided under prior law.329 
Second, some existing regulations not previously scrutinized under 
the revised Silver test may have serious anticompetitive effects on 
stock transactions.321 The new legislation should therefore require 
the SEC to review all current restrictions on stock transactions322 
Co., 309 F. Supp. 548 (D. Utah 1970) (private suits based upon SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971)). 
317. Private investor suits may be inadequate in certain areas because investors are 
unable to detect abuses or because individually they have insufficient financial interests 
to justify litigation. They may also face defendants with funds inadequate to pay 
judgments. But cf. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, §§ 5-6, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78eee-
lli (1970) (protection against brokers as bankrupt defendants). 
318. Cf., e.g., Clayton Act§ 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); Communications Act of 1934, 
§ 206, 47 u.s.c. 206 (1970). 
319. But see note 283 supra (money damages for misapplication of a previously 
approved regulation). 
320. See generally text at notes 37-152 supra. 
321. See SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 104-05. 
322. Cf. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 26 (1975). 
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within one year and invoke the new procedures for any regulation 
at the request of the Justice Department or an aggrieved person. 
Third, years after a regulation has been validated it may impose 
new anticompetitive effects because of changes in the structure of 
the securities industry. The new legislation should require the SEC 
to review all restrictions at reasonable intervals (e.g., every seven 
years) and to hold hearings on a regulation at the request of the 
Justice Department or an aggrieved party. Fourth, between these 
periodic reviews a validated regulation may impose anticompetitive 
effects with respect to a party who was not eligible to participate in 
previous validation proceedings.323 The new legislation should permit 
the party to contest the regulation under the revised Silver test by 
making a prima facie showing of important evidence that was not 
considered by the SEC at the last validation proceeding. 
In sum, the revised Silver test envisions input from all three 
branches of government in dealing with regulatory restrictions on 
stock transactions. Congress should provide empirical data on the 
stock markets and articulate a set of regulatory goals. The SEC should 
assess the regulatory and competitive impact of all restrictions, al-
though the Justice Department should have the option to issue 
independent :findings on competitive impact. After deferring to the 
SEC .findings on administrative costs and regulatory benefits and to 
the Justice Department :findings on efficiency losses, the courts should 
weigh three factors according to the revised Silver test. Because the 
courts will favor regulations based on detailed legislative enactments 
and supported by the Justice Department, Congress should have 
increased incentive to articulate more precise mandates for the SEC, 
and the SEC s~ould give more weight to the critiques of the Antitrust 
Division. Ultimately, such disputes should be settled without fre-
quent resort to the judiciary. 
III. .APPLICATION OF THE ALTERNATIVE .APPROACH TO 
SELECTED REGULATORY DECISIONS, 
To illustrate the utility of the revised Silver test, this section will 
compare the results of its application to certain regulatory decisions 
with those obtained under the present approach. Current reforms 
in the securities industry provide concrete examples for comparison. 
While the NYSE and other exchanges have heretofore maintained 
minimum commission rates that member firms may charge public 
323. For example, a person might not have owned any stock at the time of the 
last validation proceeding. See also note 283 supra. 
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investors,324 the SEC has announced the institution of negotiated 
rates as of May 1, 1975.325 The absence of a common communications 
system826 and the existence of regulatory barriers827 have inhibited 
comparative shopping by brokers among marketplaces, but the SEC 
has issued policy statements favoring a central market connecting all 
brokers.828 In the context of these recent developments, this section 
will analyze: (1) an antitrust suit before the Supreme Court chal-
lenging fixed commission rates; (2) congressional and SEC proposals 
for the transition from negotiated rates to the central market; and 
(3) the SEC's plan for a central tape as the first part of the central 
communications system. 
A. Fixed Commission Rates and the Gordon Case 
By granting certiorari in Gordon v. NYSE,829 the Supreme Court 
has decided to examine the proper forum for an antitrust suit against 
a stock exchange for the first time since Silver was decided.380 The 
plaintiff in Gordon sued the NYSE and AMEX831 for fixing commis-
sion rates in violation of the antitrust laws.832 The district court 
granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that it could 
not hear the antitrust claim because section 19(b)(9) of the 1934 Act 
324. For a history of fixed commission rates, see R. DoEDE, THE MONOPOLY PowER 
OF THE NEW YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE Oune 1967), reprinted in Hearings on S. ]169, 
supra note 184, at 405, 409-27. 
325. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11203, supra note 16. 
326. Historically, the tape, quote, and clearing systems that did exist were attached 
exclusively to one marketplace, although lately there has been some cooperation be-
tween marketplaces, as with the joint clearing corporation of the NYSE and AMEX. 
See HOUSE STUDY, supra note 7, at 59-63; SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 96-104. For 
this rc,ason, a broker could not compare price information on stocks offered simul-
taneously in different marketplaces, and could clear only at marketplaces of which the 
broker was a member. 
327. See HouSE STUDY, supra note 7, at 126-28; SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 
104-05. 
328. The central communications plan includes tape, quote, and clearing systems 
that would connect all existing marketplaces. See SEC Policy Statement, supra note 18, 
at 11-16. 
329. 498 l'.2d 1303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3290 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1974) 
(No. 74-304). 
330. See text at notes 30-36 supra. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U,S. 289 
(1973), was an antitrust claim against a commodities exchange. See note 42 and text 
at notes 42-46 supra. 
331. The complaint also accused two representative member firms of the exchanges 
-Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner&: Smith and Bache&: Co., Inc. 498 F.2d at 1304 n.l. 
332. The claim was based on the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970), as well as 
the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(2) (1970). The court stated that there was 
no precedent for treating brokerage services as "commodities" for the purpose of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, and held that only the Sherman Act claim was cognizable. 
498 F.2d at 1305 n.7. 
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gave the SEC exclusive jurisdiction over commission rates.333 In an 
opinion by Chief Judge Kaufman, the Second Circuit affirmed and 
suggested that an appeal from SEC action was the proper route for 
judicial review of commission rates.334 The court justified this choice 
of forum on four grounds: the Supreme Court's opinion in Silver, 
the legislative history of the 1934 Act, the st,atutory language of that 
Act, and policy arguments favoring administrative hearings. None 
of these reasons, however, properly disposes of Gordon. So long as 
the case is couched as a jurisdictional choice between an administra-
tive agency and an antitrust court,335 the Supreme Court cannot base 
its decision on firm legal grounds or clear policy reasons. 
I. The Second Circuit's Approach to Gordon 
In Gordon, Chief Judge Kaufman said: "Any analysis of the 
interrelation of the antitrust laws and the system of supervised ex-
change self-regulation embodied in the 1934 Act must begin with 
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange ... .''336 According to Kaufman, 
the Court decided Silver in favor of antitrust court jurisdiction be-
cause the absence of SEC jurisdiction over the relevant regulation 
precluded judicial conflict with the agency, and denial of antitrust 
court jurisdiction would have left no governmental body to prevent 
unjustifiable injury to competition.337 Since the SEC can review 
commission rates under section 19(b)(9), however, the court con-
cluded that "the Silver rationale might well authorize us to ground 
our holding here on the existence of SEC review power • . . ."338 
But, as the Chief Judge recognized, the Court in Silver explicitly 
reserved decision on cases in which the SEC has jurisdiction to review 
a challenged rule.339 Other courts have read Silver to imply the 
existence of antitrust court jurisdiction in cases subject to SEC over-
sight.340 If the meaning of the Silver opinion for antitrust claims 
333. 366 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
334. 498 F.2d at 1311. Chief Judge Kaufman noted that an appeal could be taken 
under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1970), or Administrative 
Procedure Act §§ IO(a), (c), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1970). 498 F.2d at 1311. 
335. See text at notes 37.39 supra. 
336. 498 F.2d at 1305. 
337. 498 F.2d at 1305. 
338. 498 F.2d at 1305. 
339. 498 F.2d at 1305. See note 41 supra and accompanying text. 
340. See, e.g., Thill Sec. Corp. v. NYSE, 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
401 U.S. 994 (1971). See also Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc., 451 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972), discussed in note 83 supra; Frederickson v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 8' Smith, BNA SEC. REc. 8' L. REP. No. 271, at D-1 
(Oct. 2, 1972). 
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subject to SEC review were as clear as the Second Circuit suggested, 
there might not have been a split in the lower courts on such claims841 
and the Supreme Court might not have granted certiorari in Gor-
don.s42 
Chief Judge Kaufman next asserted that "[e]xemption from the 
antitrust laws with regard to the fixing of minimum rates of com-
mission is . . . mandated by both the language and the legislative 
history of the 1934 Act, and in particular § 19(b)(9) .... "848 He 
interpreted the legislative history of section 19(b)(9) in light of con-
gressional awareness that price-fixing had been declared a per se 
violation of the antitrust laws,344 that minimum commission rates 
had existed in the securities industry,345 and that, according to Sam-
uel :Untermeyer, section 19(b)(9) "would permit the Commission to 
fix rates."346 Even the district court in Gordon concluded, however, 
"that the legislative history of the 1934 Act is, perhaps typically, 
ambiguous as to Congress' intent regarding the Exchanges' long-
standing practice of fixing commission rates."347 Moreover, the Jus-
tice Department has marshaled historical evidence to show that the 
1934 Act was not intended to mandate fixed commission rates,848 
including testimony by Untermeyer interpreting section 19(b)(9) as 
a protection for investors against excessive commissions.349 
From the statutory language of the 1934 Act, the Second Circuit 
formulated a nvo-step argument against antitrust court jurisdiction 
in Gordon. First, section 19(b)(9) indicates that reasonable fixed rates 
are essential to achieve the goals of the 1934 Act.350 Second, section 
341. See text at notes 72-83 supra. 
342. U.S. SUP. Cr. R. 19(l)(b) states as a possible circumstance in which certiorari 
will be granted: "Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with 
the decision of another court of appeals on the same matter • . • ." 
343. 498 F.2d at 1307, citing United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 
(1927). 
344. 498 F.2d at 1307. 
345. 498 F.2d at 1307. 
346. 498 F.2d at 1307, citing Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97 
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 16, at 
7705 (1934). 
Samuel Untermeyer was counsel for a concurrent congressional investigation of the 
stock markets (the Pujo Committee). Comments of the Justice Department on the 
Proposal To Adopt Securities Exchange Act Rules l9b--3 and lOb--22, SEC File No. 
4-176, at 9 (Dec. 10, 1974) [hereinafter Justice Comments]. 
347. 366 F. Supp. at 1266. Professor Baxter has written: "[.f]he attention of Con• 
gress in 1934 was focused on problems of dishonesty, manipulation, and solvency, and 
• • • no coherent congressional purpose was articulated concerning the problems of 
intra-industry competitive structure," Baxter, supra note 16, at 685. 
348. See Justice Comments, supra note 346, at 5-11. 
349. Id. at 9 n.16. 
350. 498 F.2d at 1306. 
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19(b) gives the SEC authority to determine whether changes in the 
fixed rates at any exchange are "necessary" to the goals of the Act.3111 
This statutory argument would support the conclusion that the SEC 
should have the first chance to deal wth claims against commission 
rates on exchanges; indeed, Ricci might require such a conclusion 
given subsection 19(b)(9).852 But Chief Judge Kaufman went much 
further: "As our earlier discussion of the language and history of the 
1934 Act indicates, we are of the view that Congress intended to 
exempt commission rate-fixing from the operation of the antitrust 
laws, and consequently deprived the courts of even 'secondary' juris-
diction ... .''358 If this language means that a court cannot entertain 
an antitrust claim on which the SEC has explicitly refused to act, 
Chief Judge Kaufman is wrong. The Supreme Court in Ricci indi-
cated that the antitrust court should adjudicate the claim in such a 
case.354 If Kaufman's language means that an antitrust court cannot 
entertain a claim on which the SEC has taken some action, his posi-
tion is hardly compelled by congressional intent as inferred from 
statutory language. One could reasonably infer an opposite congres-
sional intent from the omission of an explicit antitrust exemption 
for exchanges in the 1934 Act,355 especially in light of the explicit 
exemption for the NASD in the Maloney Act of 1938.81i6 
The inconclusiveness of the judicial precedents, legislative his-
tory, and statutory language requires investigation of policy reasons 
for the choice of forum.857 Chief Judge Kaufman presented strong 
arguments for deference to the SEC in Gordon. Since 1968, the SEC 
has been actively reviewing the commission rates established by the 
stock exchanges.858 I£ the antitrust courts entertain the Gordon 
claim, conflict might arise between the SEC and the courts.860 More-
over, the Commission's expertise better suits it to decide such a 
351. 498 F.2d at 1306. 
352. See text at notes 42-55 supra. 
353. 498 F.2d at 1309-10 n.8. 
354. See note 70 supra and accompanying text. Othenvise, there would be no body 
to guard against antitrust infringements. See text at note 337 supra. 
355. See, e.g., Frederickson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &: Smith, DNA SEc. 
REG. &: L. REP. No. 271, at D--1, D--2 to -3 (Oct. 2, 1972), citing cases in which the 
Supreme Court I1as disfavored implied exceptions to the antitrust laws. 
356. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(n), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(n) (1970). See 
note 83 supra. For discussion of the opposing inferences that may be drawn from com-
parisons between the original language of the 1934 Act and the Maloney Act (now 
section 15A of the 1934 Act), see Comment, supra note 28, at 291 n.138. 
357. Cf. text at notes 84-100 supra. 
358. 498 F.2d at 1308-09. 
359. 498 F.2d at 1307-08. 
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fundamental issue as rate structure.380 In particular, the SEC is better 
able than the courts to supervise the gradual introduction of nego-
tiated rates needed to protect investors against the precipitous col-
lapse of inefficient brokerage firms.361 Kaufman's opinion, however, 
omits arguments that favor antitrust jurisdiction. Although the SEC 
has expertise in the ar~a of market regulation, the antitrust courts 
have expertise on matters of competition.362 Generally the SEC has a 
bureaucratic bent toward regulation rather than competition, which 
cannot be checked effectively by judicial review.363 Moreover, brokers 
have already absorbed much of the sudden impact of negotiated 
rates through the dramatic decline in the price of a NYSE seat,364 
and investors would be compensated for losses incurred in any broker 
bankruptcies under the new mandatory insurance scheme.361> 
Finally, the Gordon court did not focus on the issue of remedies, 
illustrating the unviability of the choices open to a court under the 
jurisdictional approach.366 If the Supreme Court remands the case 
and permits Gordon to proceed with his antitrust suit, a district 
court may be obliged to order the NYSE to pay treble damages of 
over one billion dollars.367 Such a huge award seems unfair, because 
the SEC has had the power to alter exchange rates since 1934368 and 
did not challenge the minimum commission schedules until 1968.369 
360. 498 F.2d at 1!109. 
361. 498 F.2d at 1309. 
362. See note 86 supra. 
363. See text at notes 96-98 supra. For instance, the Second Circuit dismissed an 
appeal of an SEC letter voicing no objection to the NYSE's proposed changes in its 
commission rates after more than three years of hearings on that subject. Independent 
Investor Protective League v. SEC, No. 71-1924 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 1971) (unreported), 
cited in SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 209. 
364. The price of an NYSE seat, once worth more than $500,000, has dropped to 
$72,000 in recent years. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1975, § 3, at 13, cols. 4-5 (late city ed.). 
365. See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-ZZZ (1970). 
To the extent that insurance rates are raised to make up deficits in the SIPA fund 
caused by broker bankruptcies, the costs of an antitrust decision against fixed rates 
would be passed on in part to investors. Alternatively, such a deficit could be financed 
by a congressional appropriation, so that the loss would be spread to all citizens. 
366. Although the SEC will unfix commission ntes as of May 1, 1975, see text at 
note 325 supra, this will not affect Gordon's claims as to damages for past actions of 
the NYSE. As to future actions, the SEC's decision to terminate fixed rates may be 
significant even if the Commission's legal authority to do so is successfully challenged 
by the NYSE. See BNA SEc. REG. 8: L. REP. No. 286, at A-3 (Jan. 22, 1975). A court 
could hold that, regardless of the SEC's legal authority to unfix rates, the Commission's 
regulatory findings mean that minimum rate schedules are no longer "necessary" to the 
goals of the 1934 Act under Silver. See note 33 supra. 
367. Gordon demanded $1.5 billion in treble damages and $10 million in attorneys' 
fees. Complaint ,i 22d. 
368. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 7Ss(b)(9) (1970). 
369. For a history of objections to minimum commission ntes, see R. WFSr 8: 
S. TINIC, supra note 178, at 200-05. 
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However, if the Court allows Gordon only to appeal SEC orders 
or decisions on commission rates under section 25 of the 1934 Act 
or under the Administrative Procedure Act,870 a lower court cannot 
impose any penalty on the NYSE.871 Such lenient treatment also 
seems unfair, because the NYSE has fixed prices for many years872 
and has fought against the SEC's recent efforts to institute negotiated 
rates.373 
2. An Alternative Approach to Gordon 
If Congress had enacted the procedures for the revised Silver 
test before the Gordon case arose, the court of appeals would not 
have confronted the Hobson's choice between a treble damage suit 
against the NYSE and judicial review of SEC discretion. The SEC 
would have conducted hearings on fixed commission rates374 and the 
Antitrust Division could have intervened to challenge the SEC's 
conclusions.375 On appeal, the court would have employed the sub-
stantial evidence test to review the Antitrust Division's findings on effi-
ciency losses and the SEC's findings on administrative expenses and 
regulatory benefits. The court would then have balanced these three 
factors under the revised Silver test. If fixed commission rates sur-
vived the test, the plaintiff could later have challenged them only 
at the periodic SEC review of restrictions on stock transactions.876 
If fixed commission rates did not meet the test, they would no longer 
have been in effect and therefore would not have given rise to Gor-
don's claim. 
While this hypothetical application of the alternative approach 
to fixed commission rates cannot be described precisely, the analysis 
370. Administrative Procedure Act § IO(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). See text at notes 
61-67 supra. 
371. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text. 
372. See R. PosNER, supra note 213, at 201. 
373. For a review of the history of the controversy since 1968, see SEC Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. II093 (Nov. 8, 1974), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 80,007. In 
1968 and 1969, the NYSE presented the SEC with elaborate briefs defending fixed 
commission rates. See Ba.xter, supra note 16, at 694. The NYSE refused to comply with 
the SEC's request to unfix floor brokerage rates in 1974. See SEC Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. II073, supra note 16, at 84, 547-58 n.3. At the recent SEC hearings on 
proposed rule 19b--3, the chairman of the NYSE intimated that it will challenge the 
SEC's authority to unfix commission rates. See BNA SEC. REG, & L. REP. No. 281, 
at AA-2 (Dec. II, 1974). 
374. See text at notes 321-22 supra. 
375. See text at notes 290-96 supra. 
376. See text preceding note 323 supra. If Gordon had filed suit before legislative 
enactment of the revised Silver text, the case would be decided under current law even 
if Congress did enact new procedures. See text at note 320 supra. 
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called for by the revised Silver test probably would have taken the 
following lines. In making findings on efficiency losses, the Justice 
Department would have attempted to demonstrate the impact of 
fixed rates on the choice of marketplace for execution. The evidence 
is fairly strong that fixed rate schedules induced execution of many 
orders in marketplaces without certain regulatory restrictions, rather 
than in the most efficient marketplace.377 Since the NYSE's minimum 
commission schedule exceeded actual transactioJ:! costs for large 
orders,378 institutional investors were driven to regional exchanges 
and the OTC. Most regional exchanges further attracted trades by 
permitting institutional investors to become members and execute 
trades for their mm accounts, at actual transaction costs,379 and by 
offering complicated schemes that allowed institutional investors to 
direct part of the fixed commissions to nonmember firms for services 
other than execution.880 To undercut the minimum prices in the 
NYSE schedule, institutional investors began to negotiate in the 
"third-market"-they traded for NYSE-listed stocks in the OTC.881 
In addition, they traded· directly among themselves, in the so-called 
"fourth market.''382 
In making findings on regulatory expenses, the SEC would have 
determined the administrative problems created for. the SR O's and 
the Commission by the minimum fee schedule. To enforce its mini-
mum schedule, the NYSE prohibited institutional mmership of 
NYSE firms383 so that funds could not trade for their mm accounts 
at actual transaction costs, and virtually prevented NYSE members 
from negotiating trades in the third market at prices lower than the 
NYSE schedule.384 Because of their discriminatory effect on certain 
investors and marketplaces, these two rules became the subject of 
377. See SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 49-51. 
378. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SruDY, supra note 196, pt. 8, at 102. While the 
NYSE introduced some volume discounts in 1968, there were still substantial differ-
ences between actual transaction costs and the NYSE schedule. See SENATE SruDY, supra 
note 1, at 65. 
379. For a survey of exchange rules on institutional membership, see SENATE STUDY, 
supra note 1, at 71-73. 
380. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 196, pt. 8, at 103; Ratner, supra 
note 200, at 356-57. 
381. See INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 196, pt. 8, at 91-92. 
382. For a discussion of the fourth market, see S. ROBBINS, SEcURlUES MARKErs 
257-59 (1966). For a description of Instinet, the information system for the fourth mar-
ket, see R. WEST & S. TINIC, supra note 178, at 70-71. 
383, See Baxter, supra note 16, at 679-83. 
384. See NYSE Rule 394, 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE ~ 2394 (1974). The NYSE has an-
nounced recently that it is lessening restrictions against third-market trading by NYSE 
members. See BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 272, at A-7 (Oct. 9, 1974). 
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administrative disputes between the SRO's and the SEC.386 The SEC 
concluded that it was incapable of reviewing the reasonableness of 
the minimum fee schedules in a manner similar to a public utility 
commission.386 The exchanges could not generate appropriate cost 
data to support their rate schedules and the SEC could not develop 
adequate criteria for an industry with such a heterogeneous group 
of :firms.ss1 
Two of the alleged regulatory benefits of fixed commission rates 
would focus on distributional concerns, and therefore would have to 
overcome a strong negative presumption against implementing dis-
tributional goals through stock market restrictions.388 The first 
distributional argument would be that uniform charges by brokers 
to all customers give cross-subsidies to individual investors from 
institutional investors, because of the lower transaction costs for 
large blocks.389 Since individual stock ownership is more concen-
trated among the wealthy than the beneficial ownership of most 
institutional funds,390 however, this cross-subsidy cannot be supported 
on distributional grounds. Also, institutional investors usually do 
not employ the same brokers as individual investors,391 and under 
negotiated rates even brokers handling individual customers might 
execute for fees lower than the NYSE minimum schedule.392 The 
second distributional argument would be that fixed commissions 
protect small brokers against destructive competition from large 
brokers.393 But the NYSE studies to support this argument have been 
cogently assailed by Professor Baxter.394' Other studies show that, 
385. See Note, supra note 51, at 820-25. For a discussion of the dispute over insti• 
tutional ownership rules, see SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 64-87. 
386. See SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 47-48. 
387. See Justice Comments, supra note 346, at 25-31. 
388. See text at notes 247-69 supra. 
389. See SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 58-59; Baxter, supra note 16, at 695. 
390. See text at notes 256-60 supra. 
391. See SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 58. Therefore no cross-subsidy can result 
from a uniform charge by a broker to both categories of investors. 
392. By providing "bare-bones" execution, without the other services now auto• 
matically included in fixed commission charges, see, e.g., text at note 397 infra, "dis• 
count brokers" have been able to offer individual investors transaction costs lower than 
the NYSE minimum schedule offers. See N.Y. Times, June 17, 1973, § 3, at 2, cols. 1-8 
(late city ed.). The chairman of Merrill Lynch has stated that his firm would be able 
to offer a straight execution service for individual investors at a lower price under 
negotiated rates than under the current NYSE minimum schedule. See SENATE STUDY, 
supra note I, at 59. However, if individual investors actually receive all of the services 
theoretically included in the fixed commission rates, they will probably pay fees higher 
than those offered by the NYSE minimum schedule. See N.Y. Times, May 28, 1974, 
at 55, cols. 1-3 (late city ed.). 
393. See SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 52. 
394. See Baxter, supra note 16, at 697-703. 
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because economies of scale are limited in the brokerage industry, 
many small firms have higher profit margins than the largest broker-
age house in the country.395 
One key controversy in applying the revised Silver test would 
involve the claim that fixed commission rates promote the high-
quality research essential to wise investing.896 Under fixed rates, 
investors automatically pay a research charge included in the ex-
change member's brokerage commission; under negotiated rates, 
investors would generally purchase research information and execu-
tion services separately.397 According to some experts, this separation 
would lead investors to seek the least expensive execution, regard-
less of the quality of research provided.398 Money managers fear that 
they may be accused of breaching their fiduciary duties to fund bene-
ficiaries by choosing brokers on the basis of research quality as well 
as execution cost.399 But a growing body of evidence supports the 
"random walk theory," which suggests that much securities research 
is worthless.400 The SEC has been approaching the problem of research 
under negotiated rates by formulating explicit rules on best execu-
tion for brokers and money managers.401 So long as research could 
be monitored by specific legal rules, the courts should not permit 
the regulatory benefit argument on research to outweigh the effi-
ciency losses and administrative expenses imposed by fixed com-
mission rates.402 
The other key controversy would involve the claim that fixed 
commission rates preserve the auction market.403 According to the 
NYSE, negotiated rates would eliminate the primary incentive to 
join an exchange, the subsequent reduction in membership would 
decrease the volume of orders in the NYSE, and the lower volume 
would diminish the opportunity for public matches without dealer 
395. See SENATE STUDY, supra note I, ,at 52-53. 
396. See id. at 60; BNA SEc. REG. &: L. REP. No. 279, at AA-6 (Nov. 27, 1974) 
(testimony of James Lorie). 
397. See HouSE STUDY, supra note 7, at 145. 
398. See generally Hearings on S. 3169, supra note 184, at 25 (testimony of SEC 
Chairman William Casey). 
399. See SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 61. 
400. For a review of the empirical data on the random walk theory, see sources 
cited note 210 supra. If the price movements of stocks are random, brokers cannot 
identify securities with superior levels of return and can advise investors only about 
the appropriate diversification of risk. See Cohen, supra note 180, at 1615. 
401. See BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 275, at AA-I to -2 (Oct. 30, 1974). Cf. S. 249, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 24 (1975). 
402. See text at notes 314-17 supra. 
403. See BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 279, at AA-6 (Nov. 27, 1974) (testimony of 
James Lorie). 
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participation.404 However, several other groups of experts main-
tain that members will not flee the NYSE under negotiated rates;40li 
that even if they did, reduced membership would not necessarily 
mean lower order volume;406 and that presently the NYSE floor 
rarely witnesses public matches without dealer participation.407 
If the SEC were to reject the NYSE's argument on preserving the 
auction market, a court would clearly invalidate fixed commission 
rates under the revised Silver test. If the SEC were to accept this 
argument, the court would face a close case. It could appoint experts 
to help analyze the data on fixed rates, and could ask the SEC to 
investigate further the predicted impact of negotiated rates. If the 
result still remained uncertain, the court should consider that fixed 
commissions impose substantial costs not easily avoided by market 
participants in the event of erroneous judicial approval.408 The 
court would therefore be best advised to unfix rates while retaining 
jurisdiction in the event that the alleged regulatory virtues of the 
auction market were seriously impaired.400 
B. The Transition from Negotiated Rates to the Central Market 
When negotiated rates begin, brokerage firms will compete more 
actively to provide the best execution for investors.410 When the 
central communications system is completed, marketplaces will com-
pete more actively to provide the best execution for brokerage 
firms.411 Negotiated rates, however, are slated to begin in May 1975412 
and the central communications system will be operational no earlier 
404. See NYSE, Research Report on Incentives to Exchange Membership in Cen• 
tral Market System [hereinafter NYSE Research Report], reprinted in Hearings on 
S. 2519 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banlling, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 456, 468-74 (1973). 
405. See Hearings on SEC Authority over Third Market Trading Before the Sub• 
comm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess, 9-10 (1974) [hereinafter Hearings on SEC Authority]; Letter from 
Ray Garrett, Jr., SEC Chairman, to Senator Harrison Williams, Dec. 10, 1973, at 9-12, 
406. See I. FRIEND & M. BLUME, supra note 184, at 342-48; Letter from Ray Garrett, 
Jr., supra note 405, at IO. 
407. See note 199 supra. 
408. See text at note 312 supra. 
409. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 381 (1973). 
410. Cf. text at notes 198-202 supra. 
4II. When the central communications system is operational, computer hardware 
will permit brokers to compare price information and to clear trades at all market• 
places. See text at notes 469-72 infra. The SEC also plans to eliminate the regulatory 
barriers to competition among marketplaces in the central communications system, See 
SEC Policy Statement, supra note 18, at 46-64. 
412. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. Il203, supra note 16. 
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than 1977.413 During the transitional period, between the introduc-
tion of negotiated rates and the completion of the central communi-
cations system, brokerage firms without the computer hardware 
needed for systematic shopping among marketplaces will compete for 
investor orders. The Senate has passed legislation giving the SEC 
authority to restrict third-market trading after the elimination of 
fixed rates,414 and both the SEC415 and the Senate416 have proposed 
restrictions on institutional membership. 
I. The Third-Market Bill 
The Senate bill permits the SEC to constrain or prohibit third-
market trading-the trading of exchange-listed stocks on the OTC-
after the introduction· of negotiated rates.417 The SEC may place 
constraints on the OTC when "necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors to restore or maintain 
the fairness and orderliness of the markets for such securities."418 
The SEC may prohibit third-market trading only after finding that 
exchange rules do not "unreasonably" impair the ability of OTC 
dealers to effect stock transactions on exchange floors or to compete 
on equal terms with exchange specialists.419 Any SEC regulation 
affecting the third market would be subject to review in a federal 
court of appeals under the "necessary or appropriate" standard.420 
Because the court will defer to the SEC's findings under the substan-
413. The central tape system is in its pilot stage, and no plan has been approved 
for the central quote and central clearing functions. 
414. See S. 3126, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), which was incorporated into S. 249, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1975) (adding section ll(A)(m) to the 1934 Act); Hearings on 
SEC Authority, supra note 405. The NYSE has asked the SEC to institute administra-
tive measures along the lines of the third market bill. See BNA SEc. REG, & L. REP. 
No. 204, at AA-1 (Dec. 11, 1974). 
415. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1974). 
416. See S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b) (1975) (adding section ll(a)(l) to the 
1934 Act). See also Hearings on S. 1164 and S. 3347 Before the Subcomm. on Securities 
of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1972) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1164 and S. 3347]. 
417. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1975) (adding section 11A(c)(4)(C) to the 
1934 Act). 
418. S, 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1975) (adding section 11A(c)(4)(A) to the 
1934Act). 
419. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1975) (adding section 11A(c)(4)(A) to the 
1934 Act). The Commission must find "that no rule of any national securities exchange 
unreasonably impairs the ability of any dealer to solicit or effect transactions in such 
securities for his own account or unreasonably restricts competition among dealers in 
such securities or betlveen dealers acting in the capacity of market makers who are 
specialists in such securities and such dealers who are not specialists in such securities." 
420. Any SEC rule promulgated under section llA would be subject to direct judi-
cial review in a court of appeals under the substantial evidence rule. S. 249, 94th Cong., 
1st Sess. § 19 (1975) (amending section 25(b)(l) of the 1934 Act). 
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.tial evidence rule, restrictions on the OTC will be difficult to over-
turn as long as the SEC properly protects the record. Any SRO 
following an SEC restriction on third-market trades, however, would 
be subject to an antitrust suit under the Silver "necessity" stan-
dard.421 Thus, the possibility of conflicting decisions still exists under 
the proposed bill. 
In contrast, if Congress enacted the procedures for the revised 
Silver test, an authorized SEC restriction on the third market would 
be subject only to judicial review in a court of appeals, which would 
balance the efficiency losses as presented by the Antitrust Division 
against the regulatory benefits of a third-market restriction as put 
-fonvard by the SEC.422 There is considerable evidence that restric-
tions on the third market would not dramatically alter the allocation 
of small round-lot orders in NYSE stocks among marketplaces. Any 
marketplace can attract orders through economies of scale derived 
from a high volume of orders423 of roughly the same size.42<1 The 
NYSE will most likely be the one to reap these economies of scale 
during the transition period: Many large brokerage firms will prob-
ably continue their current practice of funneling small round-lot 
orders in NYSE stocks to that exchange426 until required to engage 
in comparative shopping through the central communications sys-
tem.426 
Restrictions on trading large blocks of shares in the third market, 
however, would probably produce substantial deviations. from a 
competitive allocation of trades. Market makers in the OTC seem 
to have inherent advantages over exchange specialists in the execu-
421. The Senate Report emphasizes that SEC consideration of competitive factors 
does not preclude de novo review of antitrust claims against SRO conduct even if that 
conduct "has been approved or required by the SEC." NATIONAL MARKET REPORT, 
supra note 163, at II. 
422. See text at notes 302-04 supra. 
423. See R. DOEDE, supra note 324, at 452-53; Baxter, supra note 16, at 708; Dcmsctz, 
supra note 176, at 50. 
424. A high volume of orders generally will reduce transaction costs because there 
will be more perfect matches of public orders and less need for dealer participation, 
Cf. R. WEST & S. TINIC, supra note 178, at 145. If the incoming orders are of very 
different sizes, however, transaction costs will rise because there is a much lower proba• 
bility of perfect matches and a much greater need for dealer participation. Cf. id. 
at 146. 
425. Interview with Neil See, Vice-President of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &: 
Smith, New York City, March 20, 1974. See BNA SEc. REc. &: L. REP. No. 279, at AA-7 
(Nov. 27, 1974) (testimony of Professor Seymour Smidt). 
426. Cf. text at note 411 supra. The only efficiency loss would be the elimination 
of a competitive threat to NYSE specialists. As a 1971 study showed, the entry of 30 
NYSE-listed stocks on NASDAQ led to the reduction of spreads by NYSE speci;ilistn. 
Weeden &: Co. Inter-Office Memorandum, Fred Siesel to Donald E. Weeden, June 8, 
1971 [hereinafter Weeden&: Co. Memo]. 
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tion of very large orders.427. Tied to the exchange floor, specialists 
often cannot match very large orders with other incoming orders 
and may be unwilling to risk a huge percentage of their mm inven-
tories in one trade.428 In the more flexible OTC, market makers can 
search for matches, use lo'wer proportions of their own inventories, 
and negotiate price or size changes among the parties to the trade.429 
A restriction on the third market would also create serious ad-
ministrative problems. Although prices of NYSE-listed stocks easily 
could be removed from the OTC's computerized quote system,430 
elimination of trading in NYSE-listed stocks throughout the rest 
of the OTC would prove more difficult. The. OTC includes about 
4,000 broker-dealers scattered throughout µie country.431 Even if the 
SEC could confine trading in NYSE-listed stocks to the NYSE, the 
absence of competitive checks from the OTC would·require mor~ 
intensive regulation of NYSE specialists-a development that has 
been difficult to achieve in the past.432 
The chairman of the NYSE has maintained that restrictions are 
needed to protect ·investors under negotiated rates.438 According to 
the NYSE, any increase in OTC executions at the expense of the 
exchange will impose higher transaction costs on investors.434 While 
these studies explain why the NYSE will probably continue to. at-
tract many transactions under negotiateq rates, other studies conclude 
that increased · competition among marketplaces under negotiated 
427. AI.though block trading firms of the NYSE now play roles similar to thos~ _of 
market makers in the OTC, they consummate their trades in their "upstairs offices-" 
and .then must bring their trades to the. exchange floor so that the specialist's book 
can be cleared of orders. Thus, the exchange and the specialists Jiave become func-
tionally dispensable in the disposition of many large orders. See Mendelson, Nostalgia 
vs. the Computer: The Issue of Stock Market Reform, 1971 SEc. L,. JlEv. 503, 508-10. 
See also R. WFSr &: S. TINIC, supra note 178, at 218-20; Fiske, Can the Specialist Cofe 
with the Age of Block Trading?, lNsrrtllTIONAL I~oR, Aug. 1969, at 29, 33-34. . 
428. See Mendelson, supra note 427, at 508-10. Cf. R. WFSr &: S. TINIP, sµpi:a ,note 
178, at 217-18. • 
429, "This ability to take a heavy position', ·or ~ neg~tiat~ a large -d~l· o~ an 
agency basis, undoubtedly constitutes the single attribute of the [thi~d] market makers 
most important to their institutional customers." SPECIAL SnlDY, supra note 1, pt. 2, 
at 894-95. · . · , · · · 
430. See generally notes 5-6 supra. 
431. This repr'esents the combined membership of NASD and SECO. See noie 10 
supra. Any broker or dealer is a potential participant in the third market; although 
NYSE Rule 394 effectively bars· third-market trading by NYSE members. See note ·3s4 
supra and accompanying text. - ' 
432, See SENATE STUDY, supra note l, at 183-84. 
433. See Hearings on SEC Authority, supra note 405, at 79-101 (testimony of James 
Ne~dhruµ). The vast majority of third-market stocks are listed on the NYSE. AMEX 
stocks are not traded heavily in the OTC, and the regional exchanges tend to trade 
heavily in NY~E-listed stocks. See SENATE STUDY, supra_ note I,. at 91-93. · ' 
· 434. See N1'.SE Research Report, supra not~ 404, at 503-10. 
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rates would probably offset any deleterious effects on transaction 
costs caused by decreases in NYSE volume.430 Similarly, the NYSE 
argues that the OTC cannot offer investors the greater regulatory 
protection available at exchanges.438 Some of the unique protections 
once afforded by exchanges, however, have been superseded by 
uniform rules for all marketplaces, such as the recent SEC rule on 
short sales.437 Although OTC dealers are not subject to the restric-
tions on market making applied to NYSE specialists, these restrictions 
are needed to regulate the trading monopolies given to specialists.438 
Competition among OTC dealers in the same NYSE stock arguably 
provides as effective a check on market making.439 
Thus, courts applying the revised Silver test should be unrecep-
tive to restrictions on the trading of large blocks of securities by 
institutional investors. Restrictions would seriously distort trading 
efficiency and would create a difficult enforcement problem. Institu-
tional investors that are managed by professionals and possess some 
bargaining power do not appear to need regulatory protection against 
the alleged vagaries of the OTC.440 If the SEC restricts only third-
market trading of small round-lot orders in high-volume stocks,441 
the courts would face a much closer question, because such a restric-
tion would arguably not distort the allocation of trades among 
marketplaces. Before making a decision in the latter case, the court 
should ask the SEC to monitor closely the impact of negotiated rates 
on such orders. If the regulatory concerns of the NYSE materialize, 
the courts should validate the SEC restriction until completion of 
the central communications system, when a new analysis of trading 
patterns would be needed.442 
435. See I. FRIEND &: M. BLUME, supra note 184, at 353-54; R. WESr &: S. TINIC, 
supra note 178, at 162; Weeden&: Co. Memo, supra note 426. 
436. See NYSE Research Report, supra note 404, at 489-92. 
437. 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOa-l (1974). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-15 (1974), requiring 
that all exchanges submit plans for reporting last sale information. 
438. See Hearings on SEC Authority, supra note 405, at 171, 175-77. 
439. Moreover, the SEC has stated that it is planning to require more regulatory 
controls on market making in the OTC. See id. at 178. Compare text at note 432 supra, 
440. The SEC has argued against institutional membersWp precisely because insti-
tutional investors were perceived as having too much power over other market par• 
tidpants. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra note 51. 
441. See, e;g., BNA SEc. REc. &: L. REP. No. 250, at A-16 to -17 (May 1, 1974). 
442. Under the Senate bill, the SEC's authority to restrict third-market trading 
will end when "the Commission has determined that a national market system for 
securities has been established or April 30, 1978, whichever is earlier •••• " S. 249, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1975) (adding section 11A(c)(4)(C) to the 1934 Act). The 
SEC's authority may be extended beyond April 30, 1978, until a national market 
system is established, if the Commission finds that "such extension is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors •••• " But see text 
at notes 420-21 supra. 
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2. Institutional Membership on Exchanges 
The SEC has recently promulgated rule 19b-2, requiring that 
exchange members have "as the principal purpose of [their] mem-
bership" the conduct of a public securities ·business.443 A member 
may satisfy this criterion by executing no more than twenty per cent 
of its transactions for its own account or for "affiliated" accounts.444 
Because the SEC has developed a lengthy statement in support of the 
rule's regulatory goals and has protected the record by considering 
competitive factors,445 it seems unlikely that a court using current 
procedures would overturn the new rule.446 The reviewing court 
must defer to the SEC's conclusions concerning competitive effects 
if those findings are supported by substantial evidence,447 notwith-
standing opposition by the Justice Department.448 While an antitrust 
suit against an SRO adhering to the SEC rule would permit a more 
independent analysis of competitive factors by the court,449 a decision 
against the SRO could conflict with aflirmance of the SEC's rule by 
another court,450 and the award of treble damages would unfairly 
penalize an SRO that had relied on the rule.451 
If the procedures for the revised Silver test were in effect, how-
ever, the SEC's rule would come before only one court, which would 
balance the efficiency losses against regulatory considerations. Under 
negotiated rates, firms would compare the cost of executing their 
own trades with the price charged by brokers. If regulatory restric-
tions are placed on the type of firms that can join exchanges,452 
some efficiency losses will result because a number of firms will be 
paying more for brokerage services than they would for in-house 
execution.453 In addition, restrictions on institutional membership 
443. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2 (1974). 
444. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2(a) (1974). See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
9950, supra note 51, at 82, 83. 
445. See SEC Brief, supra note 98, at 76-88. 
446. See note 98 supra and accompanying text. A regional exchange is appealing 
rule 19b-2, however. _See note 67 supra. 
447. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
448. The Justice Department could argue only that the SEC was applying an in-
correct legal standard to the facts. See text at notes 133-52 supra. 
449. See text at notes 85-89 supra. 
450. One district court has dismissed an antitrust claim involving NYSE member-
ship rules because the SEC was exercising jurisdiction over the subject matter and its 
decision would be subject to direct judicial review. See Robert W. Stark, Jr., Inc. v. 
NYSE, 346 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
451. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text. 
452. The proposed legislation also gives the SEC authority to prohibit trading for 
affiliated accounts on the OTC. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1975) (amending sec-
tion ll(a)(2)(B) of the 1934 Act). · 
453. Some institutional members on exchanges would apparently choose not to re-
main members after the elimination of fixed rates even if they conld negotiate access 
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will impose new administrative expenses, albeit of low magnitude. 
The SEC· might have to apply a control test to the contractual ar-
rangements and informal practices used by excluded firms,4G4 thus 
preventing institutional_ investors from reaping the benefits of ex-
cha,nge membership by other means. 
-- _The prime danger of the institutional membership rule stems 
from the vulnerability of regional exchanges during the period 
between commencement of negotiated rates and the completion of 
the central communications system.m The opportunity for institu-
ti.onal membership is one of the few advantages that the regionals 
enjoy over other marketplaces.456 Negotiated rates will remove the 
incentive for institutional trading on regional exchanges to avoid 
the NYSE minimum commission schedule.467 Active OTC dealers, 
x:ather than passive exchange specialists, probably will handle large 
orders from institutional investors.458 Regionals will have difficult}' 
competing with the NYSE for small round-lot orders because many 
of these orders will be funneled routinely to the NYSE until the 
commencement of the central communications system.459 Regionals 
could pJay an important role once that system is operative, however, 
because brokers would be required to discover the best marketplace 
and _investors would be able to compare executions at different 
to exchange floors. Telephone fo.terview with Frank Romano, chief securities trader 
for National Life Insurance Company of Vermont, an institutional member of the 
PBW Exchange, June 7, 1974, 
; 454. For example, S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1975) (amending section ll(a)(l) 
of the 1934 Act) prohibits any exchange member from trading on the exchange for 
any account "in which it or an associated person thereof exercises investment discre-
tion •.•• " An· "associated person" of a member includes "any person directly or in• 
directly controlling, controlled by, or in common control with such member •• , ," 
$, 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d) (1975). 
Rule 19b-2 presumes that a person who "has a right to participate to the extent 
of more than 25 per cent in the profits of [another] person or owns beneficially, di-
rectly or indirectly, more than 25 per cent of the outstanding securities of [another]" 
controls the other person. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-2(2) (1974). 
455. See BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 280, at F-1 (Dec, 4, · 1974) (testimony of 
E. Wetherill, President of the PBW); BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 278, at G-1 
(N'ov. 20, 1974) (testimony of Michael Tobin, President of the Midwest Stock Exchange). 
456. See Hearings on S. 1164 and S. 3317, supra note 416, at 403-04 (testimony of 
D. Farrar, former Director of the lnstitutional Investor Study); Wetherill & Hender, 
Institutional Membership and the Experience of the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washing• 
ton Stock Exchange, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 1021, 1024-26 (1972), 
457. Urider fixed rates, institutional investors sought exchange membership to re• 
capture commissions. See text at note 879 supra. Some have argued that the fiduciary 
duties of money managers required them to seek exchange membership for their funds. 
See Miller & Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds, 46 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 35, 50-55 (1971). 
458. See text at notes 427-29 supra. 
459. See text at notes 423-26 supra. 
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marketplaces.460 To ensure the survival of regionals as a potentially 
competitive force until the central communications system becomes 
operational, these exchanges need flexibility in allowing institutional 
membership.461 
The SEC has made two regulatory arguments for the rule re-
straining institutional membership. First, it maintains that exchange 
membership furnishes institutional investors with special advantages 
over individual investors through better access to new information 
and to the trading fioor.462 But major studies reveal that the profits 
of most institutional investors have been below market averages,463 
and no study shows that the above-average performance of certain 
funds is attributable to their exchange memberships rather than to 
other attributes of large funds, such as full-time managers. The 
second regulatory argument is stronger: Combining the functions of 
money management and stock brokerage creates conflicts of interest 
injurious to fund beneficiaries and to other customers of the broker-
age firm.464 An institutional manager could "dump" the stock held 
by the fund to help position a large block for another customer; 
alternatively, an institutional manager could urge other customers 
to purchase a flagging stock in the fund's portfolio. 
Application of the revised Silver test would warrant invalidation 
of rule 19b-2 because that rule does not achieve either of its stated 
regulatory benefits.465 The rule does not eliminate the alleged trading 
· advantages of institutional membership because institutional inves-
tors could easily circumvent the twenty per cent criterion by purchas-
ing a brokerage house with a large public business. If institutional 
investors make such purchases in order to become exchange mem-
bers, then conflicts of interest between fund beneficiaries and _public 
customers will multiply.466 •• 
460. See text at notes 410-11 supra. 
461. The regionals have introduced some devices to cope with the threat of nego-
tiated rates before the completion of the central communications system. See BNA 
SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 279, at A-1 (Nov. 27, 1974). 
Another reason to preserve :regional exchanges is that they have been major in-
novators in the recent history of the securities industry. See generally BNA SEC. REG. 
&: L. REP. No. 280, at F-2 (Dec. 4, 1974). 
462. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950, supra note 51, at 114-26. 
To the extent that the SEC's argument against institutional investors is based on ;t 
distributional concern for small investors, the argument is misplaced. The beneficiaries 
of many institutional funds are in the same or lower income brackets· than most 
individual investors. See text at notes 252-60 supra. · 
463. See, e.g., I. FnmND, M. BLUME &: J. CROCKE'IT, MUTUAL FuNDS AND OTHER 
!NsmtmONAL INVESTORS 20, 50-59 (1970). 
464. See SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, _at 75-76. 
465. See text at note 306 supra. 
466. An additional difficulty of rule 19b-2 emerges from an apparently. ai;_bitrary 
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An SEC restriction based on the recent Senate bill concerning 
institutional membership would fare much better. By generally for-
bidding a member to conduct any business on an exchange for its 
own account or that of an affiliated person, 467 the Senate bill more 
adequately responds to the two main regulatory arguments against 
institutional membership than does rule 19b-2. The prohibition on 
trading for one's own account or for "affiliated" accounts would 
eliminate the alleged advantages derived from exchange membership 
by institutional investors, and would decrease the conflicts of interest 
between fund beneficiaries and public customers. If the SEC issued 
a regulation based on the Senate bill after completion of the central 
communications system, it should clearly be validated under the 
revised Silver test because its adverse effects would be minimal. If the 
SEC issued such a regulation during the period between the institu-
tion of negotiated rates and the operation of the central communi-
cations system, however, the danger posed to the survival of regional 
exchanges would complicate the case. The regulation should never-
theless be upheld because the detailed· Senate bill would represent 
an implicit congressional judgment that the regulatory benefits of 
the membership restriction outweigh its costs.468 
C. The Central Communications System: A Case Study 
The SEC has proposed that all existing marketplaces be linked 
by a central communications system.469 This system would provide 
three services: a consolidated tape on last sale information,470 a 
composite report on current quotes,471 and a common clearing net-
work for processing stock transfers.472 While there is a consensus 
distinction in the SEC's definition of "affiliated persons" for the purpose of the 20 per 
cent criterion. The term excludes pension funds managed by brokerage firms, see 
SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 82, but includes pension funds managed by insurance 
companies. This distinction was reportedly inserted at the suggestion of the NYSE, 
whose members frequently manage pension funds. See id. 
467. S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1975) (amending section ll(a) of the 1934 Act). 
The bill contains exceptions for specialists, block positioners, and other securities 
professionals. 
468. See text at notes 309-ll supra. 
469. See SEC Policy Statement, supra note 18; SEC Statement on Future Market 
Structure, supra note 18. 
There have also been discussions concerning development of a central execution 
system that would merge all existing marketplaces into one computer. The central 
computer would be combined with the tape, quote, and clearing functions of the 
central communications system. See Black, Toward a Fully Automated Exchange, 1971 
SEC. L. REv. 540, 550-62; Mendelson, supra note 427, at 512-24. 
470. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9530 (March 8, 1972), [1971-1972 Transfer 
Binder] CCH Fm. SEC. L. REP. 1f 78,600. 
471. See SENATE STUDY, supra note l, at 101-04. 
472. See id. at 39-42. 
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among public officials and industry representatives regarding the 
general desirability of a central market,473 serious debate exists con-
cerning its precise form and management.474 A study of the consoli-
dated tape service-the only segment of the central communications 
system completed thus far475-provides some useful insights into the 
arguments that will probably be made with respect to other aspects of 
the proposal for a central communications system.476 
I. The Current Approach to the Consolidated Tape 
If the goal of the central tape plan were solely to maximize 
competition, the SEC would simply require that all SRO's provide 
last trade information to any firm interested in marketing such 
information and willing to follow the basic format for the tape.477 
Indeed, the SEC originally envisaged precisely this type of arrange-
ment for the production and distribution of the tape among vendors 
of last-trade information.478 The final plan approved by the SEC,479 
473. See id. at 89: "Recent discussion of the market structure of the future has 
reflected virtually unanimous sentiment in favor of a 'central market system.'" 
474. The SEC advocates a system that will retain the existing marketplaces. See 
SEC Statement on Future Market Structure, supra note 18, at 7-8. The NYSE, on the 
other hand, has conceived of the central market in terms of one national exchange. 
See w. MARTIN, THE SECUIUTIES MARKET: A REPORT, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 5-16 
(1971). See generally BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 258 ijune 26, 1974) (Special Supp.). 
475. The central tape began a six-month pilot phase on October 18, 1974. See SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11036 (Oct. 3, 1974), [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. ,r 79,973. While the full tape system was scheduled to be operational on Febru-
ary 21, 1975, completion has been postponed to July 1, 1975. See BNA SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. No. 282, at AA-5 (Dec. 18, 1974). 
476. The SEC has issued a rule on the central quote system, but no plan has yet 
been approved. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10969 (Aug. 14, 1974), 
[Current) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,r 79,931. The SEC has only issued a memorandum 
on the central clearing function. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10631 
(Feb. 7, 1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,I 79,643. 
477. The private vendors would put together various packages of last sale infor-
mation and vie for subscribers on the basis of price and quality of informational ser-
vices. Subscribers would pay only for the package of information best suited to their 
needs, at a competitively determined price. The SEC would have to ensure only that 
the basic format for the central tape was followed by any vendor of last sale informa-
tion. A substantial number of vendors already have an interest in processing and 
distributing data on last trades. See letters in SEC File No. 4-147 from Robert 
Haring, Business News Editor, Associated Press, Sept. 25, 1972: J.T. Lawson, President 
of General Telephone and Electronic Information Systems, Sept. 28, 1972; Milton Mohr, 
President of Scantlin Electronics, Inc., May 4, 1973; Richard Paul, on behalf of In-
stinet, April 6, 1973; Anthony Barnett, Vice-President of Bunker-Ramo, April 6, 1973; 
Dr. A. Kay, President of AUTEX, April 6, 1973; B.V. Borngesser, Systems Manager 
Securities, IBM, March 23, 1973. 
478. See BNA SEc. & REG. L. REP. No. 258, at 7 ijune 26, 1974) (Special Supp.). 
479. After issuing proposed rule 17a-15, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
9530, supra note 470, the SEC began a series of negotiations with the proponents of a 
plan for the central tape, mainly the NYSE and AMEX. See SEC Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 10218 ijune 13, 1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. 
REP. ,r 79,397; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10671 (March 8, 1974), [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 79,700. Finally, the SEC approved the 
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however, stipulates that the central tape will be managed by the 
Securities Industry Automation Corporation (SIAC), a corporation 
owned two thirds by the NYSE and one third by the AMEX.480 The 
SRO's will send the prices of last trades in selected securities only to 
SIAC,481 which will produce a consolidated tape divided into two 
data streams-one for NYSE-listed stocks and one for AMEX-listed 
stocks plus certain other issues.482 SIAC will have the exclusive right 
to sell these data streams on a continuous basis, that is, through the 
ticker tape.483 
The procedures adopted in formulating the plan were ill-suited 
for reconciling competitive and regulatory factors with respect to the 
consolidated tape. While the SEC was advocating the central com-
munications system,484 the SRO's were reaching a deadlock on the 
format for a consolidated tape, the first step in the central market 
plan.485 The SEC therefore issued rule 17a-15,486 mandating that the 
SRO's develop a central tape plan under section 17 of the 1934 Act. 
That section, however, requires submission of written reports by the 
securities industry, and does not clearly envisage construction of a 
computerized information network.487 Moreover, since any central 
plan submitted by the exchanges. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10787 
(May IO, 1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1) 79,782. Since the 
plan was approved, the SEC has ratified a plan amendment relating to NASD rules 
on reporting of market information, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No, 11061 
(Oct. 18, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 38299 (1974); and has issued an amendment to rule 17a-15 
providing for appeals to the Commission on certain matters relating to the tape. SEC 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11097 (Nov. 13, 1974), [Current] CCH FED. SEc. 
L. REP. 1J 80,008. 
480. See PLAN SUBMllTED PURSUANT TO RULE 17a-15 OF SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
Co11rMISSION UNDER SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, §§ IV(a)-(b) (April 22, 1974) 
[hereinafter CENTRAL TAPE PLAN]. 
481. Id. § VII(a). 
482. Id. § V(a). 
483. To obtain the tape, a subscriber will pay a standard yearly fee to the NYSE 
or Al\fEX and agree not to engage in retransmission of the tape. A subscriber who 
wishes to display the tape for its customers will have to rent hardware from private 
vendors. These vendors will be prohibited from retransmitting the ticker tape, although 
they can use the tape as the data base for interrogation services, which provide a sub-
scriber with specific information on particular stocks. Id. § VIII. 
484. See materials cited note 18 supra. 
485. See SENATE STUDY, supra note I, at 97. 
486. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-15 (1974). 
487. Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker or 
dealer who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such 
member, every registered securities association, and every broker or dealer regis-
tered pursuant to section 15 of this title, shall make, keep, and preserve for such 
periods, such accounts, correspondence, memoranda, papers, books, and other rec-
ords, and make such reports, as the Commission by its rules and regulations may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970). 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(8) (1970), permits the 
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market threatens the NYSE's dominance, and the central tape jeopar-
dizes about fourteen million dollars of its annual profits,~88 the NYSE 
successfully threatened to delay the start of the central market by 
challenging the consolidated tape unless· sIAC was made the exclu-
sive processor.489 
The SEC formulated the central tape plan through negotiations 
with the NYSE,490 which are continuing on related regulatory mat-
ters.491 The SEC did not hold a hearing on rule 17a-15, although it 
did invite comments from interested parties.492 Nor did it accept 
comments by the Senate Subcommittee on Securities,493 the Justice 
Department,494 or its 01vn advisory committee495 advocating that• a 
neutral body manage the consolidated tape to avoid discrimination 
among competing marketplaces. The SEC did not investigate ade-
quately the need to organize tape production and distribution 
SEC to alter or supplement exchange rules relating to ticker tapes. Use of its authority 
under this section would have left the SEC plan less vulnerable to challenge. Appar-
ently the SEC avoided this strategy because the procedures required under section 
19(b) were considered too time-consuming. This conclusion was confirmed by personal 
interviews in Washington, D.C., with Barry Levine, SEC .Branch Chief, Market Struc-
ture, Division of Market Regulation, April 9, 1974; Robert Lewis, Assistant Director 
of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation, April 3, 1974; John Liftin, then Associate 
Director of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation, March 8, 1974 [hereinafter Inter-
,iews]. The weakness of the SEC's position under section 17, however, led to three 
years of negotiations between the SEC and the NYSE. See notes 490-91 infra and 
accompanying text. 
488. See Letter from Jay Rosen, GTE Information Systems, to John Liftin, SEC 
Associate Director, Division of Market Regulation, Feb. 1, 1973. 
489. Wall St. J., Dec. 20, 1972, at 8, col. 2 (eastern ed.). 
490. For a history of the negotiations between the SEC and the NYSE leading to 
the approval of the central tape plan, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Releases Nos. 
10218, 10671, supra note 479. After agreement was reached between the SEC, the NYSE, 
and the AMEX, the NYSE solicited the support of several regional exchanges, which 
acquiesced because they, like the SEC, wanted the central market to start as soon as 
possible. See, e.g., Letter of Michael Tobin, President of the Midwest Stock Exchange, 
to J. Bradford Cook, SEC Chairman, March 1, 1973. The NYSE never asked some re-
gional exchanges, such as the Boston Stock Exchange, to agree to the central tape plan. 
See BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 258, at 8 Gune 26, 1974) (Special Supp.). 
491. Although the consolidated tape is now in its pilot phase, the SEC is faced 
with another round of negotiations before the full consolidated tape plan can begin. 
The SEC issued a uniform rule for short-selling on transactions reported via the con-
solidated tape, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11030 (Sept. 27, 1974), [Cur-
rent] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 79,971, but it has been forced to suspend the effectiveness 
of this rule, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11056 (Oct. 17, 1974), [Current] 
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 79,984, because of criticisms leveled by the NYSE. See BNA 
SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 273, at D-1 (Oct. 16, 1974) (NYSE letter to the SEC). 
492. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9530, supra note 470. The written 
comments are contained in SEC File No. 4-147. 
493. See SENATE STUDY, supra note 1, at 100. 
494. See Comments on Proposed Rule 17a-15 by Thomas A. Kauper, Assistant At-
torney General, Department of Justice, at 7-9 (Sept. 29, 1972). 
495. ADVISORY CoMMITrEE ON MARKET DISCLOSURE ON A COMPOSITE REPORTING SYS-
TEM, REPORT TO THE SEC Guly 17, 1972), reprinted in BNA SEC. REG. &: L. REP. No. 161, 
at E-1 (July 19, 1972). 
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through a monopoly; nor did it grapple with the problem of setting 
rates for a tape monopolist, which will put the SEC in the position 
of a public utility commission.496 Moreover, the SEC asked the NYSE 
for a position paper explaining the main regulatory arguments in 
defense of SIAC's exclusive role, and adopted many of the NYSE's 
arguments as its own.497 
2. An Alternative Approach to the Consolidated Tape 
If the revised Silver test were in effect, the SEC would have fol-
lowed very different procedures in formulating a tape plan. It first 
would have held public hearings in which the Justice Department 
probably would have criticized the plan's anticompetitive aspects. I£ 
the SEC did not change the plan in response to these criticisms, the 
Justice Department could have begun its own proceedings to assess 
the plan's efficiency aspects.498 If the Justice Department found that 
the plan was anticompetitive, it would have been in a strong position 
to bargain with the SEC, and the latter could have used the Justice 
Department's opposition as leverage in its negotiations with the 
NYSE.499 If the SEC still supported SIAC as the exclusive processor 
and distributor of the tape, private vendors could have employed the 
adverse findings by the Justice Department in appealing the SEC's 
decision. The appellate court would have balanced the efficiency 
loss and administrative expense of the tape plan against its regulatory 
virtues. 
a. Efficiency loss and administrative expense. By granting SIAC 
a monopoly in processing and distributing the consolidated tape, the 
plan eliminates the checks on performance that competition might 
otherwise provide. The plan does not even permit bidding for the 
right to run the tape monopoly, which would impose some competi-
tive restraint.600 On the contrary, the plan presents the NYSE and 
AMEX with ample opportunities to use SIAC's monopoly power 
against competing marketplaces.501 Similarly, the plan gives the own-
496. See text at notes 518-21 infra. These conclusions were confirmed during Inter-
views, supra note 487. 
497. See text at notes 523-32 infra. Compare Letter from the NYSE and AMEX to 
the SEC, June 1, 1973, with SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10671, supra 
note 479. 
498. See text at notes 292-93 supra. 
499. See text at note 296 supra. 
500. See generally Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J. LAW &: EcoN. 55 (1968), 
501. For a survey of the critiques by other marketplaces leveled at the selection of 
SIAC as tape processor, see BNA SEc, REG. &: L. REP. No. 258, at 7-9 CTune 26, 1974) 
(Special Supp.). The NYSE and AMEX must approve subscribers to the tape who 
were not previously subscribers to the NYSE or AMEX tapes, see CENTRAL TAPE PLAN, 
supra note 480, § VIII(d), and SIAC has the right to charge regional exchanges or the 
NASD the cost of running the tape after trading hours end in New York City, Id, 
§ X(b). 
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ers of SIAC considerable leverage over potential competitors in the 
business of supplying last sale information.502 The SEC's designation 
of SIAC as the central tape processor will also create serious barriers 
to achieving an efficient organization of the tw-o future communica-
tions functions (the central quote reporter and the common clearing 
network). SIAC recently argued that it should run the central quote 
reporter to reap the efficiency advantages gained through its role as 
tape processor.503 If the SEC gives SIAC the central quote function 
without competitive bidding, however, it will be impossible to ascer-
tain whether SIAC in fact is the most efficient choice.504 Even if the 
SEC takes competitive bids on the central quote function, . SIAC 
could potentially make the lowest bid by hiding costs for the central 
quote function in its prices for the central tape function, which are 
set on a cost-plus basis.505 
Instead of imposing competitive checks on the central tape func-
tion, the plan establishes a new regulatory body-the Consolidated 
Tape Association (CTA)-to supervise SIAC's operations.506 The 
initial governing board of the CT A has eight voting members-two 
from the NYSE, two from the AMEX, and one from each of the four 
other participating SRO's.507 Since the affirmative vote of at least five 
of the eight members is required for any action, 508 CT A action may 
be effectively blocked by the NYSE and· AMEX-the owners of 
SIAC. In addition, any SRO reporting fifty-one per cent or more of 
the transactions on either data stream has a veto over any amendment 
to the plan.500 This provision virtually assures that the NYSE and 
AMEX may combine to veto any amendment to the plan in the near 
future.510 
502. In general, the plan gives SIAC a monopoly over the distribution of the tape 
on a continuous basis, but does not prevent SIAC from competing with private firms 
in the interrogation business. Such competition might give rise to many of the issues 
raised by the recent suit against American Telephone & Telegraph, which has an 
approved monopoly over telephones but is seeking to expand into related fields in 
competition with private firms. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 6 (late city ed.). 
503. See BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. No. 263, at A-5 O'uly 31, 1974) (remarks of 
Robert Hall, SIAC chairman). 
504. The NASD, for example, has gained relevant experience in running a com-
puterized quote system for the OTC. See BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 273, at A-4 
(Oct. 16, 1974). 
505. Cf. Invin & McKee, Vertical Integration and the Communications Industry, 
53 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 446, 448-49 (1968); Tribing, Common Carrier Regulation-The 
Silent Crisis, 34 LAw & CoNTEMl'. PROB. 299, 314-16 (1969). 
506. See CENTRAL TAFE PLAN, supra note 480, §§ lll(a), IV(a). 
507. See id., Exhibit A, art. III, § 1 (articles of association). 
508. See id. § IIl(a). 
509. See id. § III(b). 
510. While the plan permits the distribution of voting and veto power to change 
over time, any change is unlikely before completion of the central communications 
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During·the first five years of the tape's operation, the CTA is 
empowered to hold SIAC accountable for the tape expenditures.m 
According to the fiscal structure of the plan, if SIAC can keep costs 
about one million dollars below revenues, the NYSE and AMEX 
will receive all of the profits from the consolidated tape for this time 
period.1'12 Verification of SIAC's cost figures will be a difficult task, 
as illustrated by the American experience with public utilities and 
defense contracts.613 The CTA will face especially complex problems 
in determining costs for the central tape because SIAC performs all 
of the computer work for the NYSE and AMEX, including the de-
velopment of other central market functions. 614 After five years, the 
CTA theoretically can end SIAC's monopoly over the ticker tape.616 
As demonstrated by the FCC's practice with respect to renewals of 
licenses, however, an incumbent monopolist can bring to its defense 
a well-developed group of political supporters, as well as claims based 
on investments made in reliance on its continued franchise.610 In 
system. The plan would give another SRO two seats on the board and a veto over 
amendments if it reported the majority of transactions on either data stream. Id., 
Exhibit A, art, ill, § I. However, the plan does not allow any changes in the board 
until five years after the central tape has been fully operative. Id. The plan designates 
one data stream for NYSE-listed stocks only, id. § V(a)(i), thus giving the NYSE a 
tremendous advantage over all other SRO's as far as reporting a majority of the trans-
actions on this stream. The plan weights the second stream heavily in favor of the 
AMEX, because all AMEX-listed stocks are automatically admitted to this stream, in 
contrast to stocks listed on other marketplaces, which must be individually approved 
by each marketplace. Id. §§ VI(a), (d), (e). 
!HI. Id. § IV(d). 
512. The plan provides that any yearly revenues from the tape will first cover 
SIAC's operating costs. If there is any revenue remaining, during the first five years 
the NYSE will receive the first SI.12 million from one data stream and the A:MEX will 
receive the first $200,000 from the other data stream. Any remaining revenue will be 
split among all SRO's, according to the proportion of transactions they reported. Id. 
§§ XI(a), (b). Therefore, if profits from the tape are less than $1.32 million above 
costs, the NYSE and AMEX will receive all profits. The justification for this allocation 
is that _partial reimbursement should be made for developmental costs. Id. These al-
locations could total about S6 million over the five-year period. However, the total 
developmental cost for the central tape processor is estimated at $1.5 million. Francis 
Palamara, Chairman of the CTA, Press Release at I (Aug. I, 1974) (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review). 
513. See generally THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (P. MacAvoy ed. 
1970). The CTA will have to find a comparable source of price data, select a proper rate 
of interest, and engage in debates concerning original versus replacement costs. See 
generally R. POSNER, supra note 213, at 142-49. 
514. The books of SIAC will be audited by "a firm of independent public accoun-
tants (which may be the firm regularly employed by NYSE or the Processor) •••• " 
CENTRAL TAPE PLAN, supra note 480, § XI(a)(iv). For a critique of such "independent" 
advice by outside professionals in another context, sec Bishop, Sitting Ducks and De• 
coy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 
77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1080 (1968). 
515. See CENTRAL TAPE PLAN, supra note 480, §§ IV(d), (e). 
516. See Green 8: Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the 
Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 880 (1973). 
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particular, the review procedures written into the central tape plan 
ensure the stability of SIAC's position. Before CTA can consider bids 
from any potential competitors, a majority of the board must vote 
that SIAC "has failed to perform its functions in a reasonably accept-
able manner in accordance with the provisions of the Plan or that its 
reimbursable expenses have become excessive and are not justified 
on a cost basis."517 
b. Regulatory arguments. The SEC could argue that one entity 
should serve as tape processor and distributor because the consoli-
dated tape is a natural monopoly. Average costs of a natural monop-
oly decline throughout the range of effective demand, so that a single 
firm can supply the entire output demanded at a lower cost than 
could several firms.518 Such monopolies may occur when entrance 
into an industry requires a firm to expend large sums on fixed costs, 
although thereafter the marginal cost of producing any unit is mini-
mal. 519 The only possible natural monopoly would be in the produc-
tion rather than the distribution of the consolidated tape, however. 
After a firm incurred the fixed costs of collecting and sequencing last-
sale data from all stock markets, the marginal cost of producing the 
tape for any one customer might be close to zero. 520 If one firm were 
given a regulated monopoly in producing the tape and could divide 
production costs among all vendors, competition could still exist 
·with respect to the distribution of the tape.521 
The SEC could also argue for one entity because everyone should 
rely on the same historical record of stock transactions.522 Tapes ·with 
different sequences could cause confusion, for instance, in the valu-
ation of securities at the time of death for estate purposes. But, to 
the extent that this regulatory argument is valid, it might be achieved 
by having one tape processor rather than one tape distributor. 
Even if the case for giving some aspects of the tape production 
and distribution process entirely to one entity were persuasive, it 
would not justify the SEC's approval of SIAC without competitive 
517. CENTRAL TAPE PLAN, supra note 480, § IV(d). Rejection of SIAC on any other 
grounds can be effected only through an amendment to the tape plan. Id. § IV(e). 
Since the owners of SIAC have veto power on amendments to the plan, see text at 
notes 509-10 supra, an amendment is unlikely to pass. 
518. R. PosNER, supra note 213, at 139-41. 
519. Id. 
520. Note that the SEC has not made any empirical investigation of cost curves. 
See text at note 496 supra. 
521. Vendors already compete with respect to display devices, the main fixed dis-
tribution cost. See also note 483 supra. While communication lines might be consid-
ered a fixed cost of tape distribution, these lines have already been built by the 
telephone company and can be leased at a standard tariff by any tape distributor, 
522. Interviews, supra note 487. 
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bidding. The main defense of SIAC's preferential position is con-
tained in the SEC's arguments for granting SIAC the exclusive right 
to sell continuous tape transmissions. The first argument is that SIAC 
would be the only reliable processor and distributor of the consoli-
dated tape: The SEC feared that independent vendors would not 
have the incentive to provide the back-up capacity necessary to ensure 
that the ticker tapes will continue to run even if the primary system 
breaks down.523 However, the SEC could ensure that independent 
vendors include a back-up system by making it a specification in the 
competitive bidding process. It would then be possible to determine 
whether SIAC could run the tape with a back-up system less expen-
sively than other firms. Furthermore, rather than inducing reliability 
by holding SIAC responsible for breakdown or error, the central tape 
plan indemnifies SIAC for "any liability, loss, claim, cost, damage or 
expense incurred or threatened as a result of the last sale price 
furnished to" SIAC and transmitted to tape users.624 
The second argument is that SIAC would be more amenable to 
regulatory directives from the SEC than any private firm. "[A]s an 
exchange facility," the SEC has argued, SIAC is "directly subject to 
Commission oversight," while the "principal obligation of the inde-
pendent vendors is to serve the interests of their shareholders rather 
than to promote fair and orderly markets and to protect investors.''u2u 
The exchanges obviously do not share this view of the SEC's au-
thority: The NYSE and AMEX, for instance, have rejected the SEC's 
contention that it has the power to amend the central tape plan. u2o 
On the other hand, the SEC itself has recognized that the proposed 
legislation would give it direct regulatory authority over stock market 
tape processors.527 Alternatively, the SEC could subject any tape 
monopolist to its authority by requiring certain contract provisions 
in the bidding specifications. Either method would probably give the 
Commission more regulatory authority over the tape monopolist than 
it now has over SIAC. 
523. "Currently, the exchanges provide extensive back-up systems for their tapes to 
ensure these tapes will continue to run even if there is a breakdown in the primary 
- system. It is not clear that the interest of the independent vendors in uninterrupted 
service would be sufficiently great to justify the expense involved in developing such a 
back-up capability." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10671, supra note 479, 
at 83,879. 
524. CENTRAL TAPE PLAN, supra note 480, § IV(c). 
525. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10671, supra note 479, at 83,879. 
526. See id. at 83,876; Letter from James Needham, Chairman of the NYSE, to 
Raymond Garrett, Chairman of the SEC, Aug. IO, 1973, at 13-14. 
527, See SEC Securities and Exchange Act Release No. 10671, mpra note 479, at 
83,879; S. 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1975). 
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The SEC's :final argument is that SIAC should run the tape monop-
oly because since 1968 the NYSE has charged uniform rates for ticker 
services regardless of actual cost differences among geographic loca-
tions. 528 In contrast, private firms _might "find it more profitable to 
concentrate their efforts in high-volume metropolitan centers and 
either discontinue service to more remote areas or charge a fee more 
commensurate with the costs involved in providing such service."529 
The SEC's rule 17a-15, however, does not prohibit SIAC from charg-
ing differential rates, although it permits SIAC to require all private 
vendors to charge uniform rates.530 Under this rule, it is possible that 
SIAC would revert to the NYSE's pre-1968 policy of price differences 
for the tape service and that private vendors would be forced to sell 
interrogation services at geographically uniform prices.531 In addi-
tion, the technological basis for the SEC's argument on uniform 
pricing is rapidly becoming obsolete. While the traditional system of 
sending the ticker tape via Western Union lines has varying costs 
among regions, advances in multi-packet switching are starting to 
eliminate price differences based on geographical location.532 
Thus, the efficiency losses and administrative problems imposed 
by the central tape plan may decisively outweigh its regulatory bene-
fits. Even viewed as a close case, the plan could be invalidated under 
the revised Silver test. The SEC has no specific guidelines from Con-
gress on the organization of the tape,533 and the structure of the CTA 
does not permit easy correction of erroneous judicial approval534 in 
an area of rapidly changing technology. By invalidating the plan, the 
court would force the SEC to revamp the consolidated tape proposal 
along more competitive lines, under the procedural protections of 
the new test. 
528. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10671, supra note 479, at 83,879. 
529. Id. 
530. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-15(f) (1974). 
531. Before 1952, Western Union handled the tape for the NYSE and charged dif-
ferential rates based on costs. Between 1952 and 1968, the NYSE ran its own service 
and rented lines from Western Union. The NYSE divided the nation into zones ac-
cording to distance from New York City and charged a different rate for each zone. 
See Letter from the NYSE and AMEX to the SEC, June 1, 1973. 
532. The FCC has recently approved the application of Telenet, Inc., to provide 
terminal-computer and computer-computer communications utilizing packet-switching. 
See In the Matter of the Application of Telenet Communications Corporation, File 
No. P~8780 (April 16, 1974). Telenet charges per packet of information, irrespective 
of distance traveled or location. Telenet, Public Packet Switching Networks 11-12 
(March 8, 1974). 
533. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)(8); 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(8) 
(1970); text at notes 309-11 supra. 
534. See generally text at note 313. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has presented an alternative to the current jurisdic-
tional approach to resolving the tension between competition and 
regulation in the securities industry. Under the jurisdictional ap-
proach, the court hides substantive issues behind a facade of forum 
selection. Under the revised Silver test, the court would deal explic-
itly with the economic issues raised by restrictions on stock transac-
tions. Under the jurisdictional approach, the- court chooses between 
one procedure favoring competition and another favoring regulation. 
Under the revised Silver test, the court would follow only one proce-
dure that permits opposing parties to present findings on roughly 
equal footing. Under the jurisdictional approach, the court must 
award either injunctive relief against the SEC or treble damages 
against an SRO for harms already imposed by regulatory restrictions. 
Under the revised Silver test, the court would determine the validity 
of such restrictions before they give rise to claims for money damages. 
While this alternative was developed for the securities industry, 
it may be relevant in other areas. The tension between competition 
and regulation has become a matter of great concern in most regu-
lated industries, 535 yet the general line of precedents under the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction is confused.536 By examining the impact 
on competition of governmental intervention in each regulated 
industry, it would be possible to delineate the relevant categories of 
empirical data under a decisional rule analogous to the revised Silver 
test.537 Appropriate presumptions against certain types of regulatory 
restrictions could be established, such as the presumption against SEC 
regulations geared to distributional concerns.538 Disputes could then 
be resolved in one forum in which the agency with a bureaucratic 
interest in the particular industry would battle the Justice Depart-
ment as the advocate of competition for the entire economy.639 
535. See generally THE CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY CoMIIUSSIONS, supra note 513. 
Legislative proposals have recently been made to establish an independent commission 
to study reforms of agencies that regulate private industries. See BNA SEC. REC. &: L. 
REP. No. 279, at A-7 (Nov. 27, 1974). 
536. See note 29 supra. 
537. According to Thomas Kauper, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, the 
Antitrust Division has begun such an analysis of the anticompetitive effects of various 
agency actions. See BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 279, at A-9 (Nov. 27, 1974), 
538. See text at notes 252-69 supra. 
539. See, for example, the recent battle between the CAB and the Justice Depart-
ment over minimum rates for chartered flights, as illustrated in Comments and Al-
ternative Motion for Hearing of the United States Department of Justice on Proposed 
Regulation 14 C.F.R. § 399.45, CAB Docket No. 25875 (Nov. 2, 1973); CAB, Statement 
of General Policy: Minimum Charter Rate Level, Order 74-12-40, CAB Docket No. 
25875 (Dec. II, 1974) (denying Justice Department's motion for stay and dismissing 
its petition). 
